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Abstract
This thesis contributes in several ways to the theoretical literature that studies 
regionalism.
First, this thesis investigates whether there are incentives for a regional trading bloc to 
enlarge through further extensions of its membership, or to reject new membership 
requests. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model where the incentives for a regional 
trading bloc to enlarge and for third countries to join are formalised, and the 
enlargement of the bloc is endogenously determined by the interaction between supply 
of, and demand for membership. Furthermore, this analytical set-up is used to assess 
how deeper integration among the members of a regional trading bloc affects the 
equilibrium size of the bloc.
Second, this thesis studies the incentives for a country to enter a regional trade 
agreement when a multilateral free trade agreement is available, and the implications of 
the choice of regionalism for the incentives to pursue subsequent multilateral trade 
liberalisation. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model that formalises a country's choice 
between entering a regional trade agreement or a multilateral free trade agreement, 
depicted as alternative trade policy options. Also this analytical framework is used to 
assess how a country's choice to enter the regional trade agreement affects its incentives 
to liberalise trade multilaterally.
Third, this thesis studies the trade effects of deeper integration among the members of 
a regional trading bloc, and the impact of economic dissimilarities on the identified 
trade effects. Chapter 4 develops a general equilibrium model which formalises the 
trade effects of the formation of a currency union among the members of a regional 
trading bloc, and of the subsequent enlargement of the currency union to include an 
economically dissimilar country. Furthermore, this analytical framework is used to 
assess how economic dissimilarities between the members of the currency union and 
the accession country affect the magnitude of the trade effects that would follow the 
enlargement
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid spread of regional trade agreements, often referred to as regionalism, is one 
of the most relevant recent developments the global trading system.
Notably, since 1990 more than 250 regional trade agreements have been notified to 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the World Trade Organization, and 
nearly every country in the world is currently a member of one or more regional trade 
agreements.
This recent spread of regionalism had a significant impact on economic research 
shifting the focus of the analysis from the welfare effects of regionalism to the so-called 
“dynamic” time-path effect of regionalism, that is whether regionalism provides an 
impetus to, or detract from the multilateral non-discriminatory freeing of trade.1,2
This thesis contributes to the theoretical literature that investigates regionalism 
and its dynamic time-path effect, and its focus, as suggested by its title, is threefold.3
1See Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999) for a useful survey and formal discussion of the theoretical 
contributions that investigated the “static” welfare effects of regional trade agreements.
2 Bhagwati (1991) introduced the notion of the dynamic time-path of regionalism. Notably in his 
seminal contribution he posed the question of whether regional trading blocs are “building blocs” or 
“stumbling blocs” toward the multilateral freeing of trade. See also Frankel (1997), Bhagwati (1999), 
and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999) for a discussion of the dynamic-time path question.
3In this thesis, as in most of the recent theoretical literature, the notion of regionalism, or regional 
trade agreements, is used as a synonymous of preferential trade agreements. In a stricter interpretation, 
regionalism only refers to those preferential trade agreements formed among countries belonging to a 
geographic “region”.
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First, this thesis contributes to the literature by developing a theoretical model 
that formalises the incentives for a regional trading bloc to enlarge, and depicts its 
enlargement as the endogenous outcome of the interaction between supply of, and 
demand for membership.
The question of whether an inherent dynamic in regional trade agreements exists 
which would lead to larger regional trading blocs thus promoting global free trade has 
dominated the recent debate on regionalism.4
In this regard, the literature has focused on the incentives for third countries to 
join a regional trading bloc showing that these incentives become greater as a regional 
trading blocs become larger, a phenomenon labelled as “domino” effect of regionalism.5
However, whether a growing demand for membership will be accompanied by re­
gional trading blocs’ willingness to admit new members has not been addressed so far 
in the existing literature.
Notably, theoretical contributions have so far assumed that any country asking for 
membership in a regional trading bloc would be admitted to it.6
As a main contribution to the literature, this thesis addresses in Chapter 2 the 
question of whether there are incentives for a regional trading bloc to enlarge through 
further extensions of its membership, or to reject new membership requests.
Thus, we develop a theoretical model where the incentives for a regional trading 
bloc to enlarge, and for third countries to join are formalized, and the enlargement 
of the bloc is the endogenously determined by the interaction between supply of, and 
demand for membership.
Our theoretical model is the first in the literature to formalize the supply of mem­
bership of a regional trading bloc by analysing the scheme of incentives that underpin 
members’ decision on whether to accept or reject third countries’ membership requests.
4 In this thesis, we refer to regional trade agreements and regional trading blocs as synonyms.
5 Baldwin (1995) provided a formal analysis of the “domino” effect of regionalism. We refer the 
reader to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of Baldwin (1995).
6 See Chapter 2 for a survey of the theoretical contributions that have investigated the enlargement 
of regional trading blocs.
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In addition, our model is the first in the literature to portray the enlargement of a 
regional trading bloc as determined by the interaction of the supply of, and demand 
for membership.
Assuming a political economy approach k la Grossman-Helpman (1994), we show 
that in a regional trading bloc pro and anti-enlargement forces exist, and the policy­
maker’s decision on whether to enlarge the bloc or not is a political equilibrium that 
balances these opposing forces.
The analysis we provide in Chapter 2 points out that due to the interaction between 
pro- and anti-enlargement forces, a maximum size of the regional trading bloc exists 
beyond which it will not enlarge further, labelled as the supply-side implied maximum 
size of the bloc.
In fact, we show that the regional policy-maker will prevent the enlargement of the 
regional trading bloc beyond this maximum size to avoid a loss in the political support 
it receives.
In addition, our analysis emphasizes that the enlargement of a regional trading 
bloc endogenously arises from the interaction between the supply of, and demand for 
membership.
When the size of a regional trading bloc is smaller than its supply-side implied 
maximum size, the bloc will enlarge in the event of a request for new membership 
from third countries. However, once the regional trading bloc has reached the supply- 
side implied maximum size, the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further 
enlarge the bloc by admitting new members, and any request of membership from 
third countries will be refused.
Thus, we derive that the equilibrium size of a regional trading bloc as jointly 
determined by the supply of membership of the bloc, and demand for membership 
from third countries.
In this regard, we point out that the equilibrium size of a regional trading bloc 
cannot exceed the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc since once a bloc has 
reached its maximum size, the supply-side of membership will be binding on further
10
enlargements.
We also show that the supply-side implied maximum size of a regional trading 
bloc might not be reached if the requests for membership from third countries are not 
“numerous” enough.
The equilibrium size of a regional trading bloc might then be smaller than the 
maximum size that the regional policy-maker would be willing to achieve if the demand- 
side of membership is binding on further enlargements of the regional trading bloc.
Furthermore, we investigate in Chapter 2 how deeper integration among the mem­
bers of a regional trading bloc affects the equilibrium size of the bloc.
Our analysis shows that deeper integration reduces the supply-side implied maxi­
mum size of the bloc while it boosts the demand of membership from third countries.
We emphasize that the implications of deeper integration on the equilibrium size 
of the regional trading bloc depend on whether the supply-side or the demand-side of 
membership are binding in the determination of the equilibrium size of the bloc.
Second, the thesis contributes to the literature by developing a theoretical model 
that formalizes the incentives underpinning a country’s choice to enter a regional trade 
agreement rather than multilateral free trade agreement, and the implications of this 
choice for the country’ incentives to pursue subsequent multilateral trade liberalisation.
The most recent theoretical studies in the debate on whether regionalism would 
lead to broader multilateral trade liberalisation have focused on how entering a regional 
trade agreement may affect a country’s incentives to liberalise trade multilaterally.7
As a main contribution to the literature, this thesis addresses in Chapter 3 the 
question of which axe incentives for a country to enter a regional trade agreement 
when the option of entering a multilateral agreement leading to free trade is available.
Thus, we build a theoretical model in which a regional trade agreement and a mul­
tilateral free trade agreement are formalized as alternative options of trade policy, and
7 See Chapter 3 for a survey of the theoretical contributions that have investigated the implications 
of regional trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalisation.
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we formalise the policy-maker’s choice between the two alternative trade agreements.
The analysis we develop in Chapter 3 points out that a policy-maker’s decision to 
enter a regional trade agreement rather than a multilateral free trade agreement is a 
choice of political economy driven by the presence of distortions in the policy-making 
process.
Assuming a political economy approach h la Grossman-Helpman (1994), we show 
that pro- and anti-regionalism forces exist, and the policy-maker’s choice is a political 
equilibrium that balances these contrasting forces.
Notably, taking into account the interaction between pro- and anti-regionalism 
forces, we derive a condition under which a political support-maximizer policy-maker 
chooses to enter a regional trade agreement rather than a multilateral agreement lead­
ing to free trade.
Furthermore, drawing on the developed theoretical framework, in Chapter 3 we 
investigate the implications of a country’s initial choice to enter a regional trade agree­
ment for the country’s incentives to pursue further multilateral trade liberalization.
Our analysis shows that when a country chooses to enter a regional trade agreement, 
subsequent multilateral liberalisation will no longer be pursued since the incumbent 
policy-maker will have no incentives to move from the status quo.
We emphasize that in our theoretical framework where the policy-maker balances 
industrial interests and net aggregate social welfare in order to choose its trade policy, 
regionalism unambiguously undermines multilateral trade liberalization.
Third, this thesis contributes to the literature by developing a theoretical model 
that formalises the trade effects of deeper integration among the members of a re­
gional trading bloc, and the impact of economic dissimilarities on the magnitude of 
the identified trade effects.
Regional agreements have become increasingly ambitious in terms of their depth as 
recently shown by the members of the European Union adopting a common currency.
Thus, we develop in Chapter 4 a general equilibrium model which formalises the 
trade effects of the formation of a currency union among the members of a regional
12
trading bloc, and of its subsequent enlargement toward an economically dissimilar 
country.8
Furthermore, we use our theoretical framework to assess the implication of eco­
nomic dissimilarities between the original members of a currency union and an acces­
sion country on the magnitude of the trade effects that would follow the enlargement 
of the currency union.
Notably, our analysis is inspired by the formation of the European Monetary Union, 
and its envisaged enlargement to the economically dissimilar Eastern European acces­
sion countries.
Thus, in Chapter 4 we build a three-country intra-industry trade model in which 
economic dissimilarities across countries exist, and sharing a common currency affects 
the patterns of trade via the elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different 
currencies, and a general equilibrium induced effect on relative wages across countries.
We use our theoretical model to analyse the effects of the formation of a currency 
union between the members of a regional trading bloc on the volume of bilateral trade 
realised between member countries, and between any of the members and the non­
member country.
Our analysis shows that the formation of the currency union affects countries’ 
patterns of trade via the elimination of intra-bloc transaction costs thus reducing intra­
bloc trade costs, and a general equilibrium induced reduction of the relative wage in 
the non-member country.
Thus, we prove that the formation of a currency union between the members of a 
regional trading bloc unambiguously increases the volume of bilateral trade between 
the members, and it reduces the volume of bilateral trade between any member and 
the non-member country.
We analyse, then, the impact of the enlargement of the currency union toward an 
economically dissimilar country on the volume of bilateral trade realised between any
8 See Chapter 4 for a detailed survey of the studies that have investigated the impact of sharing a 
common currency on trade.
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original member and the accession country, and between the original members.
In this regard, we show that the enlargement of the currency union affects on the 
patterns of trade through the elimination of extra-bloc transaction costs thus reducing 
extra-bloc trade costs, and a general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country.
Our analysis proves that the enlargement of the currency union toward an economi­
cally dissimilar country unambiguously increases the volume of bilateral trade between 
the original members and the accession country, and reduces the volume of bilateral 
trade between the original member countries.
Furthermore, in Chapter 4 we draw on our theoretical framework to investigate how 
greater economic dissimilarities between the members of the currency union and the 
accession country affect the magnitude of the trade effects fostered by the enlargement 
of the currency union.
Simulating our model, we show that the more economically dissimilar is the acces­
sion country compared to the original members, the lower is the gain in the volume of 
bilateral trade between any original member and the accession country following the 
enlargement.
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Chapter 2
W ill a Regional Bloc Expand?
2.1 Introduction
The new wave of regionalism experienced since the 1990s and the growing number 
of regional trade agreements clearly indicate that countries are inclined to liberalize 
within a subset of countries thus leading to regional trade agreements.1
This unprecedented and worldwide spread of regionalism had a significant impact 
on economic research, stimulating a buoyant debate which concentrated on the analy­
sis of whether regionalism would build in favour of, or operate against the goal of 
multilateralism.2
This chapter contributes to the literature by addressing the question of whether 
there are incentives for a regional trading bloc to expand through further extensions of 
its membership, or to keep stagnant in terms of its size by rejecting new membership 
requests.3
This issue is crucial for the ongoing “regionalism versus multilateralism” debate 
since a regional trading bloc which enlarges through further extensions of its member­
1 Since 1990 more than 250 new regional trade agreements are reported to have been notified to the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the World Trade Organization.
2See Winters (1996), and Baldwin and Venables (1997) for useful surveys of the literature in the 
“regionalism versus multilateralism” debate.
3 We refer to the number of countries that are members of the regional trading bloc as the “size” 
of the bloc.
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ship may be thought as contributing toward the multilateral freeing of trade.
On the other hand a regional trading bloc which does not expand, and remains 
stagnant in terms of size, may be conceived as leading to the fragmentation of the 
worldwide economy.
The theoretical contributions that have investigated the enlargement of regional 
trading blocs have adopted two fundamentally different approaches.
One strand of the literature has depicted the expansion of a regional trading bloc 
as exogenously determined focusing on the implications of the enlargement on social 
welfare. Thus, in his seminal contribution Krugman (1991) showed that in a world 
divided into symmetric trading blocs, a symmetric exogenous increase in the absolute 
size of the blocs may reduce the world welfare. Later, Bond and Syropolus (1996), 
generalizing Krugman (1991) taking into account the existence of comparative advan­
tages, showed that an exogenous increase in the size of trading blocs may increase 
world welfare.
A second strand of the literature has instead modelled the enlargement of a regional 
trading bloc as endogenously determined. In this context, the main contribution is 
Baldwin (1995) who focused on the demand-side of the enlargement process, and pro­
vided a formal analysis of the incentives of non-members countries to join a regional 
trading bloc.4
A major shortcoming of Baldwin (1995) is that while the incentives of non-members 
countries to enter a regional bloc are formalised, the supply of membership of a regional 
trading bloc is assumed to be perfectly elastic.
As a result, Baldwin (1995) formalises the enlargement of a regional trading bloc 
as uniquely demand-determined since any country asking for membership would be 
admitted to the bloc.
This seems strongly counter factual since regional blocs appear to be “closed clubs” 
in which member countries decide whether or not a new country should be admitted,
4 Recently, Alesina et al. (2005) investigated the related but different issue of the enlargement of 
an international political union modelled as a group of countries deciding together the provision of 
certain public goods and policies because of spillovers.
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as pointed out by the recent experience of the enlargement of the European Union.
We propose a model in which both the incentives for a regional trading bloc to 
enlarge, and for third countries to join, are formalized such that the enlargement of 
the bloc endogenously arises from the process of interaction between the supply of, 
and the demand for membership.
We emphasize that our analysis is the first theoretical contribution to model the 
supply-side of membership of a regional trading bloc by formalising the scheme of 
incentives that underpin members’ decisions to accept or reject third countries’ mem­
bership requests.
Our work is also the first contribution to formalise the enlargement of a regional 
trading bloc as endogenously determined by the interaction of the supply of, and 
demand for membership.
Assuming a political economy approach & la Grossman-Helpman (1994), we show 
that pro and anti-enlargement forces operate in a regional trading bloc such that the 
final decision of the regional policy-maker is a political equilibrium that balances these 
contrasting forces.
Focusing on the supply of membership of the regional trading bloc, we emphasise 
that a maximum size of the bloc exists due to the interaction between pro and anti­
enlargement forces, as well as the existence of distortions in the policy-making process.
In fact, the regional policy-maker will prevent the enlargement of the regional 
trading bloc beyond this maximum size to avoid a loss in the political support it 
receives.
In addition, we show that the enlargement of the regional trading bloc is the en­
dogenous outcome of the interaction between the supply of membership arising from 
the bloc and the demand for membership arising from third countries.
Thus, if the size of the regional trading bloc is smaller than the supply-side implied 
maximum size, the bloc will enlarge in the event of a request for membership from 
third countries.
However, once the regional trading bloc has reached the supply-side implied maxi­
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mum size, the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further enlarge the bloc such 
that any eventual request of membership from third countries will not be accepted.
As a result, we show that the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc is jointly 
determined by the supply of and demand for membership such that it can not exceed 
but could be smaller than the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc.
First, we show that the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc can not exceed 
the supply-side maximum size since once this size has been reached, the supply-side of 
membership will be binding on further enlargements in case of a request for membership 
from third countries.
However, while the supply-side determines the existence of a maximum size beyond 
which the regional trading bloc will not further enlarge, the demand-side implies that 
the maximum size of the bloc might not be reached in the equilibrium.
In fact, we show that the equilibrium size of the bloc might be smaller than the 
maximum size that the regional policy-maker would be willing to achieve if the requests 
for membership are not “numerous” enough. Thus, the demand-side of membership 
might be binding on further enlargements of the regional trading bloc, preventing it 
from reaching the maximum size that the regional policy-maker would be willing to 
achieve.
Finally, we use our theoretical framework to investigate how deeper integration 
among the members of a regional trading bloc affects the equilibrium size of the bloc.
Our analysis shows that deeper integration contracts the supply of membership 
reducing the maximum size of the bloc that the regional policy-maker is willing to 
achieve, while it boosts the demand of membership from third countries through a 
“domino” effect & la Baldwin (1995).
We show that the implications of deeper integration on the equilibrium size of a 
regional trading bloc are, in general, ambiguous and crucially depend on whether the 
supply-side or the demand-side are binding in the determination of the equilibrium 
size of the bloc.
We note that our results on the implications of deeper integration on the equilibrium
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size of a regional trading bloc differ from Baldwin (1995) where deeper integration 
unambiguously lead to wider integration by boosting the requests for membership in 
the bloc.
In fact, in our framework where the supply-side of membership is formalised, deeper 
integration among the members of a regional trading bloc affects both the supply of, 
and the demand for membership in regional bloc.
2.2 The basic model
We consider that the world economy is constituted by g countries, h of which are 
members of a regional trading bloc.5
In order to simplify our framework to investigate whether a regional trading bloc 
would enlarge or not, we assume that the regional trading bloc is unique in the world 
economy, and we rule out the possibility of formation of other regional trading blocs.
Therefore, we consider that the countries which are not members of the bloc, la­
belled as third countries, may ask for membership in the regional trading bloc but can 
not organize in any alternative form of preferential trade agreement.
We assume that all countries are symmetric, and each country is characterized by 
the existence of a manufacturing sector and an agricultural sector.
The manufacturing sector is characterized by differentiated products, increasing re­
turns to scale and imperfect competition, while in the agricultural sector a homogenous 
product, constant returns to scale and perfect competition exist.
In order to capture a feature of real economies, we consider that in each country
5 In this chapter we aim to investigate the enlargement of a regional trading bloc as the endogenous 
outcome of the interaction between the supply of, and the demand for membership, as well as the 
equilibrium size of the bloc. However, the theoretical framework we develop in this chapter can also 
be used to formalise the formation of the regional trading bloc in the first place, once we consider that 
none of the countries is initially in the regional trading bloc, that is h =  0. At this regard, please also 
see footnote 32.
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there axe two different classes of agents, that is labourers and firm owners, whose 
preferences, labelled as UL and UF, respectively, are given by:
(2.1)
v f  = (2.2)
where
1
.  t
Thus, we consider that consumers have a love for variety, and c* indicates the 
consumption of variety i of manufactured good.
The elasticity of substitution between any two manufactured varieties is represented 
by a and is greater than one while the preference parameters are such that 0 < A < 1 
and 0 < <f> < l.6
Specifically we consider that labourers’ incomes derive from the labour they provide 
to firms while firm owners’ incomes only derive from firms profits.
Focusing on technology, we assume that in the manufacturing sector the labor input 
requirement for a typical manufactured variety is given by:
of any country is given and equal to k such that new entry is ruled out, and each 
manufacturing firm is sufficiently small in the market to treat market aggregates as
h =  ol + (3xi with a  and (3 > 0 (2.3)
where Xi is the output of variety i and a  is a fixed cost.
We consider that the number of active firms operating in the manufacturing sector
6 The assumption of different parameters in labourers’ and firm owners’ utility functions allows to 
capture the real world’s feature that different groups of agents show different tastes over the same 
range of available goods. However, we note that our final results would not be affected if we assumed 
the same parameters in labourers’ and firm owners’ utility functions.
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exogenous.7,8
In order to simplify our framework we consider that there is no possibility of relo­
cation for manufacturing firms and that each firm is wholly owned by the residents of 
the country in which it is located.
We also assume that in the agricultural sector the production function is linearly 
homogenous, the market structure is perfectly competitive and units of the agricultural 
good are chosen such that the unit labour coefficient is unity.
Finally, focusing on international flows of goods, we assume that trade in manu­
factured varieties is costly while trade in the agricultural good is costless.9
We consider that “iceberg” trade costs exist such that shipping manufactured va­
rieties between any two countries melts a fraction of the shipment. However, no trade 
costs are assumed to apply on domestic sales of manufactured varieties.
We point out that the crucial aspect of trade costs is that they are assumed to be 
lower for flows of manufactured varieties arising between countries that are members 
of the regional trading bloc rather than for all other trade in manufactured goods.
Thus, we consider that all international trade in manufactured varieties that arises 
between countries within the regional trading bloc requires \i > 1 units to be shipped 
for every unit sold.
On the other hand, all international trade in manufactured varieties that does not 
arise within the regional trading bloc is assumed to require r  > 1 units to be shipped 
for every unit sold, where r  > //.
Therefore, in our framework the main advantage for a country to be a member 
of the regional trading bloc consists in having access to lower trade costs on trade in
7 Market behavior in the manufacturing sector is then like monopolistic competition but without 
free entry. See Baldwin (1995), and Desrouelle and Richardson (1997) for a similar approach.
8 Ruling out new entry in the manufacturing sector guarantees that firms have positive profits that 
can be used in lobbying activities. Alternatively, we could use a framework with free entry and the 
existence of specific factor of production owned by firm owners. In this case even if firms’ profits would 
be zero, firm owners would have a positive income to be used in lobbying activities.
9 See the seminal work of Krugman (1979) for a formal analysis in which international trade in man­
ufactured goods is explained by the existence of increasing returns to scale and product differentiation.
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manufacturing goods with other member countries.
2.3 The equilibrium
In order to derive the equilibrium for the representative member country and the 
representative third country, we first focus on two generic countries j  and i.
Due to the assumption of costless trade in the agricultural good, the equilibrium 
wage in all countries will be equalized as long as the agricultural good is produced in 
any country, which is assumed henceforth.10
Taking labour as the numeraire, the wage perceived by labourers in any of the g 
countries will be equal to unity. Since we assumed that labourers’ incomes only derive 
from the labour provided to firms, carefully choosing the units with which to measure 
national workforce, the aggregate income of labourers located in country j ,  labelled as 
E f ,  is:
E f  = 1 (2.4)
Furthermore, given the assumption that firms’ owners income derive only from firm 
profits and that k manufacturing firms operate in any country, the aggregate income
of firm owners located in country j ,  labelled as E?,  is:
E f  = kllj (2.5)
where IIj indicates the profits earned by a typical manufacturing firm located in 
country j.
Given that all varieties enter consumers’ demand symmetrically, and assuming the
10The non-full-specialisation (NFS) condition requires that no country has enough labour to sat­
isfy the world demand for the agricultural good, i.e. that the world spending on this good is 
larger than the maximum value of its production that is possible in any of the countries. Given 
that the g countries are assumed to be economically symmetric, the NFS condition requires that 
g • [(1 — A) • E l +  (1 — 0) • E f ] >  pa - L, which is assumed to hold henceforth.
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cost of introducing a new manufactured variety to be zero, no two firms will produce 
the same variety.
As a result, in equilibrium there will be only one firm in any country that produces 
a given manufactured variety, and no duplication will arise across countries with each 
country specialised in the production of its own range of varieties.
In addition, having assumed the same manufacturing technology across firms and 
across countries, all varieties produced will be symmetric and have the same equilib­
rium price.
Since we assumed that when manufactured goods are shipped between different 
countries they will incur iceberg trade costs, we denote the mill or f.o.b price of a 
typical manufactured variety produced in country j  as pj.
We label as Tji the amount dispatched per unit received if a manufactured variety 
is shipped from country j  to country i, with Tji > 1.
The iceberg transport technology implies that if the manufactured variety produced 
in country j  is sold at price pj, the delivered or c.i.f. price at the consumption location 
i is given by:
Pji — Pj ’ Tji
Given that k symmetric manufactured varieties are produced in any country, the 
manufactured composite price index faced by consumers located in country i is:
J =1
Notably, due to the asymmetric nature of the trade costs, the manufacturing com­
posite price index may assume different values in different countries.
of the equilibrium demand patterns, we assume (f> to be zero and A to be strictly between
9
(2.6)
Focusing on consumers’ utility maximization, in order to simplify the computations
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unity and zero.11
Therefore, given the shape of preferences, and the unitary nature of labourers’ 
income, the equilibrium consumption demand in country i for any manufactured variety 
produced in country j  is given by:
i
Thus, the aggregate demand of the manufacturing composite good in country i is:
C f  =  A  (2.8)
Finally, given the shape of preferences and the income of labourers and firms own­
ers’, the aggregate demand for the agricultural good in country i is:
q 4 =  -1 ~ ^  t  (2.9)
PA
where pa is the price of the agricultural good A, and 11* indicates the profits earned 
by a typical manufacturing firm in country i.
Turning to the supply, we firstly observe that since the agricultural sector is as­
sumed to be perfectly competitive, the price of the agricultural good will reflect its 
marginal cost.
Since we chose units of good A  such that the labor input coefficient is unitary, and
we took labour as numeraire, the price of the agricultural good A  in any country is:
PA =  1
Focusing on the manufacturing sector, the typical profit-maximising firm located 
in country j  faces an isoelastic demand curve expressed in equation (2.7).
However, if equation (2.7) expresses the consumption demand in country i for any 
manufactured variety produced in country j ,  due to the existence of trade costs, in
11 Our final results would not change if we assumed <f> to be strictly between zero and one.
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order to supply this amount of consumption, Tji times this amount has to be shipped.
Thus, if we sum up across countries in which manufactured varieties produced in 
country j  is sold, the total sales of the typical manufacturing firm located in country 
j , denoted by Xjt is:
i=l "\
Assuming that each profit-maximising manufacturing firm sets its price taking the 
price index Pi as given, the equilibrium mill or f.o.b. price for any variety produced in 
country j  is a constant mark-up over the marginal cost given by:
Vi = -^ zy P  (2.11)
We note that in any of the g countries, profit-maximising manufacturing firms will 
charge the same f.o.b. price, expressed in equation (2.11), for all sales regardless of 
destination.
Furthermore, assuming that the manufactured goods are measured in units cho­
sen so that the unit input coefficient (3 just equals a j  (a — 1), in the equilibrium all 
manufacturing firms will charge the same unitary price.
We observe that, given the constant demand elasticity and the equilibrium f.o.b. 
price, the equilibrium profits (gross of fixed costs) of any manufacturing firm are equal 
to 1/a times sales.
Thus, given equations (2.10) and (2.11), the equilibrium profits of the typical man­
ufacturing firm located in country j  are:
< * *t=l i
Taking into account the asymmetric nature of trade costs on trade in manufactured 
goods, we can derive the equilibrium for the representative country member of the 
regional trading bloc and the representative third country.
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First, we note that delivered prices or c.i.f. prices paid by consumers for manufac­
turing varieties will vary depending on consumers’ location.
Thus, consumers located in the representative member country will pay a price fj, 
for any unit of manufactured variety produced in the regional trading bloc, and a price 
r  for any unit of manufactured variety produced in any of the third countries.
On the other hand, consumers located in the representative third country will pay 
a price r  for any unit of manufactured variety produced in any other country, either 
member or third country.
Given equation (2.6), the manufacturing composite index price faced by consumers 
located in the representative member country and in the representative third country, 
labelled as P r  and Pjv, respectively, are:
PR =  [fc +  k ■ (h -  1) • p (1_<T) + k - ( g - h ) -  r ' 1-" )]1=7 (2.13)
PN = [fc +  k ■ (g -  1) • t (1-<7)] ^  (2.14)
It follows that, given equations (2.8), (2.13) and (2.14), the equilibrium aggre­
gate consumption of the manufacturing composite good in the representative member
country and in the representative third country, labelled as Cj(  and C f f , respectively, 
are:
C% = A  (2.15)
C* = ' h  ( 2 ' 1 6 )
Given equations (2.9), (2.13) and (2.14), the aggregate demand for the agricultural 
good in the representative member country and in the representative third country, 
labelled as and respectively, are:
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= (i -  A) +  fen* (2.17)
cfi = (1 -  A) + H IW (2.18)
Finally, given equations (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14), the equilibrium profits earned by 
any manufacturing firm located in representative member country and in the repre­
sentative third country, labelled as II# and IItv, respectively, axe:
n #  =  -G Pr _1) +  (/» — !)• • Pr ~1} + (9 -  h) ■ r il~a)' PN _1)] (2.19)
I I j v  =  ^  • [P<T-1) +  h  ■ r * 1- ^  • p £ _ 1 )  +  (g -  h  -  1 )  • T { l ~ a) ■ P ] f _ 1 ) ]  (2.20)
2.4 The supply-side o f membership
In this section we formalise the regional trading bloc’s supply of membership focusing 
on the scheme of incentives underpinning the regional policy-maker’s choice between 
accepting or rejecting third countries’ membership requests.
Notably, we analyse the supply of membership of the regional trading bloc under 
the simplifying assumption that the regional policy-maker considers the demand for 
membership from third countries as perfectly elastic, that is as if any third country is 
willing to enter the bloc.
The assumption of a perfectly elastic demand of membership will be then relaxed 
in section 2.6 where we will formalise the interaction between the supply-side and 
demand-side of membership in determining the equilibrium size of the regional trading 
bloc, and show how the demand-side of membership might be binding on further 
enlargements of the bloc.
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To date the main contribution on the analysis of the endogenously determined 
enlargement of regional trading blocs is Baldwin (1995) who assumed that the supply 
of membership of a regional trading bloc is perfectly elastic.
However, Baldwin’s assumption that any country that asks for membership of a 
regional trading bloc will be admitted appears to be counter factual. In fact, regional 
trading blocs seem to be “closed clubs” in which member countries decide whether 
or not a new country should be admitted as shown by the recent experience of the 
enlargement of the European Union.
Thus, we propose a more realistic framework where in the event of a third country’s 
request for membership, the regional trading bloc chooses whether to admit it or not.12
At this regard, we assume that decisions are centralized in the regional trading bloc 
such that a regional policy-maker exists.13
We consider that two different trade policy options are open to the regional policy­
maker, that is to enlarge the bloc by admitting a third country or not to enlarge thus 
refusing the new membership request.
Notably, we investigate the decision of the regional policy-maker regarding a “mar­
ginal” enlargement of the regional trading bloc, that is an enlargement that would 
increase the size of the regional bloc by one additional member country.14
Relying on the pressure group model by Grossman and Helpman (1994), we con­
sider that the regional policy-maker shapes its trade policy taking into account not 
only regional aggregate well-being but also the political contributions provided by an 
organised interest group which participates in the political process in order to influence 
policy outcomes.15
12 We assume that the eventual choice of the regional policy-maker to admit a country in the bloc 
is irreversible such that once a third country is admitted into the regional trading bloc it can not be 
forced to leave it later on.
13 This modelling choice is suggested by the existence of centralised political organs in the European 
Union.
14 Our theoretical framework could be extended to investigate the choice of the regional policy-maker 
to enlarge the regional trading bloc by admitting more than one new member.
15 Grossman and Helpman (1994) investigated the structure of protection that emerges when many 
interest groups simultaneously attempt to “buy” protection by offering political contributions to an 
incumbent policy-maker’s in order to influence his choice of trade policy. Recently, a number of
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Thus, we assume that the regional policy-maker trades off the political contribu­
tions that would come from heeding the lobby’s interests against the reduction in 
regional aggregate social welfare that would follow the implementation of a socially 
costly trade policy.16
We assume that all manufacturing firms located in the regional trading bloc are 
organized in a unique interest group or lobby group that offers a schedule of contingent 
(implicit) donations to the regional policy-maker to affect its choice of trade policy.17
Thus, the organized industrial lobby specifies donation contracts or “contribution 
schedules” that stipulate how large a donation will be made for each of the two possible 
stances of trade policy open to the regional policy-maker.
Notably, the organised interest group tailors its contribution schedule to maximise 
the total welfare of its members, net of contributions.
The game is in two stages: in the first stage, donation contracts axe announced 
by the organized interest group to the policy-maker while in the second stage the 
policy-maker sets the trade policy and collects the donations.
Political contributions paid by the organized interest group to the policy-maker 
are then ex-post, that is they are paid after the policy-maker has chosen whether to 
enlarge or not.
The incumbent regional policy-maker will decide whether to enlarge the regional 
trading bloc or not with the aim of maximizing the political support it will receive.18
studies have provided empirical evidence in support of the Grossman and Helpman’s political economy 
approach to the formation of trade policy. At this regard see Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Mitra et al. (2002), Eicher and Osang (2002), McCalman (2004), and 
Gawande and Krishna (2005).
16Grossman and Helpman (1994) noted that an incumbent policy-maker may make trade policy 
choices while being aware that its decisions may affect its chances for re-election. Thus, a policy­
maker may value political contributions since they can be used to finance campaign spending, and 
aggregate social welfare since voters are more likely to reelect a government which has delivered a 
high standard of living. In this chapter, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we do not explicitly 
formalise the existence of an electoral process. At this regard, see Grossman and Helpman (1996) for 
a model with electoral competition where interest groups may use campaign contributions to influence 
the outcome of the election, and the competing parties’ platforms.
17 We rule out the possibility for the interest group to offer donations to third countries’ governments.
18 See Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a detailed survey of alternative political economy ap­
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We consider that the political support received by the regional policy-maker de­
pends positively on the amount of political contributions received from the organized 
interest group.19
In addition, the political support received by the incumbent regional policy-maker 
depends positively on the level of the aggregate social welfare, net of contributions, 
achieved in the regional trading bloc as a whole.20
We define the objective function of the regional policy-maker as the weighted sum 
of the total amount of political contributions received from the organized interest 
group and the aggregate social welfare reached in the regional trading bloc, net of 
contributions.
Labelling as D the political contribution that the regional policy-maker receives 
from the lobby group, and as W  the net aggregate social welfare reached in the regional 
trading bloc, the objective function of the regional policy-maker may be expressed as:
G = a -D  + ( l - a ) - W  (2.21)
where a is a parameter that lies in the range [0 , 1], and measures the extent of the 
political distortion in the policy-making process in the regional trading bloc.
Thus, when the parameter a is equal to zero the regional policy-maker will behave 
like a social welfare maximiser. On the other hand, the closer is the value of the 
parameter a to one, the greater is the degree of political distortion since the greater 
is the weight that the interests of manufacturing firms receive in the policy-making 
process.
The regional policy-maker will achieve different levels of political support depending 
on whether it decides to enlarge the regional trading bloc or not since the amount of 
political contributions received and the level of regional aggregate social welfare will 
depend on the chosen stance of trade policy.
proaches to the formation of trade policy.
19 We assume that consumers are not organised in any form of interest group.
20 We rule out the possibility of side-payments paid to the regional policy-maker by organised interest 
groups located in the third countries.
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In the following we investigate the implications of the two alternative options of 
trade policy open to the policy-maker on the amount of political contributions it would 
receive, and on the level of net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in the 
regional trading bloc.
2.4.1 Lobbying: pro or anti-enlargement force?
First, we focus on the organized interest group and we investigate whether the indus­
trial lobbying activity constitutes a pro or anti-enlargement force.
We emphasized previously that the organized industrial lobby specifies a contribu­
tion schedule which stipulates how large a donation will be made for each of the two 
possible stances of trade policy open to the regional policy-maker.21
The interest group’s contribution schedule will then comprise two items, D e n l  
and Dn o n , which are the political contributions associated with the regional policy­
maker’s choice to marginally enlarge the bloc or not to enlarge, respectively.
Notably, it will never be optimal for the interest group to specify a positive con­
tribution for both policy outcomes since then it could cut back equally on both of its 
offers without affecting the regional policy-maker’s decision, and also since it will not 
wish to give the policy-maker an incentive to choose the trade policy outcome that it 
is contrary to the lobby’s interests.
Following Grossman-Helpman (1994) we restrict the contribution schedule speci­
fied by the organized interest group to be “truthful” in the Bernheim-Whinston (1986) 
specification such that the contribution schedule everywhere reflects the true prefer­
ences of the interest group.
The assumption of “truthful” donation contracts implies that the contingent con­
tribution schedule specified by the interest group will assume a specific form.
The interest group will, in fact, pay to the regional policy-maker for any trade policy
21 In our analysis we rule out the possibility for the interest group to offer contributions to foreign 
governments. See Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a similar 
approach.
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the excess, if any, of the lobby’s gross welfare, reached under the specified stance of 
trade policy, relative to some optimally chosen base level of welfare.
Having assumed that the organized interest group is constituted by firm owners 
located within the regional trading bloc, the gross aggregate welfare of the group, 
labelled as V F, is the sum of the gross indirect utility reached by firms owners located 
in the regional trading bloc.
Thus, restricting political contributions to be non-negative, a truthful contribution 
function can be formally expressed as:
D = max [o, — s i
where the organised interest group will choose B  as such as to satisfy the voluntary 
participation constraint of the regional policy-maker.
The truthful contribution function evidences that the organised interest group’s 
net welfare will be equal to B  whenever the group makes a positive contribution to 
the regional policy-maker. The interest group will then wish to make B  as large as 
possible but without inducing the regional policy-maker to choose a policy outcome 
which is damaging to the group’s interests.
Since only one organised interest group operates in the bloc, the interaction be­
tween the regional policy-maker and the industrial lobby configures as a principal-agent 
problem such that the regional policy-maker’s voluntary participation constraint can 
be used to derive the lobby’s choice of B  in equilibrium.22
The interest group will choose B  in order to make the regional policy-maker just 
indifferent between heeding the lobby’s interests regarding whether to enlarge or not, 
and the policy outcome that the regional policy-maker would implement in absence of 
any contributions, that is the socially optimal choice of trade policy.
Since the interest group will lobby for the stance of trade policy that implies the
22 See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the derivation of the lobby’s choice of B  in equilibrium 
when different organised interest groups compete for protection in a common agency framework.
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greater level of the group’s gross welfare, we compare the gross welfare that interest 
group will achieve if the regional policy-maker decided to marginally enlarge the bloc 
or, alternatively, not to.
The gross aggregate welfare that the organised interest group would achieve if the 
policy-maker decided to marginally enlarge the regional trading bloc or not to, labelled 
as V£NL and VfiON, respectively, are23:
(2.22)
VpiON = kh^-NON (2.23)
where Henl and TInon indicate, respectively, the profits that would be earned by 
any manufacturing firm in the bloc if the policy-maker decided to enlarge the bloc or 
not to enlarge.
Having assumed the contribution schedule to be truthful, and given equations (2.22) 
and (2.23), it follows that the political contributions that the interest group would 
offer to the regional policy-maker for the two alternative stances of trade policy can 
be expressed as:
D e n l  = max [0, khllENL — B] (2.24)
D n o n  = max [0 , khU^oN ~ B\ (2.25)
As pointed out by equations (2.22) and (2.23), the organised interest group will
lobby in favour of the stance of trade policy that implies the greater level of aggregate
profits earned by manufacturing firms located in the regional trading bloc.
Thus, given the symmetric nature of manufacturing firms, to evaluate whether 
the organized interest group constitutes a pro or anti-enlargement force in the policy­
23 Having assumed that <f> is equal to zero, firm owners will only consume the agricultural good in 
the equilibrium.
Vrnl — khUENL
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making process, we compare the profits that would be earned by a typical manufac­
turing firm located in the regional trading bloc under the two alternative stances of 
trade policy.
The profits that would be earned by any manufacturing firm located in the re­
gional trading bloc if the regional policy-maker chose to marginally enlarge or not to, 
respectively, are:
n  e n l  =  -  a Prnl  +  + (g -  h -  1) ■ (2.26)
IIjvojv =  £  • [ i T 1 +  (* “  1) • P°r 1 +  (»-/> ) (2.27)
where P n  is expressed in equation (2.14) and P e n l  is given by:
P b n l  =  [k + k - h - +  k ( g - h -  1) • r '1- ^ ] ^  (2.28)
If the regional policy-maker chooses to marginally enlarge, a manufacturing firm 
located in the regional trading bloc would face different effects in the three markets 
where it operates, that is the local market, the regional bloc market, and the third 
countries’ market.
First, if the regional trading bloc marginally enlarged, the manufacturing firm 
would face greater competition in its local market since the price local consumers 
would pay for any manufactured varieties produced in the new member country would 
decrease from r  to fi.
Thus, due to a substitution effect, local consumers would reduce their consumption 
of the locally produced manufactured varieties such that any manufacturing firm would 
experience an unambiguous reduction in profits on its local market.
Focusing on the regional bloc market, we note that the manufacturing firm would
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experience greater competition since the price consumers located in the original mem­
ber countries would face for any variety produced in the new member country would 
be reduced from r  to p,.
On the other hand, since the size of the regional bloc market would increase from 
(h — 1) to h, the manufacturing firm would enjoy an enlarged regional bloc market. 
As a result, the price paid for the firm’s own variety by consumers located in the 
new member country would decrease from r  to p such that they will increase their 
consumption of the firm’s own variety.
We emphasize that the outlined effects would have opposing implications on the 
profits earned by the manufacturing firm on the regional bloc market since, while the 
competition-effect would reduce firm’s profit, the market-size effect would increase it.
Finally, the manufacturing firm would experience an unambiguous reduction in the 
amount of profits earned in the third countries’ market since the size of this market 
would contract from (g — h) to (g — h — 1).
Taking into account the profit implications on the three different markets where 
the manufacturing firm operates, we can investigate the effect of the policy-maker’s 
eventual choice of marginally enlarging the regional trading bloc on the firm’s overall 
amount of profits.
At this regard, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition  1 A size of the regional trading bloc, labelled as h, exists that maximizes 
the profits earned by any manufacturing firm located in the regional trading bloc.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix for proof. ■
Thus a marginal enlargement of the regional trading bloc could be either profit- 
enhancing or profit-reducing for firms located within the bloc depending on the initial 
size of the bloc.
If the initial size of the bloc is smaller than the size that maximizes manufacturing 
firms’ profits, the policy-maker’s choice of marginally enlarging the bloc would imply
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a greater amount of aggregate profits for manufacturing firms located in the bloc than 
the alternative choice of not to enlarge.
On the other hand, if the initial size of the bloc is greater than or equal to the size 
that maximizes manufacturing firms’ profits, the policy-maker’s choice of enlarging the 
bloc would imply a lower amount of aggregate manufacturing profits than the choice 
of not to enlarge.
We can then draw some important conclusions concerning the lobbying activity 
realised by the organised interest group, and state the following corollary:
Corollary 2 The organized interest group is a pro-enlargement force if  the size of the 
regional trading bloc is such that h < h while it is an anti-enlargment force if h >  h.
We underline that the organized industrial interest group may act either as a pro­
enlargement or anti-enlargement force in the policy-making process depending on the 
initial size of the bloc.
When the size of the bloc is lower than h, the interest group represents a pro- 
enlargement force since this choice of trade policy would imply a greater level of the 
group’s gross welfare.
However, the organised interest group will effectively contribute in equilibrium 
only if its own interests are in conflict with the trade policy outcome that the regional 
policy-maker’s would choose in absence of any political contributions.
Thus, for any size of the bloc lower than h , since the lobby’s preferred policy 
outcome coincides with the socially optimal outcome, the interest group will then 
contribute nothing in equilibrium, and the trade policy outcome would be as if firm 
owners were politically unorganized.
On the other hand, when the initial size of the regional bloc is equal to or higher 
than /i, the organized interest group constitutes an anti-enlargement force, since this 
choice of trade policy would imply a greater level of the group’s gross welfare.
It follows that, for any size of the bloc equal to or higher than h, insofar as the 
lobby’s interests are in conflict with the socially optimal policy outcome, the organised
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interest group will offer a positive contribution to the regional policy-maker if it chooses 
not to enlarge, and a zero contribution otherwise.
2.4.2 Aggregate welfare: a proenlargem ent force
In this section we investigate the implications of the regional policy-maker’s choice on 
the level of aggregate welfare, net of contributions, reached in the regional trading bloc 
as a whole.
Thus, we compare the level of net aggregate social welfare that would be reached 
under the two alternative stance of trade policy open to the regional policy-maker.
We define the net aggregate social welfare at the regional level as the gross aggregate 
welfare reached in the regional trading bloc as a whole less the amount of donations 
that the organized interest group pays to the regional policy-maker.
The gross aggregate social welfare in the regional trading bloc as a whole is defined 
as the sum of the gross aggregate social welfare reached in any of the member countries.
Notably, the gross aggregate welfare in any member country is defined in a “utili­
tarian” way, that is as the sum of the indirect utilities reached by the different agents 
in the economy.
Since we assumed that in any country two different groups of agents exist, the gross 
aggregate social welfare in any member country is given by the sum of the aggregate 
indirect utility of labourers and the aggregate indirect utility, gross of contributions, 
of firm owners.
We recall that equations (2.22) and (2.23) express the gross indirect utility that 
would be reached by firm owners’ located in regional trading bloc under the two alter­
native stances of trade policy open to the regional policy-maker.
Furthermore, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the indirect utility that 
labourers would reach if the policy-maker decided to marginally enlarge the regional 
trading bloc or not to, labelled as VEENL and VE NON, respectively, are:
Vr ,e n l  — (1  “  • A A • P Ex L
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V r .n o n  =  ( 1  -  A ) (1~ A) ■ A A ■ P n x
As shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the gross aggregate social welfare that 
would be achieved in the regional trading bloc if the regional policy-maker decided 
to marginally enlarge or, alternatively, not to enlarge, labelled as W e n l  and W jv o n ,  
respectively, are:
W e n l  = h-  Aa (1 -  A)(1~a) • P ^ l  +  khnENL (2.29)
W n o n  = h • Aa (1 -  A)(1- a> • p j f  A) +  khTlNON (2.30)
Thus, given equations (2.24), (2.25), (2.29), and (2.30), the net aggregate social 
welfare that would be reached in the regional bloc if the regional policy-maker decides 
to marginally enlarge or not to, labelled as W e n l  and W n o n , respectively, are:
W e n l  = h • Aa (1 — A)^ 1_a  ^ • P ^ n l  +  ^ U e n l  — D e n l
W n o n  =  h  • Xx  ( 1  —  A ) ^ 1 - ^  • - I -  k h llN O N  — D n o n
Comparing the levels of net aggregate social welfare that would be reached at 
the regional level under the two alternative trade policies, we can state the following 
proposition:
P rop osition  3 The net aggregate social welfare reached in the regional trading bloc 
would be greater if the policy-maker choose to marginally enlarge rather than not to 
enlarge.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix for proof. ■
We emphasize that when the regional policy-maker chooses to marginally enlarge 
the bloc, consumers located within the regional trading bloc will experience a reduction,
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from r  to fi, in the price paid for any manufactured varieties produced in the new 
member country.
Consumers located in the regional trading bloc will then increase their consumption 
of manufactured varieties produced in the new member country thus reaching a higher 
level of indirect utility.
Therefore, for any initial size of the regional trading bloc the policy-maker’s choice 
of marginally enlarging the bloc would imply a higher net aggregate social welfare than 
the alternative choice of not enlarging.
However, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the gain in terms of regional 
aggregate social welfare that the policy-maker could achieve if it decided to marginally 
enlarge the bloc rather than not to enlarge, will be decreasing in the size of the bloc.
In fact, the greater the size of the bloc, the wider is the range of manufactured 
varieties available to consumers located in the regional bloc at a lower price before the 
enlargement.
As a result, the smaller will be the increase in their utility once the manufactured 
varieties produced in the new member country will become available at lower price due 
to the enlargement.
2.4.3 The supply-side condition
We formalise the regional trading bloc’s supply of membership by analysing the regional 
policy-maker’s choice between enlarging by admitting a new member country, and not 
enlarging under the simplifying assumption that the demand of membership is perfectly 
elastic.
The regional policy-maker will achieve a different level of political support depend­
ing on which of the two stances of trade policy it chooses to implement.
As shown in the previous section, the choice of trade policy will affect the compo­
nents of the policy-maker’s objective function, that is the actual amount of political 
contributions the policy-maker receives and the net aggregate social welfare achieved 
in the regional trading bloc.
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Given equation (2 .21), if the regional policy-maker decided to marginally enlarge 
the regional trading bloc, the value of its objective function, which expresses the level 
of political support received, would be:
G e n l  =  a  • D e n l  +  (1 -  a )  • W e n l  (2.31)
Alternatively, if the regional policy-maker decided not to enlarge the regional trad­
ing bloc thus refusing any request for membership, the value of its objective function 
would be:
G n o n  =  a  • D n o n  +  (1 —  a )  • W n o n  (2.32)
Given equations (2.31) and (2.32), since we assumed that the regional policy-maker
is a political support maximiser, the problem of the regional policy-maker may be 
expressed as choosing 7] in order to maximize:
T} [a  • D e n l  +  ( 1  —  a )  • W e n l ] +  ( 1  — 17) [ a  • D n o n  +  ( 1  —  a )  • W n ]
where the variable 77 captures the policy-maker’s choice and will be equal to one if 
the policy-maker decides to marginally enlarge the regional trading bloc and zero 
otherwise.
We can then state the following proposition:
P rop osition  4 The regional policy-maker will decide to marginally enlarge the re­
gional bloc if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
a  • ( D e n l  — D n o n )  +  (1 — a) ■ ( W e n l  — W n o n )  > 0 (2.33)
We label the above condition as the “supply-side” condition since when it holds
the regional policy-maker will choose to marginally enlarge the regional trading bloc
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since this stance of trade policy guarantees the greater level of political support. 24
Thus, when the supply-side condition is verified a positive supply of membership 
from the regional trading bloc arises since the regional policy-maker will be willing to 
further enlarge.
However, when the supply-side condition is not verified the regional policy-maker 
will choose not to marginally enlarge since this stance of trade policy guarantees the 
greater level of political support.
In this last case, the supply of membership from the regional trading bloc will then 
be nil such that any request for new membership from third countries will be refused.
We emphasize that the regional policy-maker’s choice on whether to marginally en­
large or not to enlarge is a political equilibrium that balances pro and anti-enlargement 
forces.
We previously showed that the organized industrial interest group may act as a 
pro or anti-enlargement force in the policy-making process depending on whether the 
initial size of the bloc is greater than or smaller than the size of the bloc that maximizes 
aggregate firms’ profits.
If the size of the regional trading bloc is lower than the size that maximizes man­
ufacturing firms’ profits, that is h < h, the organised interest group acts as a pro- 
enlargement force, and it offers the policy-maker a higher donation if it decides to 
enlarge rather than not to.
However, if the size of the regional trading bloc is equal to or greater than the 
size that maximizes manufacturing firms’ profits, that is h > h, the interest group 
constitutes an anti-enlargement force offering a higher donation to the policy-maker if 
it decides not to enlarge.
Furthermore, we noted that the net aggregate social welfare reached in the regional
24Alesina et al. (2005) assuming that an international political union’s policy is decided on majority 
voting basis, showed that the union will accept a new member only if the change in the median after 
the entry is small enough.
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trading bloc is greater if the policy-maker decides to marginally enlarge the bloc rather 
than not to.
As a consequence the greater level of net aggregate social welfare that could be 
achieved when enlarging the bloc operates as a pro-enlargement force in the policy­
making process.
Thus, we note that if the initial size of the regional trading bloc is smaller than the 
size that maximizes firms’ profits, both the organized interest group and the aggregate 
social welfare will operate as pro-enlargement forces.
In this case the regional policy-maker will face no trade-off in its choice of trade 
policy since enlarging the regional trading bloc will imply both a greater amount 
of political contributions received and a higher level of net aggregate social welfare 
achieved in the regional bloc.
However, when the initial size of the regional trading bloc is greater or equal to the 
size that maximizes manufacturing firms’ profits, the policy-maker will face a trade­
off between the greater political contributions that it could achieve if it decided not 
to enlarge and the greater net aggregate social welfare it would reach if decides to 
marginally enlarge the bloc.
In this regard, the supply-side condition in equation (2.35) evidences that the 
regional policy-maker will decide to marginally enlarge if the weighted sum of the 
donation differential and the welfare differential is at least positive, that is if the 
weighted gain in net aggregate social welfare at least compensates for the eventual loss 
in political contributions.
Notably, the degree of political distortion plays a crucial role in the regional policy­
maker’s choice since the higher is the degree of political distortion, the greater is the 
weight that the policy-maker attributes to the eventual loss in political contributions 
while the lower is the weight it attaches to the gain in the level of aggregate social 
welfare at the regional level.
In the following, we derive the political equilibrium of the supply of membership 
from the regional bloc with the use of graphical analysis.
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Figure 2-1: The supply-side political equilibrium
SS
Size of the bloc
In Figure 2-1, the locus SS  plots the right-hand side of the supply-side condition 
that is the gain in political support that the regional policy-maker would receive if 
it chooses to marginally enlarge the regional trading bloc rather than not to, as a 
function of the size of the bloc.
As shown in the Mathematical Appendix, since the profit and the welfare differen­
tial are decreasing in the size of the regional trading bloc, the locus SS  is downward 
sloping.
Our graphical analysis shows that, depending on the initial size of the regional 
trading bloc, the gain in political support that might be obtained by the regional 
policy-maker if it decides to marginally enlarge rather than not to may assume both 
positive or negative values.
The policy-maker’s choice to marginally enlarge the bloc rather than no to may 
lead to a gain or a loss in the level of political support received by the policy-maker 
depending on the initial size of the regional trading bloc.
Notably, the balance between pro- and anti-enlargement forces will vary with the
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size of the bloc since the gain in the regional aggregate social welfare that would follow 
a marginal enlargement of the regional trading bloc reduces with the size of the bloc 
while the eventual loss in campaign contributions increases with the size of the bloc.
As shown in Figure 2-1, corresponding with the size of the regional trading bloc 
where the locus S S  and the horizontal axis intersect, labelled as h*, a further marginal 
enlargement of the bloc would imply a loss in the level of political support received by 
the policy-maker.
Thus, we can be define h* as the equilibrium size that the regional trading bloc 
would reach if the demand of membership arising from third country was perfectly 
elastic.25
In fact, h* represents the maximum size the regional policy-maker would be willing 
to enlarge the regional trading bloc to given that further enlarging beyond h* would 
imply a loss in political support it would receive.
Notably, when the size of the regional trading bloc is smaller than h*, the regional 
policy-maker will choose to marginally enlarge the bloc to obtain a greater level of 
political support since the weighted gain in net aggregate social welfare would more 
than compensate for the eventual weighted loss in political contributions.
On the other hand, when the size of the regional trading bloc has reached h*, 
the regional policy-maker will choose not to marginally enlarge to avoid a loss in the 
political support since the weighted loss in net aggregate social welfare would be more 
than compensated by the weighted gain in political contributions.
2.5 The demand-side o f membership
In this section we analyse the demand-side of membership focusing on the scheme of 
incentives underpinning the choice of the incumbent policy-maker in any third country
25 More precisely, respecting the integer constraint, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc 
under the assumption of a perfectly elastic demand of membership is the highest integer that is lower 
than h*.
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between joining the regional trading bloc or not.26
Notably, the analysis of the demand of membership arising from third countries is 
developed under the simplifying assumption that the policy-maker in any third country 
considers the supply of membership of the regional trading bloc as perfectly elastic, 
that is as if any country asking for membership would be admitted the regional trading 
bloc.
The assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of membership will be then be relaxed 
in section 2.6 where we will formalise the interaction between the supply-side and 
demand-side of membership in determining the equilibrium size of the regional trad­
ing bloc, and show how the supply-side of membership might be binding on further 
enlargements of the bloc.
Thus, we consider that the incumbent policy-maker in any of the third countries 
faces two options of trade policy, that is whether to join the regional trading bloc or 
not to.27
Relying on the Grossman-Helpman (1993) lobbying group model, we assume that 
the incumbent policy-maker in any third country chooses between alternative options 
of trade policy with the final aim of maximizing the political support it receives.
We consider that the political support received by the policy-maker in any third 
country depends on three different variables.
First, we assume that the political support received by the incumbent policy-maker 
depends positively on the political contributions received by the organized interest 
group.
In fact, we consider that in any third country, all manufacturing firms are orga­
nized in a lobby group that offers a schedule of contingent (implicit) donations to the 
incumbent policy-maker to affect its choice of trade policy.28
26In modelling the demand for membership in the regional trading bloc, we follow Baldwin (1995).
27 We assume that the choice to enter the regional trading bloc is irreversible such that once a country 
enters the regional trading bloc it can not decide to leave it later on.
28 We rule out the possibility for the interest group to offer contributions to the incumbent policy­
maker in the regional trading bloc. In addition, we assume that consumers located in any of the third 
countries are not organised in any form of interest group.
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Second, the political support received by the incumbent policy-maker depends pos­
itively on the level of aggregate welfare, net of contributions, reached in the third 
country.
Third, we consider that the political support received by the incumbent policy­
maker depends on the support of those groups that oppose or, alternatively, sustain 
joining the regional bloc on non-economic grounds.
While countries are assumed to be symmetric from an economic point of view, 
we consider that the resistance to membership on non-economic grounds varies across 
countries.
Notably, we assume that some countries are characterized by a resistance to enter 
the regional trading bloc on non-economic grounds while others are characterized by 
a willingness to enter the regional trading bloc on non-economic grounds.29,30
2.5.1 The policy-maker’s choice in a third country
In the representative third country, the organized industrial lobby specifies a donation 
contract or contribution schedule that stipulates how large a donation will be made 
for each of the two stances of trade policy open to the incumbent policy-maker.
Thus, we label as Din  and Dout> respectively, the political contributions that the 
policy-maker would receive if it chose to join the regional trading bloc or, alternatively, 
not to.
In addition, the net aggregate social welfare reached in the representative third 
country will depend on the policy-maker’s choice between the alternative stances of 
trade policy.
2 9 We assume that the resistance to membership on non-economic grounds influences the policy­
making process in order to capture real world political concerns and to depict an equilibrium where 
some third countries will choose to enter the regional trading bloc while others will not.
30 We could have introduced the existence of resistance or willingness to enlarge the regional trading 
bloc on non-economic grounds on the supply-side of membership but it would have only rescaled the 
relative strength of pro- and anti-enlargement forces.
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We label as W i n  and W o u t > respectively, the net aggregate social welfare that 
would be reached in the representative third country if the incumbent policy-maker 
decided to join the bloc or, alternatively, not to.
Labelling as jR, the support that the incumbent policy-maker receives from those 
groups that oppose or, alternatively, sustain joining the regional bloc on non-economic 
grounds, we note that it may assume both positive and negative values.
We capture the choice of the incumbent policy-maker in the representative third 
country through the variable <p which equals one if the policy-maker chooses to join 
the regional trading bloc and zero if it decides not to join.
Thus, the problem of the policy-maker can be expressed as choosing ip in order to 
maximize:
p  [& • D i n  +  (1 — b) • W in )  +  (1 ~  V7) [& • D o u t  +  (1 — 6) • W o u t  + fl] (2.34)
where 6 is a parameter which measures the extent of political distortions in the 
policy-making process, with 0 < b < 1.
Thus if b equals zero the incumbent policy-maker will act as a social welfare max­
imizer, while the greater is the value of 6, the higher will be the degree of political 
distortion since the interests of manufacturing firms receive a greater weight in the 
policy-making process.
Focusing on the donations received by the policy-maker in the typical third country, 
we restrict the contribution schedule specified by the organized interest group to be 
“truthful” in the Bernheim-Whinston (1986) specification.
The assumption of truthful donations contract implies that the organised interest 
group will offer the policy-maker the excess, if any, of the group’s gross welfare reached 
under the chosen stance of trade policy relative to some optimally chosen base level of 
welfare.
Having assumed that the organized interest group is constituted by the firm owners
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located in the representative third country, the group’s gross aggregate welfare is given 
by the sum of the gross indirect utilities reached by firm owners.
It follows that the political contributions that would be collected by the policy­
maker if it decided to join the regional trading bloc or not to join are:
Djn — max [0, kHjN — C\ (2.35)
Dout — max [0, kHouT ~ 0\ (2.36)
where C is chosen such that to satisfy the voluntary participation constraint of the 
incumbent policy-maker.31
Notably, in equations (2.37) and (2.38), we label as IIin  and Hour, respectively, 
the profits that any manufacturing firm located in the representative third country
would earn if the incumbent policy-maker decided to join the regional trading bloc, or,
alternatively, not to join.
Focusing on the net aggregate social welfare, we note that the gross aggregate social 
welfare reached in the typical third country is defined in a “utilitarian” way, that is as 
the sum of the indirect utilities reached by labourers and firm owners located in the 
country.
Thus, the gross aggregate social welfare that would be reached if the policy-maker 
chose to join the regional trading bloc or not to join it, labelled as Win  and Wout, 
respectively, are:
Win  =  AA ■ (1 -  A)(1“a) • P (~X) + kllIN (2.37)
Wout =  Aa ■ (1 -  A)(1_a) • Pj,~x) + k n 0ur  (2.38)
We define the net aggregate social welfare that would be reached under the two
31 See Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for a complete derivation of the equilibrium truthful contingent 
donations.
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alternative stances of trade policy as the gross aggregate welfare less the amount of 
donations that would be paid by the organized interest group to the incumbent policy­
maker.
Given equations (2.37), (2.38), (2.39), and (2.40), the net aggregate social welfare 
that would be reached in the representative third country if the policy-maker decided 
to join the regional trading bloc or not to, labelled as Win  and Wout-, respectively, 
are:
WIN =  Aa ■ (1 -  A)(1_a) ■ p j f A) +  c
WNOn  =  Aa - (1 — A)(1~a> • P {N~X) + C
2.5.2 The demand-side condition
Following Baldwin (1995), we can derive a condition under which the policy-maker in 
the representative third country will decide to join the regional trading bloc.
Notably, the policy-maker will choose to join the regional trading bloc if the political 
support it would receive is greater under this stance of trade policy is greater or at 
least equal to the political support it would receive if it decided not to join.
Formally, the policy-maker in the representative third country will decide to join 
the regional bloc if the following condition is verified:
b • (Di n  — Dout) +  (1 — 6) • (Win  — Wout) > R  (2.39)
We label the above condition as the “demand-side” condition since when it holds the 
policy-maker in the third country will choose to join the regional trading bloc as this 
stance of trade policy implies the greater level of political support.32
32 Having assumed that some countries are characterized by a willingness to enter the regional trading 
bloc on non-economic grounds implies that for some countries the demand-side condition will be always 
verified, irrespectively of the size of the regional trading bloc. In turn, this guarantees that the regional 
trading bloc will be formed in the first place.
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Notably, the policy-maker will decide to join the regional trading bloc if the weighted 
sum of the donation differential and the net aggregate social welfare differential is 
greater or equal to the non-economic resistance to join the bloc.
If the demand-side condition is satisfied a positive demand for membership arises 
from the third country since the incumbent policy-maker will choose to join the regional 
trading bloc.
On the other hand, if the demand-side condition is not satisfied the policy-maker 
will choose not to join the regional trading bloc such that the demand for membership 
of the representative third country will be nil.
Focusing on the political contributions offered under the alternative stances of trade 
policy, we note that the organized interest group will lobby in favour of the trade policy 
choice that implies the higher level of group’s gross welfare, that is by implying the 
higher level of aggregate manufacturing profits.
Thus, in order to evaluate whether the industrial lobbying activity in the represen­
tative third country constitutes a pro-, or anti-membership force in the policy-making 
process, we compare the profits that a manufacturing firm located in the country would 
earn if the policy-maker decided to join the bloc and if it decided not to.
The profit differential, that is the difference between the profits that a manufac­
turing firm located in the representative third country would earn if the policy-maker 
decided to join the bloc or not to join, is:
H/JV -  n O U T  =  ±  [(Pr1 -  P£T‘) +  h  ■ -  T*1-"*) P f ^ , ]  (2.40)
If the policy-maker decided to join the regional trading bloc, the manufacturing firm 
located in the third country would face different effects in the three different markets 
where it operates, that is the local market, the regional bloc market and the third 
countries’ market.
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The first term in equation (2.44) represents the difference in the amount of profits 
that a manufacturing firm located in the representative third country would experience 
in its local market if the policy-maker decided to join the bloc rather than not to join.
The manufacturing firm would earn lower profits on the local market if the country 
joined the regional trading bloc since the firm would face greater competition in its 
local market.
If the representative third country joined the regional trading bloc, varieties pro­
duced in the bloc would be available to consumers located in the third country at a 
price fi lower than the price r  that they would have paid if the country had not joined 
the bloc.
Thus, due to a substitution effect, consumers located in the representative third 
country would reduce their consumption of the locally produced varieties such that 
the manufacturing firm would experience an unambiguous reduction in profits on its 
local market.
The second term in equation (2.44) represents, instead, the difference in the amount 
of profits that any manufacturing firm located in the representative third country would 
experience in the regional market if the policy-maker decided to join the bloc rather 
than not to join.
We note that the profits that a manufacturing firm would earn in the regional bloc 
market will be higher if the policy-maker chose to join the regional bloc rather than 
not join.
In fact, if the representative third country joined the bloc, the firm’s own variety 
would be available to consumers located in regional bloc at a price n lower than the 
price r  that they would paid for if the firm had been located outside the regional 
trading bloc.
As a result, consumers located in the regional trading bloc would increase their 
consumption of the firm’s own variety leading to greater profits earned in the regional 
bloc market.
Finally, the profit earned by the manufacturing firm in the third countries’ market
51
will be unchanged whether or not the country joins the regional trading bloc.
Notably, the reduction in profits that the manufacturing firm would experience 
in its local market will be more than compensated by the increase in profits in the 
regional bloc market such that the profits differential will have a positive sign for any 
size of the regional trading bloc. We conclude that since it is profit-enhancing for 
any manufacturing firm located in the representative third country if the policy-maker 
chooses to join the regional trading bloc, the organized interest group constitutes a 
pro-membership force in the policy-making process.
Thus, the organised interest group constitutes a pro-joining force in the policy­
making process since joining the regional trading bloc constitutes the trade policy 
choice that would imply the greater level of the group’s gross welfare.
We note that the organised interest group in the representative third country will 
actually contribute in equilibrium when its own interests are in conflict with the trade 
policy outcome that the incumbent policy-maker’s would implement in absence of any 
political contributions.
The organised interest group will then offer a positive contribution to the incumbent 
policy-maker in order to join the regional trading bloc insofar as the non-economic 
resistance to join would dominate economic considerations to join in absence of political 
contributions.
We now focus on the welfare differential, that is the difference between the level of 
net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in the representative third country 
if the policy-maker decided to join the regional trading bloc and if it decided not to 
join.
Given equations (2.41) and (2.42), the welfare differential may be expressed as:
W IN -  W o u t  = Aa (1-A)*1'** • ( p j f A) -  Pn~X))  (2.41)
We emphasize that the net aggregate social welfare reached in the representative 
third country will be greater if the policy-maker decides to join the regional trading
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bloc rather than not to join.
If the country entered the regional trading bloc, local consumers would experience 
a reduction, from r  to /x, in the price paid for any manufactured varieties produced 
in the bloc. Consumers located in the typical third country would then increase their 
consumption of manufactured varieties produced in the bloc reaching a higher level of 
indirect utility.
Thus, the greater level of net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in 
the typical third country if the policy-maker decided to join the regional trading bloc 
constitutes a pro-membership force in the policy-making process.
Notably, since both the donation differential and the welfare differential are positive 
for any size of the regional trading bloc, the left-hand side of the demand-side condition 
will be positive.
However, the right-hand side of the demand-side condition will assume a positive 
value for those countries that have a resistance to join the regional trading bloc on 
non-economic grounds, and negative value for those countries that, instead, have a 
willingness or a “negative resistance” to join the regional trading bloc.
We conclude that in those third countries characterized by a non-economic willing­
ness to join the regional trading bloc, the policy-maker will choose to join the regional 
trading bloc.
On the other hand, in those third countries that present a non economic resistance 
to membership, the policy-maker will decide to enter the regional trading bloc if the 
weighted sum of the gain in the amount of political contributions received and in 
aggregate social welfare is at least equal to the non-economic resistance to join the 
regional bloc.33
We use graphical analysis to derive the political equilibrium of the demand-side of 
membership.
In Figure 2-2 we plot the right-hand side of the demand side condition, that is the
33 Since the interest group and the aggregate social welfare are pro-membership forces in the policy­
making process, if we had not considered the existence of a non-economic resistance to membership, 
in the equilibrium all countries would have rather joined the regional trading bloc.
Figure 2-2: The demand-side political equilibrium
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weighted sum of the gain in donations and in net social aggregate welfare that would 
be achieved if the policy-maker decided to join the regional trading bloc as function of 
the size of the bloc.
Notably, since both the profit differential and the welfare differential are increasing 
in the size of the regional trading bloc, the locus DD is upward sloping.
In addition, arranging countries in order of increasing resistance to membership on 
non-economic grounds, locus RR  plots the resistance to membership of each country.34
We note that the size of the bloc at which the two loci DD and RR  intersect, 
labelled as hD, represents the number of countries that would choose to enter the 
regional trading bloc, if the supply of membership of the regional trading bloc was 
perfectly elastic.35
34 We can think that there is a continuum of countries, or we can interpret the locus R R  as the line 
that connects individual countries’ resistance to membership on non-economic grounds.
35 More precisely in order to respect the integer constraint, the equilibrium number of countries that 
will ask for membership in the regional trading bloc, given a perfectly elastic supply of membership,
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In fact, for all countries on the left of hD, the demand side condition will be verified 
since the weighted sum of the profit differential and the welfare differential, offsets the 
political resistance to membership on non-economic grounds.
On the other hand for all countries on the right of hD, the demand side condition 
will not be verified since the weighted sum of the profit differential and the welfare 
differential is lower than the non-economic resistance to membership.
As a result, hD can be seen as the equilibrium size that the regional trading bloc 
would reach if the supply of membership of the regional bloc was perfectly elastic.
2.6 The equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc
We have has so far formalised the supply of membership of the regional trading bloc, 
and the demand for membership arising from third countries.
In this section we allow for the interaction between the supply of membership of 
the regional trading bloc, and the demand for membership arising from third countries, 
and formalise the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc.
We define the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc as that size of the bloc 
in correspondence of which no further enlargements of the bloc will take place.
Once the supply-side and the demand-side of membership interact, an enlargement 
of the regional trading bloc will arise if and only if the supply-side condition for the 
regional trading bloc in equation (2.33) is verified, and the demand-side condition in 
equation (2.39) holds for at least one of the third countries.
The equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will then be reached when either 
the regional policy-maker is not willing to further enlarge such that any eventual 
request of membership from third countries is refused, or none of the third countries is 
willing to join although the regional policy-maker might be willing to further enlarge.
In the following, we use graphical analysis to derive the equilibrium size of the 
regional trading bloc, and show that the regional trading bloc will no further enlarge
is the highest integer less than hD.
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Figure 2-3: The equilibrium size of the regional bloc: binding supply-side
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when either the supply of, or the demand for membership are binding.36
Notably, we show due to the interaction between the supply of and the demand 
for membership, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will not exceed but 
could be smaller than the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc, that is the 
equilibrium size that the bloc would have reached if the demand of membership arising 
from third countries had been perfectly elastic.
Thus, in Figure 2-3 we plot the political equilibrium of the supply-side of member­
ship, and the political equilibrium of the demand-side of membership.
We note that hD, at the intersection between the loci DD and RR, represents the 
number of countries that would like to join the regional trading bloc if the supply of 
membership of the regional trading bloc was perfectly elastic.
On the other hand h*, at the intersection between the locus SS  and the horizontal
36 See Alesina et al. (2005) for a model where the equilibrium size of an international political union 
is endogenously determined by the trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the degree of 
heterogeneity across countries.
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axis, represents the supply-side implied maximum size of the regional bloc given that 
the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further enlarge the bloc beyond it to 
avoid a loss in political support received.
Our graphical analysis points out that the number of countries that would rather 
join the regional trading bloc if the supply of membership was perfectly elastic exceeds 
the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc, that is hD > h*.
However, following the interaction between the supply of, and demand for member­
ship, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc can not exceed the supply-side 
implied maximum size since the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further 
enlarge the bloc beyond h*.
Thus, in the case depicted in Figure 2-3, due to the interaction between the supply 
of and demand for membership, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc, 
labelled as hE, coincides with the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc, that 
is hE = h*.
In the case depicted in Figure 2-3 then the supply-side of membership is binding 
in the determination of the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc.37
It follows that the number of countries that in equilibrium are in the regional 
trading bloc is then smaller than the number of countries that would have entered the 
bloc if the supply of membership had been perfectly elastic, that is hE < h D.
While the supply-side of membership implies that a maximum size beyond which 
the regional trading bloc will no further enlarge exists, the demand-side of membership 
might imply that the supply-side implied maximum size is not reached in equilibrium.
In fact, as shown in Figure 2-4, in the event the requests for membership are not 
“numerous” enough, the equilibrium size of the bloc will be smaller than the maximum 
size that the regional policy-maker would have been willing to achieve.
Our graphical analysis shows that the number of countries that are willing to join 
the regional trading bloc is lower than the maximum size that the regional policy-maker
37If we had assumed a perfectly elastic supply of membership as in Baldwin (1995), the equilibrium 
size of the regional trading bloc would have been in hD.
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Figure 2-4: The equilibrium size of the regional bloc: binding demand-side
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would have been willing to achieve if the demand of membership had been perfectly 
elastic, that is hD < h*.
Thus, due to the interaction between the supply of and demand for membership, 
the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc is smaller than the supply-side implied 
maximum size of the bloc, and it coincides with the number of third countries that 
would like to join the bloc, that is hE = hD.
In the case depicted in Figure 2-4 the demand-side of membership is then binding 
in the determination of the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc such that, due 
to the lack of requests of membership, the supply-side implied maximum size will not 
be achieved.
2.7  D o es deeper in tegration  m ean w ider in tegration?
In this section we investigate the implications of the implementation of deeper inte­
gration among the members of the regional trading bloc on the equilibrium size of the
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bloc, and assess whether it will lead to wider integration or not.38
Notably, we model deeper integration among the members of the regional trading 
bloc as a reduction in level of intra-bloc trade costs from an initial level fi0 to /il5 with 
/x0 > /Xi > 1, and we assess the implications of this reduction on the equilibrium size 
of the regional trading bloc.
Since the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc is the endogenous outcome 
of the interaction between the supply of, and the demand for membership, we first 
analyse how deeper integration affects the political equilibrium on the supply-side and 
demand-side of membership, and we then assess the overall impact on the equilibrium 
size of the bloc.
2.7.1 Implications for the supply-side of membership
In order to assess the implications of deeper integration among member countries 
on the supply-side of membership, we focus on the two components of the supply-side 
condition expressed in equation (2.33), that is the welfare differential and the donations 
differential.
First, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the derivative of the welfare differ­
ential with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade costs is positive for any size of the 
regional trading bloc.
Thus, deeper integration among members reduces the gain in net aggregate social 
welfare that would be achieved in the regional trading bloc if the regional policy-maker 
decided to marginally enlarge rather than not to.
Notably, the lower intra-bloc trade costs are, the greater is the indirect utility of 
consumers located in the regional trading bloc before the marginal enlargement since 
the greater is their consumption of varieties produced within the regional bloc due to 
their relatively lower price.
As a result, the smaller would be the increase in consumers’ indirect utility once
38 In our analysis we consider that wider integration arises when the equilibrium size of the regional 
trading bloc increases.
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the manufactured varieties produced in the new member country will be available at 
a lower price following a marginal enlargement of the regional trading bloc.
Second, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the derivative of the profit dif­
ferential with respect to intra-bloc trade costs is positive for any size of the regional 
trading bloc.
We previously noted that a marginal enlargement of the regional trading bloc has 
opposing effects on the profits earned by manufacturing firms located in the regional 
trading bloc.
Thus, a profit-enhancing market-size effect would operate in the regional bloc mar­
ket while a profit-reducing competition-effect would arise in both the local market and 
the regional bloc market, and a profit-reducing market-size effect would arise in the 
third countries’ market.
Notably, the lower intra-bloc trade costs are, the lower would be the price paid 
by consumers located in the regional trading bloc for manufactured varieties produced 
in the new member country following a marginal enlargement of the regional trading 
bloc.
Manufacturing firms located in the regional trading bloc would then experience a 
greater profit-reducing competition-effect on the local and regional bloc markets for 
the same profit-enhancing market size effect in the regional bloc market.
As a result, if the size of the regional trading bloc is lower than the size of the bloc 
that would maximise the profits of manufacturing firms located in the bloc, deeper in­
tegration would reduce the gain in profits that firms would obtain following a marginal 
enlargement of the bloc. Thus, deeper integration would reduce the gain in donations 
that the regional policy-maker would receive if it chooses to marginally enlarge the 
bloc rather than not to.
On the other hand, if the size of the regional trading bloc is equal to or greater than 
the size that would maximise the profits of manufacturing firms located in the bloc, 
deeper integration increases the loss in profits that firms would experience following a 
marginal enlargement.
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In this case, then, deeper integration would increase the loss in donations that the 
regional policy-maker would experience if it chooses to marginally enlarge the bloc 
rather than not to.
We conclude that deeper integration among member countries affects the supply- 
side political equilibrium by strengthening the anti-enlargement forces while weakening 
the pro-enlargement forces operating in the policy-making process.
In the following we use graphical analysis to illustrate the impact of deeper integra­
tion on the supply-side political equilibrium, and we show that it contracts the size of 
the regional trading bloc where anti-enlargement and pro-enlargement forces balance, 
that is the supply-side implied maximum size of the regional trading bloc.
Figure 2-5 depicts the left-hand side of the supply-side condition, that is the gain 
in political support that the policy-maker would achieve if it chooses to marginally 
enlarge the regional trading bloc, as a function of the size of the bloc for different level 
of intra-bloc trade costs.
Thus, locus SSo plots the gain in political support that the regional policy-maker 
would obtain if it decided to marginally enlarge the bloc for the initial level of intra- 
bloc trade costs ^0. On the other hand, locus SS\ plots the gain in political support 
that the regional policy-maker would obtain if it decided to marginally enlarge the 
bloc for the level of intra-bloc trade costs fi  ^ that would follow the implementation of 
deeper integration among members.
As shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the derivative with respect to level of 
intra-bloc trade costs of the profit differential and the welfare differential are positive 
for any size of the regional trading bloc such that the locus SS\  is shifted inward with 
respect to locus SSo.
For the initial level of intra-bloc trade costs /x0, the supply-side implied maximum 
size of the regional trading bloc beyond which the regional policy-maker will not be 
willing to enlarge further corresponds to /ig, at the intersection between the locus SSo 
and the horizontal axis.
Following deeper integration leading to a reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade
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Figure 2-5: The impact of deeper integration on the supply-side equilibrium
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costs to fa, the supply-side maximum size of the regional trading bloc will be at 
the intersection between the locus SSi and the horizontal axis such that h\ < /ig.
Thus, ceteris paribus, deeper integration among the members of the regional trading 
bloc will reduce the supply-side implied maximum size of the regional trading bloc, 
that is the size of the bloc beyond which the regional policy-maker will not be willing 
to enlarge further.
2.7.2 Implications for the demand-side of membership
In order to assess the impact of deeper integration within the regional trading bloc on 
the demand-side of membership, we focus on the two components of the demand-side 
condition expressed in equation (2.39), that is the welfare differential and the donations 
differential.
First, we note that deeper integration among the members of the regional trading 
bloc increases the gain in net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in the 
representative third country if the policy-maker chose to join the regional trading bloc 
rather than not to.
The lower intra-bloc trade costs are, the lower would the price paid by consumers 
located in the representative third country for any manufactured variety produced in 
the regional trading bloc if the country joined the bloc.
Thus, the greater would be the increase in the indirect utility of consumers located 
in the representative third country if the country joined the regional trading bloc since 
the greater would be the increase in their consumption levels.
In addition, deeper integration among the members of the regional trading bloc 
increases the gain in donations that the incumbent policy-maker in the representative 
third country would receive if it decided to join the regional trading bloc rather than 
not to.
Notably, the lower intra-bloc trade costs, the greater the gain in the profits of 
manufacturing firms located in the representative third country would be if the incum­
bent policy-maker chose to join the regional trading bloc since the lower would be the
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price paid by consumers in the regional trading bloc for varieties produced in the new 
member country.
Thus, deeper integration within the regional trading bloc boosts the number of 
countries that would choose to join the bloc since for a greater number of countries the 
gain in campaign contributions and in aggregate social welfare would be high enough 
to overcome the intrinsic non-economic resistance to membership.
In the following, we use graphical analysis to illustrate the implications of deeper 
integration on the demand-side political equilibrium, and we show that it boosting the 
requests for membership in the regional trading bloc.
In Figure 2-6 we depict the left-hand side of the demand-side condition, that is 
the weighed sum of the gain in campaign contribution and aggregate social welfare 
that the policy-maker would achieve if it chose to join the regional trading bloc, as a 
function of the size of the bloc for different level of intra-bloc trade costs.
Thus, locus DDq plots the weighed sum of the gain in political contributions and 
aggregate social welfare that the policy-maker would achieve if it chose to join the 
regional trading bloc rather than not to for the initial level of intra-bloc trade costs 
Mo-
On the other hand, locus DD\ plots the weighed sum of the gain in political 
contributions and aggregate social welfare that the policy-maker would achieve if it 
chose to join the regional trading bloc rather than not to for the level of intra-bloc 
trade costs /^that would follow deeper integration among members.
We note that since the derivative with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade costs 
of both the profit differential and the welfare differential is negative for any size of the 
regional trading bloc, the locus DD\ is upward shifted with respect to locus DDq.
For the initial level of intra-bloc trade /x0» the number of third countries that would 
like to join the regional bloc corresponds to at the intersection between the two 
loci DDq and RR.
Following deeper integration leading to a reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade 
costs to /xl5 the number of countries that would rather join the regional trading bloc
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Figure 2-6: The impact of deeper integration on the demand-side equilibrium
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is expressed by /if, at the intersection between the two loci DD\ and RR  such that 
/if  > /if.
We conclude that, ceteris paribus, deeper integration among the members of the 
regional trading bloc will affect the demand-side of membership by boosting third 
countries’ requests for membership in the regional trading bloc.
2.7 .3  Im plications for th e equilibrium  size o f  th e  bloc
We showed that the equilibrium size of the regional trade bloc is the endogenous 
outcome of the interaction between the supply of, and the demand for membership.
Thus, in order to assess the implications of deeper integration among the members 
of the regional trading bloc on the equilibrium size of the regional bloc, we have to 
take into account the effects on both the supply-side and demand-side of membership.
We showed that deeper integration within the regional trading bloc boosts the 
third countries’ requests for membership, while it contracts the supply-side implied 
maximum size of the bloc, that is the size beyond which the regional policy-maker is 
not willing to further enlarge.
We emphasize that the implications of deeper integration on the equilibrium size of
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the regional trading bloc are, in general, ambiguous and crucially depend on whether 
the supply-side or the demand-side are binding in the determination of the equilibrium 
size of the bloc.
We use graphical analysis to illustrate the impact of deeper integration leading to 
a reduction in the intra-bloc costs on the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc.
Notably, we compare the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc for the initial 
level of intra-bloc trade costs fi0, and the equilibrium size that would be reached if 
intrarbloc trade costs reduce to /xx due to the implementation of deeper integration 
among the members of the bloc.
In order to asses the implication of deeper integration on the equilibrium size of 
the bloc and illustrate the interaction between the supply-side and demand-side of 
membership, we consider two alternative initial scenarios.
First, we focus on a scenario in which the supply-side of membership is binding in 
the determination of the equilibrium size of the bloc for the initial level of intra-bloc 
trade costs /x0.
As shown in Figure 2-7 in this case the initial equilibrium size of the bloc, labelled 
as h,Q , coincides with the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc hj, such that 
h,Q =  hg, and {hP — hE) countries are refused the membership in the bloc even if they 
would like to join it.
Due to deeper integration among the members of the regional trading bloc, the 
supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc will shrink from to h\ while the 
number of countries that would like to join the regional bloc increases from hE to hE.
Assuming that the regional policy-maker cannot reduce the size of the regional 
trading bloc by forcing out members, our graphical analysis shows that if deeper inte­
gration arises when the supply-side of membership is binding, the equilibrium size of 
the bloc will be unaffected.
In fact, despite deeper integration stimulates the requests for membership, the 
supply-side of membership will be binding on further enlargement of the bloc such 
that h f  = hE = hj.
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Figure 2-7: Deeper integration with binding supply-side: unaffected equilibrium size
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We note that the equilibrium size of the bloc will be greater than the maximum 
size of the bloc to which the regional policy-maker would have been willing to enlarge 
under the lower level of intra-bloc trade costs, that is h f  > /ij.39
Alternatively, we consider a scenario in which the demand-side of membership is 
binding in the determination of the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc for 
the initial level of intra-bloc trade costs fiQ.
As shown in Figure 2-8, in this case the initial equilibrium of the regional trading 
bloc, labelled as hg', coincides with the number of third countries that would like to 
join the bloc /i.q>, such that =  fiff, and it is lower than the supply-side implied 
maximum size of the bloc hg.
Our graphical analysis shows that deeper integration within the regional trading 
bloc will shrink the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc from hg to h\, while 
boosting the number of countries that would rather join the bloc from h,Q to h f\
Notably, while deeper integration will boost membership requests thus removing 
the binding effect of the demand-side of membership, it will also contract the supply- 
side implied maximum size of the regional trading bloc.
Assuming that the regional policy-maker can not force out existing members, our 
graphical analysis illustrates that the implementation of deeper integration within the 
regional trading bloc will not affect the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc.
As shown in Figure 2-8, if the supply-side implied maximum size of the regional 
trading bloc that would follow deeper integration is lower than the initial equilibrium 
size, that is h\ < hjf, the equilibrium size of the bloc will not be affected since additional 
requests for membership from third countries will be refused, that is h f  =  hjf .
In this case the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will be greater than 
the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc to which the regional policy-maker
39If the regional policy-maker had the possibility to force members out, the equilibrium size of the 
bloc would contract following the implementation of deeper integration. Thus, not only the boost 
in the requests for membership induced by deeper integration would not be satisfied, but also the 
equilibrium size of the bloc would contract to coincide with the new supply-side induced maximum 
size, that is h f  =  h\ with h f  <  ho.
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Figure 2-8: Deeper integration with binding demand-side: unaffected equilibrium size
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would have been willing to enlarge under the lower level of intra-bloc trade costs, that 
is /if  > /ij.40
However, as shown in Figure 2-9, deeper integration will affect the equilibrium 
size of the regional trading bloc in the presence of an initially binding demand-side 
of membership when the new supply-side implied maximum size is greater than the 
initial equilibrium size, that is /if  < h\ < /ig.
In fact, if the supply-side implied maximum size of the regional trading bloc that 
would follow deeper integration is greater than the initial equilibrium size of the re­
gional bloc, the regional policy-maker would be willing to further enlarge accepting 
new membership requests.
Thus, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will increase since deeper 
integration within the bloc will remove the initially binding effect of the demand-side 
of membership.
As shown in Figure 2-9, if the additional requests for membership due to the imple­
mentation of deeper integration in the regional trading bloc are “numerous” enough, 
the regional trading bloc could reach its new supply-side implied maximum size, that 
is /if  =  h\ with /if  > /if.
Our results on the implications of deeper integration among the members of a 
regional trading bloc on the equilibrium size of the bloc differ from Baldwin (1995) 
where deeper integration unambiguously lead to wider integration by boosting the 
requests of membership.
In our framework where the supply-side of membership is formalized and the equi­
librium size of the regional trading bloc is the endogenous outcome of the interaction 
of supply of and demand for membership, deeper integration will not necessarily lead 
to wider integration.
Notably, the impact of deeper integration on the equilibrium size of the regional
40If the policy-maker could force members out, following deeper integration the equilibrium size of 
the bloc would contract to coincide with the new supply-side implied maximum size, that is h f  =  h\ 
with h f  <  h f .
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Figure 2-9: Deeper integration with binding demand-side: greater equilibrium size
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trading bloc depends crucially on whether the supply-side, or the demand-side of mem­
bership is binding in the determination of the initial equilibrium size of the bloc, and 
on the interaction between the effects of deeper integration on the supply-side and the 
demand-side of membership.
Our analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, deeper integration might lead to wider 
integration when the demand-side of membership is binding, while if the supply-side 
of membership is binding, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will be 
unaffected.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we addressed the question of whether a regional trading bloc will expand 
or keep stagnant in terms of its size by providing a theoretical model in which both 
the incentives for a regional trading bloc to enlarge and for non-members countries to 
join are formalised.
First we showed that, due to the interaction between pro and anti-enlargement 
forces in the policy-making process, a supply-side implied maximum size of the regional 
trading bloc exists.
In fact, our analysis pointed out that a maximum size of the regional trading bloc 
exists beyond which the political-support maximizing regional policy-maker will not 
be willing to further enlarge the bloc since this would imply a reduction in the political 
support it receives.
In addition, we showed that the enlargement of the regional trading bloc is the 
endogenous outcome of the interaction between the supply of membership arising from 
the bloc and the demand for membership arising from third countries.
Notably, when the size of the regional trading bloc is smaller than the supply-side 
implied maximum size, the bloc will enlarge if a request for membership from third 
countries arises.
On the other hand, once the regional trading bloc has reached its supply-side
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implied maximum size, the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further enlarge 
such that any request of membership from third countries will be refused.
As a result, we derived the equilibriums size of the regional trading bloc as jointly 
determined by the supply of, and demand for membership.
We pointed out that the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc will not exceed 
but could be smaller than the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc.
On the one hand, the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc can not exceed 
the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc since, once the maximum size is 
reached, the regional policy-maker will not be wiling to further enlarge the regional 
trading bloc.
However, since the equilibrium size of the regional trading bloc is determined by 
the interaction between supply of and demand for membership, the equilibrium size of 
the bloc might be smaller than the supply-side implied maximum size if the requests 
for membership are not “numerous” enough.
Thus, we concluded that while the supply-side of membership is binding on the 
maximum size that the regional trading bloc will achieve, the demand-side of member­
ship might be binding on further enlargements thus preventing the bloc from reaching 
its maximum size.
Finally, we studied how the “depth” of regional trading agreements may affect their 
“width”.
We showed that the implementation of deeper integration among the members 
of a regional trading bloc will affect both the supply-side and the demand-side of 
membership and, as a result, the equilibrium size of the regional bloc.
Our analysis showed that deeper integration contracts the maximum size to which 
the regional policy-maker is willing to enlarge the bloc while it boosts the demand for 
membership of third countries through a “domino effect” & la Baldwin (1995).
We emphasised that the impact of deeper integration on the equilibrium size of 
the regional trading bloc depends on whether the supply-side or the demand-side are 
binding in the determination of the equilibrium size of the bloc, and on the interaction
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between the effects of deeper integration on the supply-side and the demand-side of 
membership.
We concluded that deeper integration within a regional trading bloc may lead to 
wider integration when the demand-side of membership is binding in the determina­
tion of the equilibrium size of the bloc, while the equilibrium size of the bloc will be 
unaffected if the supply-side of membership is binding.
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2.9 M athem atical Appendix
2.9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The operating profit of the typical manufacturing firm located within the regional 
trading bloc as a function of the size of the bloc, h £ [0, g], may be expressed as:
n  W  =  I  ■ [ p ° r 1  +  I h  ~  1) ^ P T 1 +  ( 9 ~ h )  t ^ P Z o n '
where
PR =  +  k ■ (h -  1) + k - ( g - h )  r*1-")] ^
Pnon  =  [fc +  k • ( s  — 1) 1
In order to simplify the notation we can define:
p (h) =  k +  k ’ (h -  1) +  k • (g -  h) r (1-<r) =  p (0) +
Oh,
Thus, given equations (2.13) and (2.14), we have:
P R = p ( h ) ^
P n o n  =  P ( 1 ) 1-47 
We can then rewrite the operating profit function as:
n  (ft) =  £  • [p (ft)"1 +  (h -  1) (h)-1 + ( g -  h) t V - ^ p ( l ) - 1]
First, we compute the value of the profit function for h = 0 and h = g, that is at 
the extremes of the interval where it is defined:
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H(0) = £ • [p(O)-1 • (l + (9 -  l)r<l-">)] = 0
Furthermore, the first order derivative of the operating profit function with respect 
to the endogenous variable h is given by:
a n  (ft) a  f p (A) • [(ft + 1) pt1-")] -  i  ]
dh -H P(hy p i  i)
which may be rewritten as:
a n  (h)
dh a \ p (h)2
After some manipulations, we have that dl^  > 0 if:
rd-^) 1 
P i  1) J
p(  0)/Z + 6h
that is, recalling the definition of p{h), if:
h -  [ p ( i -* ) - r a -> ) ]  {{fcp(1)^^  + 1]}5 + (p(1'")- 1 - s r(1 _ ’ )) }
where the right-hand side of the above equation is positive for any value of the 
parameters.
The profit function has then a global maximum in h which corresponds to the 
optimal size of the regional bloc from the point of view of a typical manufacturing firm 
located in the bloc.
Notably, the optimal size of the regional trading bloc from the point of view of 
manufacturing firms located in the regional trading bloc is:
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Due to the existence of a global maximum for the profit function II (h), a marginal 
enlargement of the regional trading bloc could be profit-enhancing or profit reducing 
for the typical manufacturing firm located in the bloc depending on the initial size of 
the bloc.
We conclude that a marginal enlargement of the regional trading bloc will be profit- 
enhancing when h < h, while it will be profit-reducing for h > h.
2.9.2 Proof o f Proposition 2
The aggregate social welfare, net of contributions, that would be reached in the regional 
trading bloc under the two alternative stances of trade policy is given by:
Wenl = h ■ \ x (1 -  A)*1-*' • P i J )
WNOn =  h ■ Aa (1 -  A)(1" a) • P {~X)
where
Pr  = [fc + k • (h -  1) • fS1 ^  + k- ( g - h ) -  r ^  1
Penl  = ^k + k - h-  +  k • (g -  h -  1) • r (1-<7)J x~°
Comparing Wenl  and Wn o n , we observe that since we assumed that /x is lower 
than r  and a is greater than 1, we have that Penl  is lower than Pr .
Furthermore since we considered A to be strictly between zero and one, we conclude 
that Wenl  is greater than Wn , for any size of the regional trading bloc.
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2.9.3 Derivation of the regional aggregate social welfare
In our framework the regional trading bloc is conceived as a unique political entity with 
a centralized policy-maker whose support depends on the level of donations received 
by the industrial lobby and the net aggregate social welfare level achieved in the bloc 
as a whole.
The gross regional bloc aggregate welfare is assumed to be the sum of the level of 
aggregate welfare achieved in the countries that are members of the regional trading 
bloc.
Thus, given that countries are assumed to be economically symmetric, we have:
E N LWenl  =  h -W {
WNON =  h ■ W%NON
The gross aggregate welfare in the representative member country i is defined as 
the sum of the indirect utilities of the agents in the economy:
wfNL = v£NL +  vgNL
y y N O N E N L  =  V N  +  V N
where Vl and Vp are the indirect utility function of labourers and firm owners, 
respectively.
Focusing on labourers we recall that, given the Cobb-Douglas shape of the prefer­
ences, the amount consumed of the agricultural good and the composite manufacturing 
good are:
\  ^  ' El =  (1 -  A)C* =  „  PA
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UM ~ —p — ~  p
Alternatively, the labourers’ demand of the composite manufactured good M  can 
be derived aggregating the labourers’ demand of the typical manufactured variety i. 
The composite manufactured good is defined as:
C m  = £ 4
In equilibrium labourers’ demand of the typical manufactured variety i is:
4  = e . ^  = \ K
(-<t )
p l - a  p {  l - a )
Thus, we have:
a—I
(«*)“  = 
We can then rewrite:
Pi
(-<r)
( g - 1 )
(1—cr) p ^ " 1)=  A * • p \  • P
£(<*) ((7 - 1  ) / a
L t
(*-l)
A » •p\(i-») _
Recalling the definition of the index price, we have:
£*! = P-
So labourers’ demand of the manufactured good is:
£ p !
(i-») (»-i)
C%[ = A • P '" - 1) ■ P - ° = p  
Then, the indirect utihty function for labourers is given by:
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VL = (1 -  A)(1_a) • Aa • P _A
Focusing on firms owners, since we assumed (1 — 4>) to be equal unity, their utility 
function reduces to the form:
Uf = Ca
Since the income perceived by firm owners derives from firms’ profits, their demand 
of the agricultural good is:
k • n  
c a = - t -PA
Thus, given p a  — 1, the indirect utility function for firm owners is:
VF =  k • n
The gross aggregate welfare in the representative member country i under the two 
alternative stances of trade policy is:
W f NL =  Aa (1 -  A)(1" a) • P (E-NXi  + k ■ Uenl
w N O N E N L  =  AA ( j  _  A) ( l - > )  . p ( ~ V  +  k  .
Finally, the gross aggregate welfare that would be reached in the regional trading 
bloc under the two alternative stances of trade policy can be expressed as:
w ENL =  h ■ [a a (1 -  A)(1" A) • p 'fu l +  k ■ n EWi] 
W non =  h ■ [ a a (1 -  a ) (1- a) • p £ - A) +  k ■ n Ncw]
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2.9.4 Welfare differential
Given equations (2.31) and (2.32), the net welfare differential that would be experi­
enced in the representative member country if the regional policy-maker decided to 
marginally enlarge rather than not to is given by:
W B N L  _  W N O N  =  A* (1  -  A )(1_A) • [ p ^  -  p j ~ A)]
The derivative of the welfare differential in the representative member country with 
respect to h, that is the size of the regional trading bloc, is:
d ( W E N L  _ W N ° N )  _  Aa + 1  (1  -  A )(1- a> • k &  Q / 1- ' )  -  r ^ )  
dh (7 — 1
[1 +  ft ■ pS1-") +  ( g - h - l ) -  tI1-")] +
-  [1 +  (ft -  1) • /i( l +  (g -  ft) ■ r*1-")] ^ I_ l
We observe that if <7 > A + 1, that is the elasticity of substitution is not excessively 
low, the derivative of the welfare differential with respect to h is negative since we 
assumed that l < / x < r ,  0 < A < 1, and a > 1.
Furthermore we can compute the derivative of the welfare differential with respect 
to /x, the level of intra-bloc trade costs:
a \x (1 -  A)(1-A) A • (1 -  <t) fTaft •
( f t  [ l  +  f t / / 1 - "* +  (ff -  f t -  1 )  j  
- o A a  (1  -  A )(1_X) • A • (1  -  c )  fi~ah +  (ft -  1 ) •
• {ft • [l +  (ft -  1 ) +  (g -  ft) • }<A_1)
Given A < 1 and a > 1 and assuming that the elasticity of substitution does not 
take excessively low values, <7 > (1 +  A), the derivative of the welfare differential with
d ( W E N L _ W NON>j
dfi
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respect to /i will be positive.
2.9.5 Profit differential
Given equations (2.24) and (2.25), the profit differential that a manufacturing firm 
located in the regional trading bloc would experience if the regional policy-maker 
decided to marginally enlarge rather than not to, can expressed as:
n  e n l  — R n o n  =  -  a
(PStL ~ P ^ 1) +  (* -  1) • (P°E~NL ~  -PT1) '
The derivative of the profit differential with respect to h , the size of the regional 
trading bloc, is given by:
d  ( n e n l  ~  H n o n ) 
dh
[l +  h • +  (g — h — 1) • r (1-<7)] 2 +
-  [l 4- (h -  1) • -I- (g -  h) • r (1-<r)] 2
• [ l  +  h • lit1-*) +  (g -  h -  1) • t*1- ' ) ]  _1
~ a  [ l  +  (^ _  1 ) ' +  (9 ~  h) • +
-  [l +  h • +  (p -  h -  1) • r (1-<T)]
+
Simulating the derivative of the profit differential with respect to the size of the 
regional trading bloc shows that it is negative for any value of the parameters of the 
model.
Similarly, we can compute the derivative of the profit differential with respect to 
/n, the level of intra-bloc trade costs:
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d (n e n l  — K n o n ) 
dp
h [l +  hp^1 +  (g — h — 1) r^1 a)] 2 +
 ^ -  (ft -  1) [1 +  (ft -  1) vP -*'' + (g -  h) t*1-")] " 2 
Ah (a — 1) p~ak~2 A (a — 1) p~ak~l
[1 +  h ^ 1- ^  + (g -  h -  1) • rf'-")] 1 +  
-  [1 +  (h -  1) /if1'*’) +  (s  -  h) ■ t 1-*]
A (<r — 1) p~ak-1
+
+  hpt1 ^  +  (g — h — 1) t^1
- l
Simulating the derivative of the profit differential with respect to the level of intra- 
bloc trade shows that it has a positive sign for any value of the parameters of the 
model.
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Chapter 3
Regionalism or M ultilateralism? 
A Choice of Political Economy
3.1 Introduction
The revival in regional trade agreements experienced since the 1990s has rapidly led to 
a wide range of economic studies that have focused on whether regionalism provides 
an impetus to, or detract from the worldwide multilateral trade liberalisation.1
Most of the contributions to the “regionalism versus multilateralism”, debate have 
analysed the impact of regional trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalisation 
focusing on the imposed import tariff against non-members as a measure of the effects 
of regionalism.2
Thus, in his seminal contribution Krugman (1991) showed that in a world divided 
into symmetric trading blocs setting non-cooperative optimal tariffs on imports, an 
expansion in the size of the blocs leads to higher import tariffs. Richardson (1993) 
using a model of endogenous protection showed that tariffs against non-members fall
1See Winters (1996), and Baldwin and Venables (1997) for useful surveys of the contributions in 
the “regionalism versus multilateralism” debate.
2 See Freud (2000) for an investigation of the implications of multilateral trade liberalisation on the 
formation of regional trade agreements. Her results indicated that as multilateral tariff levels fall the 
forces pulling countries into bilateral agreements strengthen.
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due to the formation of a free trade area. Bagwell and Staiger (1993) proved that 
during the transition period over which free trade agreements are implemented, their 
trade diverting effect will lead to higher multilateral tariffs. Furthermore, Findlay and 
Panagariya (1994), in a model of endogenous protection proved that the formation of 
regional trade agreements leads to an increase in tariffs against non-member countries, 
with the increase being lower under a custom union than a free trade area. Bond and 
Syropolus (1996), generalizing Krugman (1991) by taking into account the existence 
of comparative advantages, showed that optimal import tariffs can fall as the absolute 
size of the trading blocs increases. Bagwell and Staiger (1997) showed that while in the 
early stages of the formation of a custom union a reduction of multilateral tariffs arises, 
the custom union will face an incentive to increase its external tariff once its impact 
on the degree of market power becomes felt.3 Desrouelle and Richardson (1997) com­
pared non-cooperative optimal tariffs before and after the creation of a custom union, 
concluding that the formation of the custom union will raise the tariff against non­
members. Cadot et al. (1999) in a influence-driven model of trade policy formation 
showed that deeper integration can lead to rising protection against non-member im­
ports. Bond et al. (2001) indicated that deepening of regional trade integration affects 
the sustainability of tariff agreements with non-members. Bond et al (2004) showed 
that the formation of a free trade area induces members to reduce their external tariff.
However, recent contributions in the debate on whether regionalism will lead to 
broader multilateral trade liberalisation has investigated how entering a regional trade 
agreement affects a country’s incentives to liberalise multilaterally using different po­
litical economy set-ups.
Notably, Levy (1997) used a political-economic approach & la Mayer (1984) to 
show that regional trade agreements may undermine political support for multilateral 
trade liberalization if they raise the reservation utility of key agents in a country above
3 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) adopted a different perspective and investigated how preferential trade 
agreements affect the enforcement provisions of multilateral trade agreements. Their results sug­
gested that the efficiency of the multilateral trading system will be compromised by preferential trade 
agreements.
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the multilateral free-trade level. Furthermore, Krishna (1998) using a political sup­
port approach to endogenous policy formation showed that regional trade agreements 
may critically affect domestic incentives such that multilateral liberalization that was 
initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible.
This chapter conceptually relates to this last strand in the ongoing “regionalism 
versus multilateralism” debate, and it contributes to the existing literature in two 
different ways.
First, this chapter develops a political economy analysis of a country’s incentives to 
enter a regional trade agreement when a multilateral agreement leading to free trade 
is available.
We provide a theoretical model in which regionalism and multilateralism are for­
malised as alternative options of trade policy, and we investigate a country’s choice 
between entering a regional trade agreement, or a multilateral free trade agreement.
Assuming a political economic framework k la Grossman-Helpman (1994), we con­
sider that the policy-maker balances industrial interests and aggregate social welfare 
in choosing between the regional trade agreement, or the multilateral free trade agree­
ment.
Our analysis shows that in a country faced with the choice of entering a regional 
trade agreement or, a multilateral free trade agreement, pro and anti-regionalism forces 
operate, and the policy-maker’s decision is a political equilibrium that balances these 
contrasting forces.
Thus, we formalise the policy-maker’s decision to enter the regional trade agreement 
as a choice of political economy driven by the presence of distortions in the policy­
making process.
Notably, we derive a condition under which the policy-maker will choose to enter 
a regional trade agreement rather than a multilateral agreement leading to free trade.
Second, this chapter investigates the implications of a country’s initial choice to 
enter a regional trade agreement on its incentives to pursue subsequent multilateral 
trade liberalization.
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Drawing on our theoretical framework where the choice of a regional trade agree­
ment is driven by the existence of distortions in the policy-making process, we show 
that the initial choice of regionalism unambiguously undermines the process of multi­
lateral trade liberalization.
Notably, we show that once a country enters a politically-supported regional trade 
agreement, subsequent multilateral trade liberalization will no longer be pursued since 
the incumbent policy-maker will have no incentives to move from the status quo.
In this regard our analysis distinguishes from Levy (1997) who addressed the im­
plications of regionalism on multilateral trade liberalisation in a median-voter political 
economy setting. Our analysis also differs from Krishna (1998) who investigated how 
regionalism affects the incentives for multilateral liberalisation assuming that domestic 
firms’ profits are the only decisive variable in the policy-maker’s choice.
3.2 The basic model
We assume that the world economy is constituted by three symmetric countries, la­
belled as country X , country Y , and the rest of the world Z.
We consider that in each country a manufacturing sector and an agricultural sector 
exist. Notably, the manufacturing sector is assumed to be characterised by differenti­
ated products, increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition.
On the other hand, we consider that the agricultural sector is characterized by a 
homogenous product, constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
Focusing on consumers, we assume that in each country there are two groups of 
agents, that is labourers and firm owners. In particular, we assume that k is the 
fraction of firm owners in the population while (1 — k) is the fraction of labourers, 
with 0 < k < 1.
We consider that labourers’ and firm owners’ preferences are, respectively, given
by:
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U L = C ^ C ' i f (3.1)
u F = M (3.2)
where
CM = £ < = ;
( -^D (^-i)
Particularly c* is the consumption of the manufactured variety i, a > 1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, 0 < A < 1, and 0 < 0 < l .4
Focusing on the manufacturing sector, we assiune that in each country the labour 
input requirement for any variety i is given by:
li =  a  +  /3xi with a, f3 > 0.
where X{ is the output of variety i and a  is a fixed cost.
We assume that the number of manufacturing firms in each country is fixed with 
each firm being sufficiently small to treat market aggregates as exogenous.5,6
In addition, in order to simplify our framework we consider that there is no possi­
bility of relocation of activity for manufacturing firms, and each firm is totally owned 
by a firm owner, resident of the country in which the firm is located.
4 We assume different parameters in the preferences of labourers and firm owners to capture the 
real world’s feature that different groups of agents show different tastes over the same range of goods. 
However, our results would be maintained if we assumed the same parameters in the preferences of 
labourers and firm owners.
5 Market behavior in the manufacturing sector might be thought to be like monopohstic competition 
but with no entry. See Baldwin (1995) and Desrouelle and Richardson (1997) for a similar approach.
6 The assumption of non-entry is introduced to guarantee firm owners have positive profits to use 
in lobbying activity. Alternatively, we could assume free entry and the existence of specific factor of 
production owned by firm owners. In this case even if firms’ profits would be zero, firm owners would 
have a positive income to lobby the incumbent policy-maker.
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Focusing on the agricultural sector, we consider that in the production function 
is linear homogenous, and we choose units of good A  such that the unit labour input 
coefficient is unity.
Finally, we assume that no trade barriers exist on the flows of international trade 
in the agricultural good while barriers to international trade in manufactured goods 
exist.
Thus, we consider that symmetric non-discriminatory ad-valorem tariffs are ini­
tially imposed by any country on imports of manufactured goods such that:
4  = t if s ^ j  (3.3)
tj = 0 if s = j  (3.4)
where 1ps is the tariff imposed by country j  on imports from country s.7
Notably, in any country the tariff revenue collected by the government on imports 
of manufactured goods is assumed to be uniformly redistributed through lump-sum 
transfers to all the agents in the economy.
Thus, firm owners’ income is assumed to derive from firm profits plus the transfers 
received while labourers’ income from the labour they provide to firms plus the transfers 
received.
7 In order to simplify our theoretical framework we assume that the ad-valorem import tariffs are 
exogenously given. See Krugman (1991) for a model of endogenous import tariff determination in 
which countries choose their import tariff in order to maximize their level of aggregate social welfare. 
In addition, see Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Cadot et al. (1997) for influence-driven models of 
endogenous import tariff determination in which interest groups’ lobbying activity affects the structure 
of protection.
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3.3 The initial sym m etric equilibrium
In view of the symmetric nature of countries and of import tariffs on flows of manufac­
tured goods across countries, we derive the equilibrium for the representative country.
Having assumed that costless trade in the agricultural sector prevails, the equilib­
rium wage in all countries will be equalized as long as the agricultural good is produced 
in any of the countries, which is assumed henceforth.8
Notably, taking labour to be our numeraire, the wage perceived by labourers in the 
representative country will be equal to unity.
Focusing on consumers’ utility maximization, we observe that labourers and firm 
owners will spend, respectively, a fraction (1 — A) and (1 — <j>) of their incomes on 
the agricultural good A , and a fraction A and <j> of their incomes on the composite 
manufactured good M.
In the rest of our analysis in order to simplify the derivation of the equilibrium 
demand patterns, we assume <j> to be zero and A to be strictly between unity and 
zero.9
Normalizing the size of the population to unity, since firm owners’ income derives 
from firm profits plus the transfers received, and labourers’ income derives from the 
amount of labour they provided to firms plus the transfers received, the total income 
of labourers and firm owners, labelled as E L and E F, respectively, are:
E l  = (1 -  k) • (1 +  JR°) (3.5)
E f  = k • (n° + B?) (3.6)
8The non-full-specialisation (NFS) condition requires that no country has enough labour to satisfy 
the world demand for the agricultural good, i.e. that the world spending on this good is larger than the 
maximum value of its production that is possible in any of the countries. Being countries symmetric, 
the NFS condition requires that 3 • [(1 — A) • E L +  (1 — <f>) • E F] >  pa • L, which we assume to hold 
henceforth.
9 Our final results would be maintained if we assumed <f> to be strictly between zero and one.
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where is the equilibrium import tariff revenue collected in the representative 
country and uniformly redistributed to all of the country’s agents through lump-sum 
transfers, and II0 indicate the equilibrium profits earned by any manufacturing firm 
located in the representative country.
Thus, the aggregate demand for good A  in the representative country is:
C A =  ( l - A ) - ( l - f c ) - ( l  +  f l ° )  +  M n 0 +  f l ° )  (3 .7 )
PA
where pa is the equilibrium price of good A.
Similarly, the aggregate demand of the manufactured composite good in the rep­
resentative country is:
q M  A ■ ( 1  — fc) • ( 1  +  f l ° )
po (3-8)
where P° represents the manufactured composite index price faced by consumers 
located in the representative country.
Having assumed the same manufacturing technology across firms and across coun­
tries, all varieties produced will be symmetric and have the same equilibrium price.
Assuming the cost of introducing a new manufactured variety to be zero, since all 
varieties enter consumers’ demand symmetrically, no two firms will produce the same 
variety.
As a consequence, in the equilibrium there will be only one firm in any country that 
produces a given manufactured variety, and no duplication will arise across countries 
with each country specialised in the production of its own range of manufactured 
varieties.
Due to the existence of symmetric ad-valorem tariffs on international trade of 
manufactured goods, while the typical manufactured variety i is domestically sold at 
a price pi, the price paid by consumers importing variety i will be pi • (1 + 1).
Since in the equilibrium k manufactured varieties are produced in any country, the 
manufacturing composite index price in the representative country is:
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Po = {fc • Pi(I_,,) +  2fc • bi • (1 +  i)](1-°')} 1" 7 (3.9)
Focusing on profits maximization, since we assumed the agricultural sector to be 
perfectly competitive, the equilibrium price of good A  will be equal to its marginal 
cost such that:
PA =  1
Turning to the manufacturing sector, the typical profit-maximizing firm located in the 
representative country faces an isoelastic demand defined as:
_  A (1 — k) • pi a • (1 +  jRo) * [l +  2 (1 + 1) ff]
p( i  n
s \ \ ±  ' V  i? i  V ' ALU /  L '  '  J  / ox0 = ---------------------- ------------------------------  (3.10)
where, as shown in Mathematical Appendix, the amount of tariff revenue collected 
in the representative country is:
n  2t • A • fc • (1 — fc) • Pj1-^  • (1 +  t)~<r
(Po)(1_") -  2At • (1 -  fc) ■ k ■ p(1_<r) • (1 +  t y
Given the demand function in equation (3.10), the typical manufacturing firm 
located in the representative country will set the equilibrium price as a constant mark­
up over its marginal cost such that:
»  = ( A j  ( 3 - 1 2 )
Assuming that manufactured goods are measured in units that are chosen so that 
the unit input coefficient f3 equals (l — A), the profit-maximizing producer price of 
any manufactured variety will be equal to unity.
The typical manufacturing firm will impose a unitary price for any unit of variety 
but due to the existence of import tariffs consumers will pay a unitary price for any 
unit of variety produced locally and a price (1 + 1) for any unit of imported variety.
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Thus, given equation (3.9), the equilibrium manufactured composite index price 
faced by consumers located in the representative country is:
11—a (3.13)
It follows, that given equations (3.10) and (3.12), the equilibrium profits earned by 
the typical manufacturing firm located in the representative country are:
^  A ( l - f c ) . ( l  +  f l o ) - [ l  +  2 - ( l  +  i r <’] 
A1o — --------------- r---------- :-------- „ -----------
crk
(3.14)
1 +  2 • (1 + 1)(1_,7)]
Given equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.12), and (3.13) the equilibrium aggregate level of 
consumption of agricultural good and manufactured good, respectively, are:
d°A = (1 — A) (1 -  fc) • (1 +  Uo) +  fc-R°
( l - f c ) - ( l H - f l o ) -  [1 +  2•  (1 +  t )~ g ]
(3.15)
A(1 — fc) • (1 +  Ho)
-  -  —r
[fc +  2fc • (1 +  t)(1-l7)l l-
(3.16)
Finally, given equations (3.11) and (3.12), the equilibrium tariff revenue collected 
in the representative country is given by:
2t • A- (1-&)•( !+*)■
1 +  2 • (1 + 1)(1-<7) -  2t ■ A • (1 -  fc) • (1 +  ty
(3.17)
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3.4 Regional versus multilateral trade agreem ents
Having described the initial equilibrium characterized by symmetric non-discriminatory 
import tariff on international trade in manufactured goods, we consider that the policy­
maker in country Y  faces the choice between two different trade policy options.10
First, country Y  may enter a regional trade agreement with country X  leading 
to the formation of a free trade area (FTA) such that countries Y  and X  would 
reciprocally remove any barriers to trade in manufactured goods while maintaining 
their initial tariff t on imports of manufactured goods produced in the rest of the 
world Z .11,12
Alternatively, country Y  may enter a multilateral free trade agreement with coun­
tries X  and Z  which would imply the removal of any tariff barrier on international 
flows of manufactured varieties among countries Y, X , and the rest of the world Z.
Relying on the political economy approach introduced by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), we consider that the policy-maker in country Y  shapes its choice between en­
tering the regional trade agreement, or the multilateral free trade agreement taking 
into account not only aggregate social welfare but also to the level of political contri­
butions provided by a special interest group which participates in the political process 
in order to influence policy outcomes.13
Notably, the objective function of the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  is
10 Since in this chapter we aim to investigate a country’s choice between entering a regional trade 
agreement, or a multilateral free trade agreement, we assume that remaining in the initial equilibrium 
does not constitute a trade policy option for the policy-maker. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for 
an analysis of the incentives underpinning a country’s choice between remaining in the status quo, or 
entering a regional trading bloc. Also see Grossman and Helpman (1995) for an influence-driven model 
investigating a policy-maker’s choice to pursue a regional trade agreement or remaining in the status 
quo.
11 See Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a similar approach where two countries entering a FTA are 
assumed to continue to levy their status quo tariffs on imports from non-members.
12 Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs allows for the formation of regional 
trade agreements if they eliminate “duties and other regulations of commerce” on “substantially all 
trade” among member countries.
13 See Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a detailed survey of alternative political economy ap­
proaches to the formation of trade policy.
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defined as the weighted sum of the total amount of political contributions received by 
the organized interest group and the aggregate welfare, net of contributions.14
Labelling as D y  the amount of political contributions received by the policy maker 
and as Wy  the aggregate social welfare level, net of contributions, the objective func­
tion of the policy-maker in country Y , is expressed by:
Gy  =  ay • D y  +  (1 — ay)  • Wy  (3.18)
where ay  is a parameter which represents the degree of distortion in the policy­
making process and lies in the range [0,1]. Thus, when ay  equals to zero, the policy­
maker behaves as a social welfare maximizer, while the closer ay  is to unity, the greater 
is the degree of political distortion in the policy-making process.
We consider that all manufacturing firms located in country Y  are organized in an 
unique industrial lobby that offers a schedule of contingent (implicit) donations to the 
incumbent policy-maker with the final aim of affecting its trade policy choice.15
The organized interest group specifies donation contracts or “contribution sched­
ules” that stipulate how large a donation will be made for each of the two possible 
stances of trade policy.
We consider that the organized interest group tailors its contribution schedule to 
maximize the total welfare of its members.
The game is assumed to be in two stages, that is in the first stage donation contracts
are announced by the interest group and in the second stage the policy-maker sets the 
trade policy and collects the political contributions.
14 Grossman and Helpman (1994) emphasised that an incumbent policy-maker may make trade policy 
choices while being aware that its decisions may affect its chances for re-election. Thus, a policy-maker 
may value political contributions since they can be used to finance campaign spending, and aggregate 
social welfare since voters are more likely to reelect a government which has delivered a high standard 
of living. In this chapter, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we do not explicitly formalise the 
existence of an electoral process. At this regard, see Grossman and Helpman (1996) for a model with 
electoral competition where interest groups may use campaign contributions to influence the outcome 
of the election, and the competing parties’ platforms.
15 In our analysis we rule out the possibility for the interest group to offer contributions to foreign 
governments. See Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a similar approach.
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Political contributions paid by the organized interest group to the incumbent policy­
maker in country Y  are then ex-post, that is they are paid after the policy-maker has 
chosen whether to enter the regional trade agreement or, alternatively, the multilateral 
free trade agreement.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the contribution schedule specified by 
the lobby group is restricted to be “truthful” in the Bernheim-Whinston specification 
such that it everywhere reflects the true preferences of the organised interest group.16
Focusing on the other component of the policy-maker’s objective function, we define 
the net aggregate social welfare in country Y  as the gross aggregate social welfare less 
the amount of political contributions provided by the organized interest group to the 
policy-maker.
Notably, the gross aggregate social welfare is defined in a “utilitarian” way as the 
sum of the utilities reached by the agents in the economy.
Thus, the gross aggregate social welfare in country Y  is the sum of the aggregate 
indirect utility of labourers and the aggregate indirect utility, gross of contributions, 
of firm owners.
In order to analyze the policy maker’s choice between the regional trade agreement 
and the multilateral free agreement, we first derive the equilibrium that would be 
reached under the two alternative trade agreements.
3.5 The equilibrium under regionalism
In this section, we derive the equilibrium that would arise if the policy-maker in country 
Y  decided to enter the regional trade agreement.17
Thus, we assume that countries Y  and X  form an FTA and reciprocally remove
16Bemheim and Whinston (1986) showed that players bear essentially no costs from playing truthful 
strategies.
17 Given the symmetry of countries Y  and X , and assuming the same weights in the objective function 
of the policy-makers, we consider that if country Y  chooses to enter the regional trade agreement, then 
also partner country X  will choose to enter the regional trade agreement.
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any barriers to trade in manufactured goods while maintaining an unchanged tariff 
t on imports from the rest of the world Z. In addition, we consider that country Z  
maintains an unchanged tariff t on all imports of manufactured goods from countries 
Y  and X , belonging to the FTA.
As long as all countries produce in both sectors and costless trade in the agricultural 
sector prevails, the equilibrium wage will be equalized across countries.
In addition, taking labour to be our numeraire, the equilibrium wage will be equal 
to unity. Recalling that firm owners’ income derives from firms’ profits plus the trans­
fers received and labourers’ income derive from the labour provided to firms plus the 
transfers received, under the regional trade agreement the total income of labourers 
and firm owners located in country Y , labelled as Ej*Y and E ^ y , respectively, would 
be:
E *y  =  (1 -  fc) • (1 +  R?) (3.19)
E §y = k ■ (n£ +  R§) (3.20)
where Ily and Ry  indicate, respectively, the amount of profits earned by any 
manufacturing firm in country Y, and the import tariff revenue collected in country Y  
under the regional trade agreement.
Similarly, the total income of labourers and firm owners located in country X  under 
the regional trade agreement labelled as Ej*x  and E p X , respectively, would be:
E l x  =  ( l - * ) - ( l  +  B%) (3.21)
E%x  = k-(Jl% + R $)  (3.22)
where 11  ^ and Rx  indicate, respectively, the amount of profits earned by any 
manufacturing firm located in country X , and the amount of import tariff revenue
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collected in country X  under the regional trade agreement.
Finally, the total income of labourers and firm owners located in the rest of the 
world Z  when country Y  decides to enter the regional trade agreement, labelled as 
E^ z  and E p Z, respectively, would be:
E?iZ = ( l - k )  + ( l - k ) - R §  (3.23)
E%z  = k • n £  + k • R§  (3.24)
where II^ and R z  indicate, respectively, the amount of profits earned by any man­
ufacturing firm located in country Z, and the amount of import tariff revenue collected 
in country Z.
Given the utility functions of labourers and firm owners and the unitary equilib­
rium price of the agricultural good, under the regional trade agreement the aggregate 
demand for the agricultural good and the composite manufactured good in country Y  
would, respectively, be:
Ca,y =  ( l - A ) ( l - f c ) ( l  + R^) +  fc (n p  + fl^) (3.25)
c .
where Py represents the manufactured composite price index faced by consumers 
located in country Y  under the regional trade agreement.
Similarly, the aggregate demand for the agricultural good and the composite man­
ufactured good in country X  under the regional trade agreement would be:
C l x  =  (1 -  A) • (1 -  k) • (1 +  R$) + k ■ ( n j  +  i $ )  (3.27)
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(3.28)
Furthermore the aggregate demand in country Z  for the agricultural good and the 
composite manufactured good under the regional trade agreement would be:
(3.29)
(3.30)
where P^ is the composite price index of the manufacturing good that would be
faced by consumers located in country Z.
Having assumed the same manufacturing technology across firms and across coun­
tries, all manufactured varieties produced will be symmetric and have the same equi­
librium price.
Since we assume the cost of introducing a new variety to be zero, and all manufac­
tured varieties enter consumers’ demand symmetrically, no two firms will produce the 
same variety. Thus, in equilibrium there will be only one firm in any country producing 
a manufactured variety and no duplication will arise, with each country specializing in 
the production of its own range of manufactured varieties.
Consumers located in the FTA will pay a price pi for any unit of a manufactured 
variety produced in the regional trading bloc, and a price pi • (1 + 1) for any unit of 
variety imported from the rest of the world Z.
Alternatively, consumers located in country Z  will pay a price Pi for any unit of 
a manufactured variety produced locally, and a price pi • (1 + 1) for any unit of a 
manufactured variety imported from the regional trading bloc.
Since in equilibrium k manufactured varieties are produced in each country, un­
der the regional trade agreement the manufactured composite index price faced by 
consumers located in countries Y  and X  would be:
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Py = Px  =  {2k ■ p(l_<r) +  k • [pi • (1 + 1)]'1-" )} 1 " (3.31)
On the other hand, the manufactured composite price index faced by consumers 
located in country Z, excluded from the FTA, would be given by:
P i  = {k -  PS1' " 1 +  2k ■ [pi • (1 +  *)](1-' )} ^  (3.32)
Focusing on the maximization of profits, we observe that a typical firm located in 
countries Y  and X  will maximize its profits facing an isoelastic demand given by:
xy  =  x x  = A • (1 — k) • p. 2 - ( l  +  j t f )  ( l  +  f l f ) - ( l  +  t)- 
( p « ) (I" <T> ( P i ) (1~a)
(3.33)
where, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the amount of tariff revenue col­
lected in country Y , X  and Z, respectively, are:
tjR    n R  _k y  — n x  —
p f l_Sty —
t ■ X ■ k ■ (1 -  k) ■ pj1 ^  • (1 + 1) °
(p B )(i-ff) _  A4 ■ (1 -  fc) • fc • p*1""’ . (1 +  ty
2t ■ A • (1 -  k) ■ k •p|1_") • (1 +1)"°'
(3.34)
(3.35)
( P | ) (1_<r) -  24 ■ A • (1 -  k) ■ k ■ ■ (1 +  t y
Any manufacturing firm located in the rest of the world Z would face an isoelastic 
demand expressed by:
xz  =A- (1  - k ) - p i—ai
1 + R§  ^ 2 • (l  +  Ry) ■ (1 + 1)'
(3.36)( p |) (  (p fi) '1-")
Given the demand functions expressed in (3.33) and (3.36), any profit-maximizing 
firm located in the regional trading bloc and in the rest of the world Z will set its 
equilibrium price as a constant mark-up over the marginal cost:
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Pi -  t)  (3-37)
Assuming that manufactured goods are measured in units chosen so that the unit 
input coefficient equals (l — ^), the equilibrium price of any manufactured variety 
will be equal to unity.
While all manufacturing firms will impose the same unitary price, consumers in the 
regional trading bloc will pay a unitary price for any manufactured variety produced 
locally, and a price (1 + 1) for any unit of imported variety from the rest of the world.
On the other hand, consumers located in the rest of the world Z  will pay a unitary
price for any manufacturing variety produced locally and a price (1 + 1) for any unit 
of manufactured variety imported from the regional trading bloc.
It follows that, given equations (3.31) and (3.32), the equilibrium composite manu­
facturing index price faced by consumers located in country Y  , X  and Z  respectively, 
would be:
=  h k  + k • (1 + t)(1_l7)] 1=7 (3.38)
P§  =  [fe +  2k • (1 +  t)(1-" ) l1=7 (3.39)
Given equations (3.33), (3.36), (3.38) and (3.39), the equilibrium level of operating 
profits of any manufacturing firm located in the FTA and in the rest of the world Z , 
respectively, would be:
rrfl — TTfl — ^n r - n * - — ^ r -
2 • ( l  +  R $ )  ^  ( l  +  R z ) ’ (1 + 1) (3.40)
TT-R _  
—
A ( l - f c )
ak
(1 +  R f) + 2 * ( l  +  i?y) * (1 +  f) (3.41)
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Furthermore, given equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.37), (3.38), and (3.40) the equi­
librium aggregate level of consumption of the agricultural good and the composite 
manufactured good in countries Y  and X  would be:
/nr/2UA,Y Ca ,x  — (1 -  A) • (1 — fc) • (1 +  Ry) H----^ — - •
-I- fc* Ry
2 + (1 + 1  +  2 • (1 +  i)(1_or)
(3.42)
/nr R    /~iR _°M,y — —
A • (1 -  fc) • (1 +  R§) (3.43)
2k +  k ■ (1 + 1)(1-(,)]
Also, given equations (3.29), (3.30), (3.37), (3.39) and (3.41), the equilibrium ag­
gregate level of consumption of the agricultural good and manufactured good in the 
rest of the world Z  would, respectively, be given by:
/~iR (1 -  A) • (1 — k) • (l +  R%) H----^ — -
1 + R% 2 (1 + 1) a • ( l  +  R y X)
+ +  k • flg (3.44)
siR  _°M,Z —
A . ( l - f c ) - ( l  +  iJ§)
1
L—a
(3.45)
k + 2k - (1 +  «)(1_<r)l ■'
Finally, given equations (3.34), (3.35), (3.38), and (3.39) the equilibrium import 
tariff revenue collected in countries Y, X  and Z, respectively, would be:
n R    r>R _Ky — Kx  —
T ) R __rtz —
t • X • (1 — k) • k • (1 + 1)'
2fc +  fc • (1 + - 1 • A ■ (1 -  k) ■ k • (1 +  ()’
2 • t  • A • (1 -  fc) • fc • (1 + 1)‘
1 + 2 - (1 +  t)(1_<T) — 2 • t - A • (1 — fc) • fc - (1 +  ty
(3.46)
(3.47)
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3.6 The equilibrium under m ultilateralism
In this section we derive the equilibrium that would arise if the policy-maker in country 
Y  decides to enter the multilateral free trade agreement under which all barriers to 
international trade in manufactured varieties are removed among countries y , X  and 
Z.
Given the symmetric structure of the three countries and the reciprocal elimination 
of import tariffs on international flows of manufactured goods, we derive the equilib­
rium for the representative country.
As long as all countries produce in both sectors and costless trade in the agricultural 
sector prevails, the equilibrium wage in all countries will be equalized and, taking 
labour to be the numeraire, the equilibrium wage will be equal to unity.
Since under the multilateral free trade agreement the amount of import tariff rev­
enue collected is nil, firms owners’ income derives only from firm profits while labourers’ 
income derives only from the amount of labour they provide to firms.
Thus, under the multilateral free trade agreement the total income of labourers 
and firm owners located in the representative country, labelled as E£t  and EpT, 
respectively, would be:
E [ r  = { 1 -  k) (3.48)
E P ' = MIf t  (3.49)
where is the level of profits earned by any manufacturing firm located in the 
representative country.
Given the utility functions of labourers and firm owners and the equilibrium uni­
tary price of the agricultural good, under the multilateral free trade agreement the
aggregate demand for the agricultural good and the composite manufactured good in 
the representative country would, respectively, be:
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C f ?  =  (1 -  A) • (1 -  k) + (3.50)
—
FT _  A • (1 -  fc)
(3.51)
where P FT represents the manufactured composite index price faced by consumers
located in the representative country.
Having assumed the same manufacturing technology across firms and across coun­
tries, all manufactured varieties produced will have the same equilibrium price.
Since the cost of introducing a new variety is zero, no two firms will choose to
symmetrically.
Thus, in equilibrium there will be only one firm that produces a manufactured 
variety and no duplication will arise within or across countries with each country 
specializing in the production of its own range of manufactured varieties.
under the multilateral free trade agreement, consumers located in the representative 
country will pay a price pi for any unit of manufacturing variety produced locally and 
for any unit of imported manufactured variety.
Since in equilibrium k manufactured varieties are produced in each country, the 
manufactured composite index price in the representative country under the multilat­
eral free trade agreement is:
Focusing on profits maximization, we note that the typical firm located in the 
representative country will maximize its profits facing an isoelastic demand given by:
produce the same variety since all manufactured varieties enter consumers’ demand
Since all tariff barriers to international trade in manufactured varieties are removed
(3.52)
x 3 - A - ( l -h ) - p r * (3.53)(pFT) (l-tr)
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Given the demand function in equation (3.53), the typical profit-maximizing man­
ufacturing firm located in the representative country will set the equilibrium price as 
a constant mark-up over the marginal cost:
Pi =  J ^ T )  (354)
Maintaining our assumption that manufactured goods are measured in units chosen 
such that the unit input coefficient (3 equals (l — £), the profit-maximizing producer 
price of any manufactured variety will be equal to unity.
Following the equilibrium price condition in equation (3.54), the equilibrium com­
posite manufactured composite index price faced by consumers located in the repre­
sentative country would be:
P FT =  (3 f c ) ^  (3.55)
Given equations (3.53), (3.54), and (3.55), the equilibrium level of profits earned 
by the typical manufacturing firm located in the representative country under the 
multilateral free trade agreement would be:
n FT =  A ' (1, ~ fc)- (3.56)ak
Furthermore, given equations (3.49), (3.55), and (3.56), under the multilateral free
trade agreement the equilibrium aggregate level of consumption of the agricultural
good and manufactured good in the representative country would, respectively, be:
cJT = (i-fc) ( l - A )  +  £ (3.57)
c ft =  M l  <=) (3.58)
(3 k)
Finally, since under the multilateral free trade agreement all import tariffs would
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be removed, the equilibrium import tariff revenue would be:
= 0 (3.59)
3.7 Profit analysis
In this section we compare the equilibrium level of profits that would be earned by the 
typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  under the regional trade agreement, 
or, alternatively, under the multilateral free trade agreement.
The choice of the policy-maker in country Y  between entering the regional trade 
agreement with country X  or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade agreement with 
countries X  and Z  will affect the level of profit earned by the typical manufacturing 
firm located in country Y.
First, if the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  decided to enter the regional 
trade agreement, given equations (3.39), (3.40), and (3.46), the equilibrium operating 
profits that would be earned by the typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  
would be:
n « =  A( i - fc)
ok 2 +  (1 +  t)(1_<r) -  t • A • (1 -  k) • (1 +  ty  
A( l - fc)  (1 + t)~a
+
crk 1 +  2 • (1 +  t)(1-<T) — 2 • A • t • (1 — k) • (1 +  ty
(3.60)
The equilibrium profits that a typical manufacturing firm would earn under the 
regional trade agreement are a function of the import tariff t , the elasticity of substi­
tution, the fraction of laborers in the overall population, and laborers’ propensity to 
consume the manufactured good.
On the other hand, if the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  decided to enter 
the multilateral free trade agreement, given equation (3.56), the equilibrium operating
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profits that would be earned by the typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  
would be:
t tF T  _  A • (1 — fc)
UY ~  CTk
The equilibrium profits that a typical manufacturing firm in country Y  would earn 
under the multilateral free trade agreement are a function the elasticity of substitution, 
the fraction of laborers in the overall population, and laborers’ propensity to consume 
the manufactured good.
In order to assess the profits implications of the policy-maker’s choice between the 
two alternative options of trade policy, we compare the profits that would be earned 
by the typical manufacturing firm in country Y  under the regional trade agreement 
or, alternatively, under the multilateral free trade agreement.
We note that the typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  earns its profits 
in the local market, in the country X ’s market, and in the rest of the world market.
First, for any value of the import tariff, the equilibrium profits earned by the typical 
manufacturing firm located in country Y  in the local and in country X ’s market would 
be greater under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
The equilibrium price paid by consumers located in countries Y  and X  for any 
manufactured variety imported from the rest of the world Z  would be higher under 
the regional agreement than under the multilateral trade agreement.
In fact, consumers located in country Y  and X  would pay a price (1 + 1) for any 
unit of manufactured varieties imported form the rest of the world under the regional 
trade agreement, while they would pay a unitary price for it under the multilateral 
free trade agreement.
Since consumers located in country Y  and X  would perceive varieties produced 
in country Z  as relatively more expensive under the regional trade agreement, their 
demand for varieties produced in country Y  will be higher under the regional trade
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agreement than under the multilateral agreement.
However, for any value of the import tariff the equilibrium profits earned by the 
typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  in the rest of the world market would 
be lower under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
We note that the equilibrium price paid by consumers located in the rest of the 
world Z  for any manufactured variety imported from countries Y  would be higher 
under the regional agreement than under the multilateral trade agreement.
In fact, under the regional trade agreement consumers located in the rest of the 
world Z  would pay a price (1 + 1) for any unit of manufacturing varieties imported 
from country Y  while they would pay a unitary price under the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
Since consumers located in the rest of the world Z  would perceive varieties produced 
in countries Y  as relatively more expensive under the regional trade agreement, their 
demand for varieties produced in country Y  will be lower under the regional trade 
agreement than under the multilateral agreement.
Thus, the overall profits earned by the typical manufacturing firm in country Y  
would be higher under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free 
trade agreement if the greater profits earned in the local and country X ’s markets 
more than offset the lower profits in the rest of the world market.
On the other hand, the overall profits earned by the typical manufacturing firm 
located in country Y  would be lower under the regional trade agreement than under 
the multilateral free trade agreement if the lower profits perceived in the rest of the 
world market more than offset the higher profits earned in the local market and in 
country X 's  market.
Simulating the overall profits that would be earned by the typical manufacturing 
firm located in country Y  under the regional trade agreement and, alternatively, under 
the multilateral free trade agreement shows that two different scenarios may arise.
First, our simulation analysis indicates that for medium levels of the elasticity of
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substitution, a critical level of the import tariff exists, labelled as t*, which equalizes 
the profits that would be earned by the typical manufacturing firm located in country 
Y  under the two alternative options of trade policy.
Thus, the equilibrium profits that would be earned by the typical manufacturing 
firm under the regional trade agreement could be greater or lower than under the 
multilateral trade agreement depending on the level of the import tariff t.
Notably, if the imposed import tariff t is lower than £*, the equilibrium profits 
earned by the typical manufacturing firm located in country Y  would be greater under 
the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free trade agreement.
Instead if the imposed import tariff t is greater than £*, the equilibrium profits 
earned by the typical manufacturing firm would be greater under the multilateral free 
trade agreement than under the regional trade agreement.
Alternatively, our simulation analysis points out that for high levels of the elastic­
ity of substitution, the equilibrium profits earned by the typical manufacturing firm 
located in country Y  under the regional trade agreement would be greater than under 
the multilateral free trade agreement for any level of the import tariff t.
3.8 Tariff revenue analysis
In this section we evaluate the implications of the alternative options of trade policy 
open to the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  on the amount of tariff revenue 
collected and redistributed to all of the country’s agents through lump-sum transfers.
The policy-maker’s choice between entering the regional trade agreement with coun­
try X  or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade agreement with both countries X  
and Z  will affect the amount of tariff revenue collected in country Y  and redistributed 
to the agents in the economy.
Recalling equation (3.46), if the incumbent policy-maker chooses to enter the re­
gional trade agreement the equilibrium import tariff revenue collected in country Y  
would be:
109
fiR _  _______ t • A • (1 — fc) • (1 + 1) _______
y 2 +  (1 + 1)^ 1_<7^ — t • A • (1 — fc) • (1 +  t)_<r 
Thus, the import tariff revenue collected in country Y  under the regional trade 
agreement would be a function of the import tariff t , the elasticity of substitution, the 
fraction of labourers in the total size of the population, and labourers’ propensity to 
consume the manufactured good.
Alternatively, if the incumbent policy-maker decided to enter the multilateral free 
trade agreement the amount of tariff revenue collected in country Y  would be:
R$r  = 0
In fact since under the multilateral free trade agreement all import tariffs would 
be removed, the import tariff revenue collected in country Y  would be nil.
To assess the implications of the policy-maker’s choice between the two alternative 
options of trade policy, we compare the tariff revenue that would be collected in country 
Y  under the regional trade agreement and under the multilateral free trade agreement. 
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The amount of tariff revenue collected in country Y  will be greater 
under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral trade agreement for 
any positive level of the import tariff t.
3.9 Lobbying: a pro-regionalism force
In this section we focus on the activity of the organized interest group in order to assess 
whether industrial lobbying constitutes a pro-regionalism or pro-multilateralism force 
in the policy-making process.
We considered that all firms’ owners are organized in a unique industrial lobby that 
offers contingent donations to the incumbent policy-maker to affect its choice of trade 
policy.
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The interest group specifies a contribution schedule that stipulates how large a 
donation will be made for each of the two possible stances of trade policy, and tailors 
its contribution schedule in order to maximize the total net welfare of its members.
The contribution schedule specified by the interest group will then consists of two 
items, Dy and DyT, representing the political contributions associated with the policy­
maker’s choice to enter the regional trade agreement or, the multilateral free trade 
agreement, respectively.
We point out that it is not optimal for the interest group to specify a positive 
contribution for both policy outcomes since then it could cut back equally on both of 
its offers without affecting the policy-maker’s choice, and since it will not wish to give 
the policy-maker an incentive to choose the trade policy outcome that it is contrary 
to the lobby’s interests.
The assumption of “truthful” donation contracts implies that the interest group, 
will pay to the policy-maker for any of the two stance of trade policy chosen, the excess 
(if any) of the group’s gross welfare reached under the specified stance of trade policy 
relative to some optimally chosen base level of welfare.
Since we assumed that the organized interest group is constituted by firm owners,
— Fits gross-of-contributions welfare, labelled as Vy , is defined as the sum of the gross 
indirect utility reached by the members of the interest group.
Thus, restricting political contributions to be non-negative, the truthful contribu­
tion function takes the form:
Dy = max [0, Vy — J3j (3.61)
where the organised interest group will choose B  as such as to satisfy the voluntary 
participation constraint of the incumbent policy-maker in country Y.
Since the organised interest group’s net welfare will be equal to B  whenever the 
group makes a positive contribution to the regional policy-maker, the interest group 
will wish to make B  as large as possible but without inducing the policy-maker to
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choose a policy outcome which is damaging to the group’s own interests.
Given that there is only one organised interest group in country Y , the interac­
tion between the policy-maker and the interest group configures as a principal-agent 
problem such that the policy-maker’s voluntary participation constraint can be used 
to derive the lobby’s choice of B  in equilibrium.18
The interest group will then choose B  in order to make the policy-maker just 
indifferent between heeding the lobby’s interests, and the trade policy choice that the 
policy-maker would implement in absence of any contributions, that is the socially 
optimal choice of trade policy.
Given that the interest group will lobby for the stance of trade policy that implies 
the greater level of the group’s gross welfare, we compare the gross welfare that interest 
group will achieve if the policy-maker decided to enter the regional trade agreement 
or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade agreement.
Labelling as V ^Y respectively, the gross-of-contributions welfare of the
interest group if the policy-maker decides to enter the regional trade agreement or, 
alternatively, the multilateral agreement, we have:
V ^Y =  kU$ +  (3.62)
y f r y  =  kU V  (3-63)
As shown in equation (3.62), the gross-of contributions welfare that the interest 
group would achieve if the policy-maker decides to enter the regional trade agreement 
is the sum of the aggregate profits in the manufacturing sector and the share of import 
tariff revenue redistributed to firm owners through lump-sum transfers.
Instead, as shown in equation (3.63), the gross-of-contributions welfare that the 
interest group would achieve if the policy-maker decided to enter the multilateral free
18 See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the derivation of the lobby’s choice of B  in equilibrium 
when different organised interest groups compete for protection in a common agency framework.
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trade agreement is simply given by the aggregate profits that would be earned in 
the manufacturing sector under the multilateral free trade agreement, given that the 
collected import tariff revenue would be nil.
Given equations (3.61), (3.62) and (3.63), the political contributions that the in­
terest group would offer to the policy-maker if it chose to enter the regional trade
agreement or, the multilateral free trade agreement, take the form:
Dy =  max [0, kTly +  kRy — B] (3.64)
DyT — max [0, kU.yT — B] (3.65)
In order to evaluate whether the organized interest group in country Y  will lobby 
in favour of the regional trade agreement or, alternatively, in favour of the multilateral 
trade agreement, we compare the gross-of contributions welfare that the group would 
achieve under the two alternative stance of trade policy.
Notably, comparing the gross-of-contributions welfare that the interest group would 
achieve under the regional trade agreement or, alternatively, under the multilateral free 
trade agreement, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition  6 The organized interest group is a pro-regionalism, force for any value 
of the import tariff t.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix for proof. ■
In fact, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the gross-of-contributions welfare 
that the interest group would achieve if the policy-maker decided to enter the regional 
trade agreement is greater than the amount that it would achieve under the multilateral 
free trade agreement.
Thus, given that the regional trade agreement implies a higher level of gross-of 
contributions welfare for the organised interest group than the multilateral free trade
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agreement, industrial lobbying will constitute a pro-regionalism force in the policy­
making process.
We conclude that, insofar as the lobby’s interests are in conflict with trade policy 
outcome that the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  would choose in absence of any 
political contribution, the organized interest group will offer a positive contribution 
to the policy-maker if it chooses to enter the regional trade agreement, and a zero 
contribution otherwise.
Then, given equations (3.46), (3.56), (3.60), (3.64), and (3.65), the political contri­
butions that the interest group will offer to the policy-maker under the regional trade 
agreement, and, alternatively, under the multilateral trade agreement are given by:
d r  =  A ( l - f c ) ___________ 2 +  ak  (1 +  t y ____________
y  o  2 +  (1 + 1)(1-<7) — At (1 — k) (1 +  t)~a
A(1 - k )  (1 +  f)
1 +  2(1 +  -  2At (1 -  k) (1 + 1)
- - B  (3.66)
D$t  = 0 (3.67)
3.10 Aggregate social welfare analysis
In this section we investigate the implications of the two alternative options of trade 
policy faced by the incumbent policy-maker on the aggregate social welfare reached in 
country Y.
The choice of the incumbent policy-maker to enter the regional trade agreement 
with country X  or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade agreement with both coun­
tries X  and Z  will affect the level of aggregate social welfare reached in country Y.
Labelling as Vy the aggregate indirect utility reached by labourers in country Y,  
— Fand given that Vy indicates the gross aggregate indirect utility of firm owners, we can 
express the gross aggregate social welfare in country Y  as:
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WY = Vjf +  (3.68)
We define the net aggregate social welfare in country Y  as the gross aggregate 
social welfare less the political contribution paid by the interest group to the incumbent 
policy-maker.
It follows from equation (3.68) that net aggregate social welfare takes the form:
WY = V f  + Vy  -  Dy  (3.69)
Given equation (3.69) and labelling as V ^Y and Vpyy, respectively, the aggregate 
indirect utility of labourers if the policy-maker decides to enter the regional trade 
agreement or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade agreement, we have:
Wy = Vr ,y  +  V ky  -  D? (3.70)
W y? — VpTY +  VpT y  — D y1 (3.71)
where Wy is the net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in country Y  
under the regional trade agreement, while W yT is the net aggregate social welfare that 
would reached under the multilateral free trade agreement.
If the incumbent policy-maker chose to enter the regional trade agreement, given 
equations (3.1), (3.45), (3.46), (3.49), and (3.50), the labourers’ indirect utility and 
firm owners’ gross indirect utility, would be:
r „ (1 -  A)1_A • Aa • • (1 -  fc) • [2 +  (1 +  *)<1-")] ^ +l
Vy ' = ------------------------ n— i---------      (3-72)
Y 2 +  (1 + 1)^ 1- ^  — Ai (1 — fc) • (1 +  *)_CT
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Vy
F,R _  A(1 — fc) 2 +  orkt (1 + t)'
°  2 +  (i +  t ) {l~a) -  xt (i -  fc) ( i + t y
A(i - fc)  ( i + ^ r 7
1 +  2(1  +  *)(1_<r) -  2At (1 -  fc) (1 + t y (3.73)
Given equations (3.20), (3.68), (3.70), (3.72), and (3.73), the gross aggregate social 
welfare reached in country Y  if the policy-maker decided to enter the regional trade 
agreement would be:
__ (1 -  A)1_a • Aa • (1 -  fc) [2 +  (1 +  <)(1“',)1 "■*
w 9 =  ----------------------------L-------------- J—
+1
2 +  (1 + 1)^ — Xt (1 — fc) • (1 + 1)
A( l - fc)
+ (3.74)
_____ 2+<Tkt(l+t)~a_____
2 + ( l + 0 (1-ff)- A t ( l - i b ) ( l + t ) - <
On the other hand, if the incumbent policy-maker chose to enter the multilat­
eral free trade agreement, given equations (3.1), (3.51), (3.56), (3.58) and (3.60), the 
labourers’ indirect utility and firm owners’ gross indirect utility, would be:
V f'FT =  (1 -  A)1-a • Aa • fc^T • (1 -  fc) • ( 3 ) ^ (3.75)
f>F,FT _  A • (1 — fc)
Vy ~  O
(3.76)
Thus, given equations (3.21), (3.75), and (3.76), the gross aggregate social welfare 
reached in country Y  under the multilateral free trade agreement would be:
W f1" = (1 -  A)1-* ■ Aa • k ^  • (1 -  *0 • (3)^1 +a-A \ a
_A_ A. (1 -  fc) (3.77)
Given equations (3.65), (3.66), (3.74), and (3.77), the net aggregate social welfare 
reached in country Y  under the regional trade agreement and under the multilateral 
trade agreement would be:
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w f 1Y ~
(1 -  A)1_a • Aa • f c ^  (1 -  fc) • [2 +  (1 +  t)(1_,T)] ’~l 
2 +  (1 +  -  At (1 -  fc) • (1 +  t)~a
+1
A(l-fc)
2+crkt(l+tY
- d S
(3.78)
(3.79)
w y  =  (1 -  A)1_a • Aa • fc^i • (1 -  fc) • (3 )^ r +  — — -  D f?  (3.80)<7
Comparing the net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in country Y  
under the regional trade agreement and, alternatively, under the multilateral free trade 
agreement, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 The net aggregate social welfare reached in country Y  would be greater 
under the multilateral free trade agreement than under the regional trade agreement for 
any positive value of the import tariff t.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
If the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  decided to enter the regional trade 
agreement, consumers located in country Y  would pay a unitary price for any manu­
factured varieties produced locally and in the partner country X .
Alternatively, if the policy-maker in country Y  decided to enter the multilateral 
free trade agreement, consumers located in country Y  would pay a unitary price for 
manufactured varieties produced locally as well as for manufactured varieties imported 
from both countries X  and Z.
However, consumers located in country Y  will perceive a higher income under 
the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free trade agreement since 
the collected import tariff revenue redistributed to all of the country’s agents will be 
positive.
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Since the lower prices paid for varieties imported from the rest of the world under 
the multilateral trade agreement will more than compensate for the lower income 
perceived, consumers located in country Y  will achieve a higher indirect utility under 
the multilateral trade agreement than under the regional trade agreement.
3.11 The policy-maker’s choice o f trade policy
In this section we investigate the choice of the incumbent policy maker in country Y  
between entering the regional trade agreement or, alternatively, the multilateral free 
trade agreement.
The policy-maker will achieve a different level of political support depending on 
whether it chooses to enter the regional trade agreement or, the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
Notably, the policy-maker’s choice of trade policy will affect the level of support it 
receives by affecting the actual amount of political contributions that it would receive 
and the net aggregate social welfare that would be reached in country Y.
Given equation (3.17), the political support that the policy-maker in country Y  
would receive if it decided to enter the regional trade agreement may be expressed as:
Gy = ay • Dp  +  (1 -  aY) ■ W$
where Dy  and Wy  are expressed in equations (3.66) and (3.78).
On the other hand, the political support that the policy-maker would receive if it 
decided to enter the multilateral free trade agreement, is given by:
G P ' = ay ■ D f?  +  (1 -  ay) ■ w f 1"
where Dy? and W y 1  are expressed in equations (3.67) and (3.79).
Since we assumed that the policy-maker in country Y  is a political-support maxi­
mizer, it will choose to enter the regional trade agreement or the multilateralism free
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trade agreement depending on which stance of trade policy guarantees the higher level 
of political support.
Notably, we can express the problem of the policy-maker as choosing rj in order to 
maximize:
*?■ [ a y D ?  + ( l - a y ) - W $ ]  + (X — t?) - [ay ■ D f  + ( 1  -  ay) ■ W ^ ]
where the variable 77 equals one if the policy-maker chooses to enter the regional trade 
agreement while it equals zero if it chooses to enter the multilateral free trade agree­
ment.
Given the policy-maker’s maximization problem, we can state the following propo­
sition:
Proposition 8 The incumbent policy-maker in country Y  will choose to enter the 
regional trade agreement if the following condition is satisfied:
ay ■ (Dy -  D f? )  +  (1 -  ay) ■ (W p  -  W £T) > 0 (3.81)
We refer to the condition stated in Proposition 8 as the “regionalism” condition 
since when it is satisfied the policy-maker in country Y  will choose to enter the regional 
trade agreement since this choice guarantees the greater level of political support.
Alternatively, when the regionalism condition is not satisfied the policy-maker will 
choose to enter the multilateral free trade agreement since choosing this stance of trade 
policy guarantees the greater level of political support.
Thus, our analysis points out that the choice of entering a regional trade agreement 
when multilateral free trade is at hand configures as a political economic decision driven 
by the political support maximizing behavior of the policy-maker.
Notably, the choice of the policy-maker between the two alternative stances of
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trade policy may be conceived as a political equilibrium that balances pro- and anti­
regionalism forces.
We showed that the organized interest group constitutes a pro-regionalism force 
offering a greater donation to the policy-maker if it chooses to enter the regional trade 
agreement rather than the multilateral free trade agreement.
On the other hand, we showed that the net aggregate social welfare reached in 
country Y  would be greater under the multilateral free trade agreement rather than 
the regional trade agreement so operating as a anti-regionalism force in the policy­
making process.
Thus, the policy-maker faces a trade-off between the greater political contributions 
that it would receive if it chose the regional trade agreement and the greater net 
aggregate social welfare that would be reached in country Y  if it chose the multilateral 
free trade agreement.
As the regionalism condition indicates, the policy-maker will choose to enter the 
regional trade agreement if the weighted gain in the amount of political contributions 
received offsets at least the weighted loss in the net aggregate social welfare achieved 
in country Y.
On the other hand, the policy-maker will choose to enter the multilateral free trade 
agreement if weighted gain of in net aggregate social welfare reached in country Y  more 
than offset the weighted loss in the amount of political contributions received.
Notably, the higher is the degree of political distortion, the greater is the weight 
the policy-maker attaches to the greater donations it would receive under the regional 
trade agreement, while the lower the weight it attaches to the greater net aggregate 
social welfare that would be achieved under the multilateral free trade agreement.
3.12 Simulation analysis: the policy-m aker’s choice
Our analysis developed a theoretical framework in which the choice of entering a re­
gional trade agreement vis-arvis to a multilateral free trade agreement is modeled as a
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political economic decision driven by the political support-maximizing behavior of the 
policy-maker.
We showed that the policy-maker in country Y  faces a trade-off between the po­
litical contribution that it would receive under the regional trade agreement and the 
greater net aggregate social welfare that would be achieved under the multilateral free 
trade agreement. As a result, the policy-maker will choose to enter the regional trade 
agreement if and only if the weighted gain in the political contributions it would receive 
under the regional trade agreement compensate for the weighted loss in net aggregate 
social welfare in country Y.
In this section we simulate our theoretical model under different values of the 
parameters depicting the choice of the policy-maker in country Y  between the regional 
trade agreement or the multilateral free trade agreement, and we summarize our results 
in Figure 3-1.
In the following we discuss the baseline case in which the elasticity of substitution 
is a = 5, labourers’ propensity to consume the manufactured good is A =  0.4, and the 
fraction of firm owners in the overall population is assumed to be k = 0.6.
Notably, we choose an elasticity of substitution of 5 in the baseline case to be in the 
middle of the range of estimates provided in Broda and Weinstein (2004) and Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004), but we also experiment with values of 4 and 10 to cover the 
range of the empirical estimates.19 Furthermore the share of the manufactured good 
in labourers’ utility function is chosen to be equal to 0.4 in the baseline case to be in 
line with the value commonly used in the trade literature, as for example in Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (1999), but we also provide simulations for the higher value 
of 0.6 and lower value of O.3.20 Finally, we choose a fraction of firm owners in the 
population of 0.6 in the baseline case to be in the middle of the range of the estimates
19 Broda and Weinstein (2004) estimated that the average elasticity of substitution in the U.S. for 
the period between 1990 and 2001 was around eight for 10-digit goods, around five within 5-digitgoods, 
and about four within 3-digit goods. In addition, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provided a survey 
of the empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the trade literature, and showed that it 
is likely to be in the range of four to ten.
20 At this regard also see Head and Mayer (2004), and Martin and Rey (2005).
121
Figure 3-1: Simulations of the policy-maker’s choice of trade policy
c X k oY The policy-maker's choice
Baseline 5 0.4 0.6 Low Multilateralism
Baseline 5 0.4 0.6 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.58
Lower a 4 0.4 0.6 Low Multilateralism
Lower a 4 0.4 0.6 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.56
Higher a 10 0.4 0.6 Low Regionalism for any value of t
Higher a 10 0.4 0.6 High Regionalism for any value of t
Lower X 5 0.3 0.6 Low Multilateralism
Lower X 5 0.3 0.6 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.48
Higher A, 5 0.6 0.6 Low Multilateralism
Higher X 5 0.6 0.6 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.71
Lower k 5 0.4 0.4 Low Multilateralism
Lower k 5 0.4 0.4 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.65
Higher k 5 0.4 0.8 Low Multilateralism
Higher k 5 0.4 0.8 High Regionalism for t lower than 0.42
provided in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Eicher and Osang (2002), but we also 
experiment with values of 0.4 and of 0.8 to cover the range of the empirical estimates.21
Focusing on the baseline case, in order to investigate the industrial lobbying activ­
ity, we analyse the donations differential, that is the difference between the donations 
that the policy-maker would receive under the regional trade agreement and, alterna­
tively, under the multilateral free trade agreement.
In Figure 3-2 we present a simulation of the donations differential as a function of 
the level of the import tariff for the chosen values of the elasticity of substitution, the 
fraction of firm owners in the total population, and labourers’ propensity to consume 
the manufactured good.
Our simulation analysis shows that the organised interest group lobbies in favour 
of the regional trade agreement for any value of the import tariff thus acting as a
21 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimated the fraction of the U.S. population that owned sector specific 
inputs to be 0.9 while Eicher and Osang (2002) estimated it to be 0.3. We use the estimates for the 
fraction of the population that owns specific inputs as a proxy for the fraction of firm owners in the 
population.
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Figure 3-2: Donations differential
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pro-regionalism force in the policy-making process.
Focusing on the net aggregate social welfare, we consider the welfare differential 
that is the difference between the net aggregate social welfare that would be achieved in 
country Y  under the regional trade agreement and, alternatively, under the multilateral 
free trade agreement.
In Figure 3-3 we provide a simulation of the welfare differential as a function of 
the import tariff, for the chosen values of the elasticity of substitution, the fraction of 
labourers in the total population and labourers’ propensity to consume the manufac­
tured good.
Our simulation analysis shows that the multilateral free trade agreement guarantees 
an higher level of net aggregate social welfare in country Y  than the regional trade 
agreement for any value of the import tariff.
Thus, the greater level of aggregate social welfare that would be achieved under the 
multilateral free trade agreement compared with the regional trade agreement operates
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Figure 3-3: Net aggregate social welfare differential
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as a anti-regionalism force in the policy-making process.
The policy-maker faces a trade-off between the greater political contributions that 
it would receive under the regional trade agreement and the greater net aggregate 
social welfare that would be reached in country Y  under the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
The policy-maker will choose to enter the regional trade agreement if the weighted 
gain in amount of political contributions received under the regional trade agreement 
offsets at least the weighted loss of aggregate social welfare achieved in country Y.
In order to investigate the choice of the policy-maker, we focus on the political 
support differential defined as the difference between the political support that the 
policy-maker would obtain under the regional trade agreement and under the multi­
lateral free trade agreement.
First, we note that for a low degree of political distortion in spite of the pro­
regionalism lobbying activity the policy-maker will choose to enter the multilateral
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Figure 3-4: Political support differential for a low degree of political distortion.
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trade agreement. Modelling the existence of a low degree of political distortion by 
assuming ay = 0.2, in Figure 3-4 we simulate the political support differential for the 
chosen values of the parameters.
Our simulation shows that since the policy-maker attaches a low weight to the gain 
in political contributions that it would obtain by choosing to enter the regional trade 
agreement will not compensate for the weighted loss of net aggregate social welfare 
that would arise.
Thus the policy-maker will choose to enter the multilateral free trade agreement 
rather than the regional trade agreement for any value of the import tariff.
Alternatively, for a high level of political distortion the policy-maker might choose 
to enter the regional trade agreement or, alternatively, the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
Modelling the existence of a high degree of political distortion by assuming ay =
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Figure 3-5: Political support differential for a high degree of political distortion
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0.9, in Figure 3-5 we provide a simulation of the political support differential as a 
function of the import tariff for the chosen value of the parameters of the model.
Our simulation analysis shows that for a high degree of political distortion a level of 
the import tariff exists for which the regional trade agreement and the multilateral free 
trade agreement would entail the same level of political support for the policy-maker in 
country Y.  Notably, given the values of the parameters, the value of the import tariff 
for which the alternative trade agreements imply the same level of political support 
for the policy-maker is t = 0.58.
Thus, when the import tariff is lower or equal to t = 0.58, the policy-maker will 
choose the regional trade agreement since this choice will guarantee a greater political 
support. In fact, the weighted gain in political contributions reached under the regional 
trade agreement will more than offset the weighted loss in net aggregate social welfare 
in country Y.
However, if the import tariff is greater than t = 0.58, the policy-maker will choose
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the multilateral free trade agreement since this choice guarantees a greater political 
support. In this case, the weighted gain in net aggregate social welfare reached un­
der the multilateral free trade agreement will more than offset the weighted loss in 
campaign contributions.
3.13 Is regionalism bad for multilateralism?
A buoyant debate exists between those who argue that regional agreements can com­
plement existing multilateral efforts to foster greater economic integration among coun­
tries and those who see such agreements as a threat to multilateral trade liberalisation.
A relevant body of the recent literature has focused on the implications of region­
alism for the multilateral trading system, investigating whether regionalism may be a 
faster way to reach multilateralism or hurt multilateral liberalization making it even 
more difficult.
The theoretical framework we developed provides useful insights on the implications 
of a country’s initial decision of entering a regional trade agreement on its incentives 
to move toward subsequent multilateral trade liberalization.
In this section, we assume that the regionalism condition in Proposition 8 is satisfied 
such that the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  decides to enter the regional trade 
agreement with country X  rather than the multilateral free trade agreement.
Thus, the weighted gain in the amount of political contributions that the policy­
maker receive under the regional trade agreement is assumed to more than offset the 
weighted loss in net aggregate social welfare in country Y.
We consider that once country Y  has entered the regional trade agreement, the in­
cumbent policy-maker has to choose between entering a multilateral free trade agree­
ment or, remaining in the status quo, that is in the regional trade agreement with 
country X .
The policy-maker in country Y  would choose to enter the multilateral free trade 
agreement only if this choice guarantees a greater level of political support than re­
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maining in the status quo.
On the basis of Proposition 7 we note that the multilateral free trade agreement 
would lead to a greater net aggregate social welfare in country Y  than remaining in 
the status quo.
However, on the basis of Proposition 6 we note that the organized interest group 
will lobby in favour of remaining in the status quo since this choice would imply a 
greater level gross-of-contributions aggregate welfare for the interest group.
The incumbent policy-maker in country Y  would choose to move towards multi­
lateralism rather than remaining in the status quo only if the weighted gain in net 
aggregate social welfare more than compensate for the weighted loss in the amount of 
political contributions received.
Assuming the degree of distortions in the policy-making process to be unchanged, 
the fact that the policy-maker has initially chosen to enter the regional trade agreement 
implies that the weighted gain in political contributions that it would obtain remaining 
in the status quo more than offset the weighted loss in net aggregate social welfare.
We conclude that once the incumbent policy-maker in country Y  chooses to enter 
the regional trade agreement, subsequent multilateral trade liberalisation will no longer 
be pursued since the policy-maker will have no incentives to move from the status quo.
3.14 Conclusions
This chapter provided a political economy analysis of the incentives underpinning a 
country’s choice to enter a regional trade agreement when a multilateral free trade 
agreement is available.
We built a theoretical model in which a country is faced with the choice between 
entering a regional trade agreement or, alternatively, a multilateral trade agreement 
leading to free trade.
Assuming that the policy-maker chooses its trade policy taking into account aggre­
gate social welfare but also the pressure applied by industrial interests, we investigated
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the policy-maker’s choice between the two alternative trade agreements.
As a main result, we derived a formal condition under which the policy-maker will 
choose to enter the regional trade agreement rather than the multilateral free trade 
agreement.
Notably, we showed that in the economy both pro- and anti-regionalism forces 
operate and that the policy-maker’s choice is a political equilibrium that balances 
these opposing forces.
On the one hand, we pointed out that the organized industrial interest group 
constitutes a pro-regionalism force in the policy-making process since the regional 
trade agreement implies a greater gross aggregate social welfare for the group than the 
multilateral free trade agreement.
On the other hand, we showed that the multilateral free trade agreement guarantees 
an higher level of net aggregate social welfare than the regional trade agreement thus 
operating as a anti-regionalism force in the policy-making process.
We emphasized that the policy-maker faces a trade-off in its choice of trade policy 
between the greater amount of political contributions it would receive if it chooses to 
enter the regional trade agreement and the lower aggregate social welfare that would 
be achieved in the country.
We showed that the incumbent policy-maker will choose to enter the regional trade 
agreement if the weighted gain in the amount of political contributions received offsets 
at least the weighted loss of net aggregate social welfare achieved in the country.
Our analysis pointed out that the decision to enter a regional trade agreement 
when a multilateral free trade agreement is available configures as a choice of political 
economy driven by the political support-maximising behavior of the incumbent policy­
maker.
Notably, we provided a simulation analysis of our theoretical framework in order 
to depict the policy-maker’s choice between the regional trade agreement and the 
multilateral free trade agreement.
Furthermore, this chapter investigated the implications of a country’s choice to
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enter a regional trade agreement on the incentives to pursue subsequent multilateral 
trade liberalization.
We showed that a country’s choice to enter a regional trade agreement unambigu­
ously undermines the incentives to further multilateral liberalization.
In fact, once a country enters a politically-supported regional trade agreement, 
multilateral trade liberalisation will no longer be pursued since the incumbent policy­
maker will have no incentives to move from the status quo.
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3.15 M athem atical Appendix
3.15.1 Derivation of the import tariff revenue
In the following we derive the import tariff revenue collected in countries X , Y  and Z  
in the initial symmetric equilibrium, and in the equilibrium under the regional trade 
agreement.
The initial symmetric equilibrium
Focusing on the initial symmetric equilibrium, the import tariff revenue in the repre­
sentative country is defined as the import tariff t  times the country’s total import of 
manufactured varieties.
Thus, we have:
^  “  p( 1-ff)M)
We note that the total imports of manufactured varieties in the representative 
country are a function of the total income of consumers located in the country which 
depends, in turn, on the import tariff revenue redistributed to all the agents in the 
economy.
Thus, solving the previous equation for Rq we obtain:
2 t - A - • ( !  +  <)-*
P0(1_,7) -  2t ■ A • (1 -  k) ■ k ■ p -” (1 +  t y *
The equilibrium under the regional trade agreement
Under the regional trade agreement, the import tariff revenue collected in countries Y  
and X  is defined as the import tariff t times each country’s total imports of manufac­
tured varieties from country Z.
Thus, we have:
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Solving the previous equations for Ry  and R^r, respectively, we obtain:
n R  _i l v  - -
f i ?  =
t ■ A • (1 — fc) • fc • p p -17  ^ • (1 +  t y  
( P * ) (l_<r) - 1 • A • (1 -  k) ■ k •p(1_<T) • (1 +  ty
t ■ A • (1 — k) ■ k ■ pj1 ^  • (1 + 1)~”
(p£)(1_,,) - 1 ■ a • (i -  k) ■ k • p|1_<7) • ( i + t y
Focusing on the rest of the world Z, the import tariff revenue under the regional 
trade agreement is defined as the import tariff t times country Z ’s total imports of 
manufactured varieties from countries Y  and X .
Thus, we obtain:
nR 2 • t • A • ( l - / )^ • f c■( l+i^§)■p<l - <') ■ ( l + t ^ ,
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Solving the previous equation for R^, we have:
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3.15.2 Proof o f Proposition 6
We prove that the amount of import tariff revenue collected in country Y  would be 
greater under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral trade agreement 
for any positive value of the import tariff t.
Given equations (3.46) and (3.58), the import tariff revenue that would be col­
lected in country Y  under the regional trade agreement and, alternatively, under the
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multilateral trade agreement are given by:
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Having assmned A and k to be in the range (0,1), and a to be greater than one, 
we note that the numerator of Ry  is greater than zero for any positive value of the 
import tariff t.
We conclude that the import tariff revenue collected in country Y  is greater under 
the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral trade agreement for any 
positive value of the import tariff t.
3.15.3 Proof o f Proposition 7
We prove that the gross aggregate welfare that the interest group will achieve would 
be greater under the regional trade agreement than under the multilateral free trade 
agreement for any value of the import tariff t.
We focus on the welfare differential, that is the difference between the gross welfare 
that the interest group would achieve under the regional trade agreement, and under 
the multilateral free trade agreement.
Given equations (3.66) and (3.67), the donation differential can be expressed as:
y R - F T A(l- fc) 2 +  u • k • t • (1 +  ty
a 2 +  (1 +  t)(1-<r) — t • A • (1 -  k) • (1 + 1)'
+ (3.82)
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After some manipulations, we have that the interest group’ gross welfare will be 
greater under the regional trade agreement rather than the multilateral free trade
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agreement if the following condition is satisfied:
(2 +  (1 +  *)(1_<t) - 1 • A • (1 -  k) • (1 + 1)~")
------------------ r;— r-------------------------------------- --------------- + — k) - t >  1 +  £
1 +  2 • (1 +  «)(1_l,) -  2 • A • t • (1 -  7 ) • (1 +  t)_<r
Assuming that the values of the parameters of the model are such that a > 
, that is the elasticity of substitution does not assume excessively low val­
ues, the above inequality is satisfied for any value of the import tariff t.
We conclude that the organised interest group lobbies in favour of the regional 
trade agreement rather than the multilateral free trade agreement for any value of the 
import tariff.
3.15.4 Proof o f Proposition 8
We formally prove that the net aggregate social welfare reached in country Y  would 
be greater under the multilateral free trade agreement than under the regional trade 
agreement for any positive value of the import tariff t.
Focusing on the welfare differential that is the difference between the net aggregate 
welfare reached in country Y  under the regional trade agreement and under the mul­
tilateral free trade agreement, we prove that is always negative for any positive value 
of the import tariff t.
Given equations (3.78) and (3.79), the welfare differential can be written as:
w R - f T =  (1 -  A)1_a • Aa • (1 -  k) ■ 
[2 +  (1 +
2 +  (1 + -  A • t • (1 -  k) ■ (1 + 1)
~  ( 3 ) - ► (3.83)
We note that when the import tariff t is zero the welfare differential will be zero 
since the net aggregate social welfare that would be reached under the regional trade
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agreement and under the multilateral free trade agreement will coincide.
In addition, we prove that the first-order derivative of the welfare differential with 
respect to the import tariff t has a negative value for any positive level of the import 
tariff t.
After some manipulations, the first order derivative of the welfare differential ex­
pressed in equation (3.82) with respect to the import tariff t is:
.   > (■+■,-•>•  (lM)
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Since the denominator of the derivative in equation (3.83) has a positive sign, we 
focus on the numerator in order to establish the sign of the overall derivative.
The numerator of the derivative expressed in equation (3.83) will have a negative 
sign for any positive value of the import tariff t if the following condition is satisfied:
<7 +  k > (A -j- o — 1) • (1 +  £)* a
We note that the above condition is verified for any positive value of the import 
tariff t since we assumed a to be greater than one, and A to be in the range (0,1).
Thus, the first order derivative of the welfare differential with respect to the import 
tariff t has a negative value for any positive level of the import tariff t.
We conclude that since the welfare differential will be zero when the import tariff t 
is zero and its first order derivative is negative for any positive value of the import tariff, 
the net aggregate social welfare in country Y  will be greater under the multilateral 
free trade agreement than under the regional trade agreement for any positive value 
of the import tariff t.
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Chapter 4
Trade effects of currency unions: 
the role of economic 
dissimilarities
4.1 Introduction
One of the most commonly identified benefits of currency unions is the potential in­
crease in trade that they might foster among their members.1
The first contribution to provide an empirical study of the impact of sharing a 
common currency on trade was Rose (2000) who, adding a common currency dummy 
to an augmented gravity model and estimating it on a sample of over 200 countries, 
concluded that sharing a common currency more than triple bilateral trade realised 
between countries.2
1Mundell (1961) in his seminal contribution stressed that the main benefit of a currency union 
was to facilitate trade among its members while its main disadvantage being the loss of independent 
monetary policy by its members.
2McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1998) indicated that country borders matter for trade flows by 
showing that trade between Canadian provinces was ten to twenty times greater than trade to trade 
between a Canadian province and a US state. However, until Rose (2000) there were no studies 
measuring the direct impact of sharing a common currency on the international flows of trade.
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The magnitude of Rose’s estimates of the “currency union effect” on trade gener­
ated a buoyant debate, and a number of empirical studies followed proposing alterna­
tive methodologies to estimate how trade between countries is affected by the use of a 
common currency.
These contributions refined the magnitude of the currency union effect but con­
firmed that sharing a common currency has a significant positive effect on trade.3
Thus, Glick and Rose (2001) using different panel estimation techniques showed 
that sharing a common currency approximately doubles bilateral trade realised be­
tween pair of countries. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) using sample prediction showed 
that the adoption of the euro by the members of the European Union could lead to 
an increase of 60% in the Euro-zone trade. Frankel and Rose (2001) concluded that 
belonging to a currency union more than triples bilateral trade realised between pair of 
member countries. Nitsch (2001) addressed problems of aggregation bias and, manip­
ulating Rose (2000) data-set, showed that the estimated currency union effect on trade 
is actually halved. Persson (2001), applying non-parametric matching techniques to 
Rose (2000) data-set, showed that the currency union effect on trade ranges between 
45% and 13%. Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002), using an instrumental variable ap­
proach to the common currency dummy in the gravity model, showed a large positive 
currency union effect on trade. Micco et al. (2003), showed that the formation of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) had a significant positive effect on bilateral trade 
between members with the effect of the EM U  on bilateral trade ranging between 4 and 
10%, when compared to trade between all other pairs of countries, and between 8 and 
16% when compared to trade between non-EMU  countries. On the theoretical side, 
Alesina and Barro (2002) provided a model which incorporated the trade effects of 
currency unions showing that countries that trade more with each other would benefit 
more from the adoption of a common currency.
3 However, Thom and Walsh (2002) presented a case study on Ireland’s break with sterling, following 
its decision to enter the European Monetary System in 1979, finding no significant effect on the Anglo- 
Irish trade.
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This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a general equilibrium analy­
sis of the trade effects of currency unions on member and non-member countries, by 
pointing out the implications of sharing a common currency on trade costs and on 
the equilibrium relative wages across countries, and by investigating how economic 
dissimilarities among countries affect the trade effects fostered by a common currency.
We build a three-country general equilibrium intra-industry trade model in which 
economic dissimilarities across countries exist, and sharing a common currency affects 
the patterns of trade by reducing trade costs through the elimination of transaction 
costs due to the use of different currencies, and by a general equilibrium induced effect 
on the relative wages.4
Thus, within this theoretical framework, we investigate the trade effects of the for­
mation of a currency union as a form of deepening of integration between the members 
of a regional trading bloc, and the trade effects of the subsequent enlargement of the 
currency union to include an economically dissimilar country.5
Furthermore, we draw on our theoretical general equilibrium model to assess the 
implications of greater economic dissimilarities among the original members of the 
currency union and the accession country on the magnitude of the trade effects of the 
enlargement.
First, we analyse the implications of the formation of a currency union between 
the two symmetric members of a regional trading bloc on the volume of bilateral trade 
realised between the member countries, and between any of the members and the 
non-member country.
4 Our analysis disregards other channels through which sharing a common currency may affect 
bilateral trade, i.e. eliminating the volatility in bilateral nominal exchange rates and increasing the 
transparency of markets. See Emerson et al. (1992) for a formal presentation of the channels through 
which a monetary union may potentially affect trade among members. See Frankel and Wei (1992), 
and Eichengreen and Irwin (1995), and De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) for an assessment of the effect 
of reduced exchange rate volatility on international trade. Furthermore, see De Grauwe (1994) for a 
detailed discussion of the effect sharing a common currency on the transparency of markets.
5 Our analysis abstracts from the loss of independent monetary policy of the member countries 
following the adoption of common currency.
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Notably, the non-member country is assumed to be economically dissimilar from 
the members of the currency union by having a less efficient manufacturing production 
technology.
Our analysis shows that the formation of the currency union affects the patterns 
of trade of both member and non-member countries by reducing the intra-bloc trade 
costs through the elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different currencies, 
and by leading to a general equilibrium induced reduction of the relative wage in the 
non-member country.6
In this regard, we prove that the formation of a currency union between the mem­
bers of a regional trading bloc increases the volume of bilateral trade between the 
members, and it reduces the volume of bilateral trade between any member and the 
non-member country.
Second, we examine the implications of the enlargement of the currency union to 
include the economically dissimilar non-member country on the volume of bilateral 
trade realised between any of the original members and the accession country, and 
between the original members.
Our analysis shows that the enlargement affects the patterns of trade of the original 
members and the accession country by reducing the extra-bloc trade costs via the 
elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different currencies, and by implying 
a general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession country.
We prove that the enlargement of the currency union to the economically dissimilar 
accession country increases the volume of bilateral trade between the original members
6 Since for simplicity in our framework we rule out the possibility for firms to relocate, our analysis 
does not depict the potential location effects that the formation of a currency union, and its enlargement 
to an economically dissimilar country might entail. On the contrary, the analysis of the effects of trade 
integration on industrial location is central to the “new economic geography” literature. In particular, 
Puga and Venables (1997) showed that a preferential move towards a free trade area pulls industry 
into the integrating countries while hub-and spoke arrangements favour industrial location in the hub. 
In addition, Baldwin and al. (2003) showed that a symmetric reciprocal trade liberalization between 
asymmetrically sized countries leads to industrial relocation in the large country, and to achieve fully 
open trade while avoiding delocation the large country has to maintain lower import barriers during 
the transition to free trade.
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and the accession country, and reduces the volume of bilateral trade between the 
original members.
Finally, we investigate how the existence of economic dissimilarities between the 
original members of the currency union and the accession country affect the magnitude 
of the trade effects fostered by the enlargement of the currency union.
Simulating our general equilibrium model, we show that the more economically 
dissimilar the accession country is with respect to the original members of the currency 
union, the lower is the increase in the volume of bilateral trade between any original 
member and the accession country that would follow the enlargement of the currency 
union.
We note that our analysis provides relevant insights on the trade effects of the 
formation of the EM U , and its envisaged enlargement to include the Eastern European 
accession countries.
Our results indicate that the formation of the EM U  would lead to an unambiguous 
increase in the volume of intra-industry bilateral trade realised between any pair of 
member countries. Furthermore, the eventual eastward enlargement of the EM U  
would unambiguously enhance the volume of bilateral intra-industry trade between 
the EM U  members and the accession countries.
However, the economic dissimilarities existing between the EM U  members and 
the Eastern European accession countries would constrain the magnitude of the gains 
in the volume of bilateral intrarindustry trade between the EM U  members and the 
accession countries that would follow the eastward enlargement of the EMU.
As a main policy implication, our analysis suggests that the more Eastern European 
accession countries reduce their economic dissimilarities with respect to the EM U  
members, the greater would be the gains in the volume of bilateral intra-industry trade 
between EM U  members and the accession countries that would follow the eastward 
enlargement of the EMU.
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4.2 The basic m odel
We consider that the world economy is constituted by three countries, labelled as X , 
Y  and Z, respectively. Notably, we assume that countries X  and Y  are symmetric 
while country Z  is economically dissimilar from countries X  and Y.
Furthermore, we consider that the symmetric countries X  and Y  are members of 
a regional trade agreement while country Z  is excluded from it. Thus, in the rest of 
our analysis we refer to countries X  and Y  as the member countries, and to country 
Z  as the excluded country.
Focusing on the consumption side, we assume that in any of the member countries 
and in the excluded country, consumers’ preferences are given by:
U =  Cm  with Cm  = £ 4,i=i
(4.1)
where Cm  represents a composite index of the consumption of manufactured goods, 
with c* being the consumption level of each available manufactured variety i, and 
a represents the constant elasticity of substitution between any two manufactured 
varieties.
Thus, we consider that consumers have a taste for variety, their utility depends on 
the level of consumption of the range of manufactured varieties available, and their 
income only derives from the labour provided to manufacturing firms.
Focusing on the production side, we assume that in any of the member countries and 
in the excluded country a manufacturing sector exists, characterised by differentiated 
products, increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition.7
Notably, we consider that in any country the cost of introducing a new manufac­
tured variety is zero, free entry and free exit exist in response to profits or losses, firms 
can not internationally relocate, and manufacturing firms only employ local labourers.
7 The monopolistic competition framework was introduced by the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1976). See Helpman and Krugman (1989), and Fujta, Krugman and Venables (1999) for a detailed 
discussion of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition.
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Furthermore, we assume that all countries are endowed with the same amount of 
labour and labourers cannot relocate across different countries.
Crucially, we consider that the excluded country is economically dissimilar from 
the two symmetric member countries since its manufacturing production technology is 
less efficient than the one used in the member countries.
Thus, we assume that the labour input requirement for any manufactured variety 
produced in any of the two member countries is:
Ir =  « i + P 'X r  with a\ > 0 and /3 > 0 (4.2)
where xr  is the amount produced of any manufactured variety in any of the member 
countries, and ot\ is the fixed labour input requirement.
On the other hand, we consider that the fixed labour cost required to produce any 
manufactured variety in the excluded country is greater than in the member countries 
such that the manufacturing technology in the accession is less efficient than the one 
in the member countries.8
The labour input requirement for any manufactured variety produced in the ex­
cluded country is assumed to be:
IA =  «2 + P • xa with a 2 > 0, and /? > 0 (4.3)
where xa is the amount produced of any manufactured variety in the excluded 
country, and 0:2 is the fixed labour input requirement, with ot.2 > c*i-
Focusing on the international flows of goods, we assume that trade costs exist on 
international exchanges of manufactured goods while no trade costs apply on domestic 
sales. We consider that trade costs applying to international flows of manufactured
8 In our analysis we assume the marginal labour costs to be equal across countries in order to 
simplify the derivation of the equilibrium. However, our results could be generalized to the case where 
technological inefficiency in the excluded country is also due to a higher marginal labour cost compared 
to the member countries.
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varieties are of the “iceberg” type such that shipping any manufactured good between 
any two countries melts a fraction of the shipment.
Furthermore, we assume that trade costs on international flows of manufactured 
goods are the sum of non-rent creating barriers to trade and transaction costs due to 
the use of different currencies in the international exchanges of manufactured goods.9
Focusing on non-rent creating barriers to trade, we consider that they reflect the 
extent of trade integration among countries such that they are lower the more in­
tegrated the countries. Having assumed that countries X  and Y  are members of a 
regional trading bloc, we consider that non-rent creating barriers to trade are lower 
between the two member countries than between any of the member countries and the 
excluded country.
On the other hand, transaction costs are assumed to reflect the use of different 
currencies in international exchanges of manufactured goods and to equally apply to 
trade between the two member countries and between any of the member countries 
and the excluded country.10
Thus, trade costs applying on any unit of manufactured goods traded between the 
two member countries can be expressed as:
t \ = 5\ + Q (4.4)
where Ji indicates the non-rent creating barriers applying on trade in manufactured 
goods between the two member countries, and 0  represents the transaction costs due
9 See Alesina and Barro (2002) for a similar approach where iceberg trade costs are assumed to 
reflect both non-rent creating trade barriers and transaction costs.
10 Our analytical framework differs in several respects from Krugman (1993) who showed how man­
ufacturing firms may agglomerate in a transportation hub. First, we model the existence of economic 
dissimilarities across countries, and non-wage equalization across countries in equilibrium while in 
Krugman (1993) countries are symmetric and wages are equalized. Furthermore, we focus on the im­
plications of changes in the transaction costs component of trade costs due to deepening of integration 
while Krugman (1993) concentrates on transportation costs. Finally, in our framework the adjustment 
to changes in trade costs arises through a general equlibrium-induced effect on relative wages with no 
firms relocation, while in Krugman (1993) the adjustment takes places through firms relocation with 
unaffected wages.
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to the use of different currencies in the trade exchanges.
On the other hand, trade costs applying on any unit of trade in manufactured 
goods realised between any of the member countries and the excluded country axe:
T2 =  6 2  +  9 (4.5)
where 6 2  indicates the non-rent creating barriers applying on trade in manufactured 
goods between any member country and the excluded country, with <$2 > £1 > 1.
Thus, trade costs applying on international flows of manufactured goods realised 
between the two member countries are lower than trade costs applying on international 
trade flows between any of the member countries and the excluded country.
Notably, international trade between the member countries requires t \ > 1 units 
to be shipped for every unit sold while international trade between any of the member 
countries and the excluded country requires 7*2 > 1 units to be shipped for every unit 
sold, with T2 > r\.
4.3 The initial equilibrium
In this section we derive the equilibrium in which the symmetric countries X  and Y  
axe members of a regional trading bloc from which country Z  is excluded, taking into 
account that the excluded country is less technologically efficient than the member 
countries and the asymmetric structure of trade costs on international trade.
Assuming the wage in the symmetric member countries to be the numeraire, and 
normalizing the labour force in any country to one, we have:
wa = 1 (4-6)
LR = LA = 1 (4.7)
where wr is the wage perceived by labourers in any of the member countries, and
144
Lr and La indicate, respectively, the labour forces located in any of the member 
countries and in the excluded country.
Given equations (4.6) and (4.7), and having assumed that consumers’ income only 
derives from the labour they provide to manufacturing firms, the aggregate income of 
labourers in any of the member countries and in the excluded country, labelled as E r  
and Ea, respectively, are:
E r  = 1 (4.8)
Ea =  wA (4.9)
where wa indicates the wage perceived by labourers in the excluded country.
Having assumed that the costs of introducing a new manufactured variety is zero 
and that all manufactured varieties enter consumers’ demand in a symmetric way, in 
the equilibrium there will be only one firm producing a given manufactured variety.
Furthermore, since manufacturing firms located in any country use the same tech­
nology, all manufactured varieties produced within a country will be symmetric and 
have the same price.
Since manufactured goods incur iceberg trade costs when shipped between different 
countries, we denote the mill or f.o.b. price of the typical manufactured variety pro­
duced in any member country and in the excluded country as pr and p a , respectively.
We assumed that t \ is the amount dispatched per unit received of any manufactured 
variety shipped between the two member countries, and T2 is the amount dispatched 
per unit received of a manufactured variety shipped between any of the members and 
the excluded country.
Thus, any manufactured variety produced in any of the member countries is sold 
at price p r , while the delivered or c.i.f. price paid for it by consumers located in the 
other member country and in the excluded country are p r  • t \  and Pr-T 2 , respectively.
On the other hand, any manufactured variety produced in the excluded country is 
sold at price pa while the delivered or c.i.f. price paid for it by consumers located in
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any of the member countries is pa • t 2 .
Thus, the manufacturing composite price indices faced by consumers located in 
any of the member countries and in the excluded country, labelled as P R and P a , 
respectively, then are:
P r =  n R ' P R ^  + n R -  + u a  ' {p a  1 (4-10)
Pa = [nA • PA~a) +  2 • nR • (pR • t 2) (1-<t)] 1_<t (4.11)
where nR and ha indicate the number of manufactured varieties produced, respec­
tively, in any member country and in the excluded country.
Given equations (4.1), (4.8) and (4.10), consumers’ utility maximization subject 
to budget constraints implies that the demand in any of the member countries for 
any manufactured variety produced locally, in the other member country, and in the 
excluded country, labelled as cR, and c^, respectively, can be expressed as:
CR ^  ^4 ' 12 ) 
R
(*•“ )^R
cA = (PA-T2 ) ° (4.14)
Similarly, given equations (4.1), (4.9), and (4.11), the demand in the excluded 
country for any manufactured variety produced locally, and in any of the member 
countries, labelled as ca and c^, respectively, are:
ca = - S ± ^ wa (4-15)
i4
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R  (P R  ' T 2 )  a  / A t e t \
CA =  „ ( ! - „ )  (4'16>
Focusing on the maximization of profits, we note that any manufacturing firm 
located in any of the member countries faces an aggregate consumption demand given 
by the sum of the local demand, the other member country’s demand, and the excluded 
country’s demand, expressed in equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.16), respectively.
It follows that, due to the existence of the iceberg trade costs, the total sales realised 
by any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries, labelled as s r , are:
P r  ■ r i  * (PR  * r 0 , r 2  ' ( P R '  ^ 2 ) ~ *  . . .  n ^
=  -pz=a  +  P ( i->) +  p —tg—1) ’ W A  (417>
Similarly, any manufacturing firm located in the excluded country faces an aggre­
gate consumption demand given by the sum of the local demand and the demand in
any of the member countries expressed by equations (4.14) and (4.15), respectively.
On the other hand, the total sales realised by any manufacturing firm located in 
the excluded country, denoted as sa , is given by:
P a  , o r 2  • i j P A - r 2 ) ~ (7 , a 1CA
~  p(i-^) P ( 1- * ) "  (418)
Assuming that any profit-maximizing manufacturing firm sets its price taking the
manufacturing composite price index as given, the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any
manufactured variety is a constant mark-up over its marginal cost.
Notably, the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any manufactured variety produced in any 
of the member countries and in the excluded country are given by:
PR =  — • (3 (7—1
Pa  =  7 ' ft * w acr — l
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Assuming that manufactured goods are measured in units chosen so that the unit 
input coefficient (3 just equals (a — 1 ) /a, the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any manufac­
tured variety produced in any of the member countries and in the excluded country
are:
PR =  1 (4.19)
Pa  =  w a (4.20)
Given equation (4.19) and the asymmetric structure of trade costs, the equilibrium 
c.i.f. price paid by consumers located in any of the member country for any manufac­
tured variety produced in the other member country and in the excluded country are 
r i  and T2, respectively.
Similarly, given equation (4.20), the equilibrium c.i.f. price paid for any manufac­
tured variety produced in the excluded country by consumers located in any member 
country is wa • T2-
We observe that, given equations (4.2) and (4.19), the profits of any manufacturing 
firm located in any of the member countries are:
On the other hand, given equations (4.3) and (4.22), the profits of any manufac­
turing firm located in the excluded country are:
Having assumed that there is free entry and free exit in the manufacturing sector 
in response to profits or losses, the zero-profit condition implies that the equilibrium 
output of a typical firm located in any of the member countries and in the excluded
country are, respectively:
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X R  =  Q i  • (7  (4.21)
x*A = a 2 • o (4.22)
It follows that, given equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.21) and (4.22), the equilibrium labour 
input requirement for any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries 
and in the excluded country, respectively, are:
l*R = a  i-o- (4.23)
l \  = a2 -(J (4.24)
Given the equilibrium labour input requirements expressed in equations (4.23) and 
(4.24), and since all countries are endowed with same amount of labor force normalised 
to one, the equilibrium endogenous number of manufactured varieties produced in any 
of the member countries and in the excluded country, respectively, are:
nR = —  (4.25)<7Q!1
nA =  —  (4-26)
OOL2
Following our assumption that the manufacturing technology in the excluded coun­
try is less efficient than the one used in any of the member countries, the equilibrium 
number of manufactured varieties produced in the excluded country is smaller than 
the equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in any of the member 
countries.
Given equations (4.10), (4.11), (4.19), (4.20), (4.25) and (4.26), the equilibrium 
price indices faced by consumers located in any member country and in any excluded 
country are, respectively:
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Pr  = —  • ( l  +  Tj1 +  —  • (r2 • WA)(1 a) crai V /  cra2
i
1—a
(10')
Pa = W (1-a) + 2
1
1“<7
(u ')aa.2 era i
We note that the equilibrium composite manufacturing price indices are different 
for consumers located in any of the member countries and in the excluded country due 
to the different f.o.b. prices of manufactured varieties and the asymmetric structure 
of trade costs.
The zero-profit condition implies that x*R and x*A axe, respectively, the equilibrium 
output of any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries and in the 
excluded country. However, for any manufacturing firm located in any of the member 
countries to produce the amount of output specified in equation (4.21), the following 
condition needs to be satisfied:
x*R = 8 r  (4.27)
Similarly, for any manufacturing firm located in the excluded country to produce 
the equilibrium output specified in (4.22), the following condition has to be verified:
Xa — 8  A (4.28)
Given equations (4.17), (4.18), (4.19), (4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.10;) and (4.11'), 
conditions (4.27) and (4.28) may be rewritten as:
a\ ■ a —
a2 • cr =
+
(1—a)
w a - t \
1+T11 g) | (T2-ttu)(1 a) wa a) _|_ a)aa i
W
aa.2
+
<702 <701
2 - w a - t ^
2r<1- ’> l + T j 1- ”  ( r 2 . ^ ) 0 - )
< 702 CTQl < 701 <7 0 2
(27')
(28')
Thus, given conditions (4.27;) and (4.28'), any manufacturing firm located in any 
of the member countries and in the excluded country will break even if the equilibrium
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wage in the excluded country is such that the following condition is verified:
H 2 . uA1_<r) +  2
<  ~ " L  x------------ 02 n . =  0 (4.29)
We refer to the expression in (4.29) as the wage equation since it implicitly expresses 
the equilibrium wage in the excluded country in the initial equilibrium as a function 
of the fixed labour input costs in the member countries and in the excluded country, 
a\ and « 2, and of the intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade costs, t \ and T2.11
Focusing on the international flows of manufactured goods, given equations (4.10'), 
(4.11'), (4.17), (4.19), (4.20), (4.25), (4.26), the equilibrium volume of exports and 
imports of any member country to and from the other member country, labelled as 
EX P#  and IM P §, respectively, are:
E X P g  = IM P g  = ------ ,, . 1------------ —— (4.30)
1 +  (T2 ' «U)
Since the two member countries are symmetric, they will export and import the 
same amount of manufactured goods, and the volume of exports of any member country 
to the other member will be equal to the volume of its imports from the other member 
country.
It follows from equation (4.30) that the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade re­
alised between the two members, defined as the sum of the volume of exports and 
imports of any member to and from the other member, is:
2
B IL R =  n ' 1-------------— -T (4.31)
l +  r f - ' ) +  g ( ^ - » A)(1- ' )
Given equations (4.10'), (4.11'), (4.16), (4.17), (4.19), (4.20), (4.25) and (4.26), the
“ Having chosen the wage in the member countries as the numeraire and assumed that the accession 
country has a trade costs disadvantage relative to the symmetric member countries, the equilibrium 
wage in the accession country is less than unity for any value of the parameters, as shown in the 
Mathematical Appendix.
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equilibrium volume of exports and imports of any member country to and from the 
excluded country, labelled as E X P R and IM P R, respectively, are:
EXP% =   T? ! ' WAn  , (4.32)
2  ^ ' W A +  2T2
(1—<t) —a
I M P f  = ----- ------- , 2  s. ' A---------------  (4.33)
“ ■(l +  r j ^  +  f a . t i u ) ^
Finally, given equations (4.32) and (4.33), the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade 
realised between any of the member countries and the excluded country, defined as the 
sum of the volume of exports and imports of any member to and from the excluded 
country, is:
(1—<r) (1—a) —a
B T L R -  r 2  W A  I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r 2  ' WA_____________  / 4 o 4 n
S  ■ > V ( l  +  r t * )  +  (r2 • ( ^
4.4 The formation o f a currency union
In this section we consider that the two symmetric members of the regional trading 
bloc deepen their integration by forming a currency union.12,13
We model the formation of the currency union as the elimination of the transaction 
costs due to the use of different currencies in the trade exchanges between the two 
member countries leading to a reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs.
First, we derive the equilibrium in which a currency union between the two mem­
12 Our analysis focuses on the formation of a currency union as a form of deeper integration among 
countries in a regional trading bloc. However, our results can be generalised to any form of deepening 
of regional integration leading to a reduction in intra-bloc trade costs.
13 We model the choice of the members of a regional trading bloc to form a currency union as 
exogenous. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for a formal analysis of a country’s choice to enter a 
regional trading bloc modelled as endogenous.
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ber countries exists, pointing out the implications of the formation of the currency 
union on the level of intra-bloc trade costs and on the equilibrium relative wage 
(in terms of the numeraire) in the excluded country.
We evaluate, then, how the formation of the currency union affects the volume of 
bilateral trade realised between the two member countries, and between any of the 
member countries and the excluded country with respect to the initial equilibrium 
developed in Section 4.3.
4.4.1 The equilibrium
Having chosen the wage in the symmetric member countries to be the numeraire, and 
normalised labour forces in any country to one, since consumers’ income only derives 
from the labour they provide to manufacturing firms, the aggregate income of labourers 
in any of the member countries and in the accession country, labelled as E r  and £U, 
respectively, axe:
Er  = 1 (4.35)
Ea = wa (4.36)
where wa indicates the wage perceived by labourers in the excluded country.
The formation of the currency union between the two symmetric members of the 
regional trading bloc reduces the level of intra-bloc trade costs on flows of manufactured 
varieties.14
As shown by equation (4.4), intra-bloc trade costs reflect the existence of non-rent 
creating barriers to trade between the two member countries, and of transaction costs 
due to the use of different currencies in the trade exchanges between the two member 
countries.
Thus, the formation of the currency union between the member countries reduces
14 See Alesina and Barro (2002) for a similar approach where the adoption of a common currency is 
formalised as the reduction of the iceberg trade costs between two countries.
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the level of intra-bloc trade costs by eliminating the transaction costs due to the use of 
different currencies applying to the flows of manufactured goods between the member 
countries.
Notably, the formation of the currency union between the two member countries 
will reduce intra-bloc trade costs from the initial level of t \ to <$i, with <$i < t \.
We denote the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any manufactured variety produced in 
any member country and in the excluded country as p r  and p a , respectively.
It follows that, while any unit of manufactured variety produced in any of the 
member countries is sold at price p r , the c.i.f. price paid by consumers located in the 
other member country and in the excluded country arep r ' 8 \  andP r - T 2 , respectively.
Similarly, while any unit of manufactured variety produced in the excluded country 
is sold at price p a  , the c.i.f. price paid for it by consumers located in any member 
country is pa ' r 2 -
The manufacturing composite price indices faced by consumers located in any of 
the member countries and in the excluded country, labelled as P r  and P a , respectively, 
are:
P r  =  \k r  • $R~a) +  nR -{pR- 5 i ) ( 1 _ < 7 )  +  nA • (p a  • t 2)(1_<7)] (4.37)
Pa =  'Va ^  +  2 ' ™R ’ (PR' T2)^1-^ ] 1 * (4.38)
where h r  and u a  represent, respectively, the equilibrium number of manufactured 
varieties produced in any member country and in the excluded country.
Following consumers’ utility maximization subject to budget constraints, given 
equations (4.1), (4.35), and (4.37), the demand in any member country for any variety 
produced locally, in the other member country, and in the excluded country, labelled 
as cr, eg and eg, respectively, are:
s - f d r  <“»>
%  = (4-41)
On the other hand, given equations (4.1), (4.36) and (4.38), the demand in the
excluded country for any manufactured variety produced locally, and in any of the
member countries, labelled as ca and c%, respectively, are:
^  <4-42)
% = 5(1-.) (4.4S)
I  A
_  WA -_(pr  • r 2)
5(1
A
The aggregate demand faced by any manufacturing firm located in any of the 
member countries is the sum of the local demand in equation (4.39), the demand in 
the other member country in equation (4.40), and the demand in the excluded country 
in equation (4.41).
Likewise, the aggregate demand faced by any manufacturing firm located in the 
excluded country is given by the sum of the local demand, expressed by equation (4.42), 
and the demand in any of the member countries for the firm’s own variety, expressed 
by equation (4.43).
Given the structure of trade costs, the total sales of a manufacturing firm located 
in any of the member countries and in the excluded country, labelled as s r  and sa , 
respectively, are:
Sb = P&'  +  (4.44)
p {  1—<r) p (  1—<r) p ( l ~ a)
R R A
i A = +  2 r 2 -(pA- r 2) -
r A r R
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Assuming that any profit-maximizing manufacturing firm chooses its price tak­
ing the composite price indices as given and the unit input coefficient is equal to 
(cr — 1) / cr, the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any variety produced in the member countries 
and in the excluded country, respectively, are:
PR = 1 (4.46)
PA = w A (4.47)
Thus, the equilibrium c.i.f. price of any manufactured variety produced in any of 
the member countries faced by consumers located in the other member country and in 
the accession country are, respectively, <5i and T2-
Similarly, the equilibrium c.i.f. price paid for any manufactured variety produced 
in the excluded country by consumers located in any of the member country is wa • T2-
Given the equilibrium pricing rules in equation (4.46) and (4.47), the profits of
any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries and in the excluded 
country, labelled as II/? and IIa, respectively, are:
(4.48)
— 0 2  \ (4.49)
where x r  and xa indicate, respectively, the equilibrium output produced of any 
manufactured variety in any of the member countries and in the excluded country.
Given equations (4.46), (4.47), (4.48) and (4.49), following the zero-profit condition, 
the equilibrium output of a typical manufacturing firm located in any of the member 
countries and in the excluded country, respectively, result in:
x r  = a  I -  a  (4.50)
t t  -  /  % A
U a  =  w a ' I  —
TT X RIli? =  aia
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XA = Ot2 ' a (4.51)
Thus, given equations (4.50) and (4.51), the equilibrium number of manufactured 
varieties produced in any of the member countries and in the excluded country, re­
spectively, are:
nR =
nA =
g o l \  
aa  2
(25')
(26')
Given equations (4.25'), (4.26'), (4.37), (4.38), (4.46) and (4.47), the equilibrium 
price indices faced by consumers located in any member country and in the excluded 
country, respectively, are:
Pr = —  ■ ( l  +  i*1-" ’) +  —  • ( t2 ■ wAf - ^  aot\ \ /  act2
i1—cr
(37')
Pa =
11— (T
(38')aa.2 ool\
We note that for any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries 
and in the excluded country to produce, respectively, the amount of output specified, 
in equations (4.50) and (4.51), the following conditions needs to be verified:
xr = sr (4.52)
xA = sA (4.53)
Given equations (4.37'), (4.38'), (4.44), (4.45), (4.46), and (4.47), conditions (4.52) 
and (4.53) may be rewritten as:
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Thus, any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries and in the
Notably, the wage equation in (4.54) implicitly expresses the wage in the excluded 
country in the equilibrium characterised by the existence of a currency union between 
the two symmetric member countries belonging to the regional trading bloc.
4.4.2 The general equilibrium effect on the relative wage
The formation of the currency union between the two symmetric members of the re­
gional trading bloc will affect the equilibrium relative wage (in terms of the numeraire) 
in the excluded country, compared to the initial equilibrium discussed in Section 4.3. 
Notably, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 9 The formation of the currency union between the members of the re­
gional trading bloc reduces the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country com­
pared to the initial equilibrium.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
We previously pointed out that the formation of the currency union reduces the 
level of trade costs applying to the flows of manufactured varieties between the member
excluded country breaks even if the equilibrium wage in the excluded country is such 
that the following condition is verified:
(4.54)
countries.
Thus, consumers located in any of the member countries will perceive varieties 
produced in the other member country as relatively cheaper since their c.i.f. price 
decreases with respect to the initial equilibrium.
The reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs leads then consumers in any of the 
member countries to increase their demand for manufactured varieties produced in the 
other member country, and to reduce their demand for varieties produced locally and 
in the excluded country.
Overall, the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs implied by the formation of the 
currency union increases the amount of sales of any manufacturing firm located in any 
of the member countries and reduces the amount of sales of any firm located in the 
excluded country.
On the other hand, the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs will not affect the 
amount of production for which any manufacturing firm located in any of the member 
countries and in the excluded country, respectively, breaks even.
Thus, the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country will adjust such that 
the amount of sales of any manufacturing firm located in any of the member countries 
and in the excluded country equals the level of output for which the firm breaks even.
Notably, the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country will decrease com­
pared to the initial equilibrium counterbalancing the effects of the reduction in the 
intra-bloc trade costs on the sales of firms located in any of the member countries and 
in the excluded country.
The reduction in the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country implies an 
equal reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of manufactured varieties produced in 
the excluded country, as well as in the income of consumers located in the excluded 
country compared to the initial equilibrium.
In turn, the reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the 
excluded country and in the income of consumers located in the excluded country will 
affect the amount of sales of manufacturing firms located, respectively, in any of the 
member countries and in the excluded country.
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The reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the excluded 
country will reduce the amount of sales of any firm located in any of the member 
countries, and increase the amount of sales of any firm located in the excluded country.
Consumers in the member countries and in the excluded country, perceiving vari­
eties produced in the excluded country as relatively cheaper, will increase their demand 
for these varieties while decreasing their demand for varieties produced locally and in 
the other member country.
Similarly, consumers located in the excluded country, perceiving local varieties 
as relatively cheaper, will increase their demand for varieties produced locally, and 
decrease their demand for varieties produced in any of the member countries.
In addition, the reduction in the income of consumers located in the excluded 
country will reinforce the reduction in their demand for varieties produced in any of 
the member countries while limiting the increase in their demand for varieties produced 
locally.
We conclude that the general equilibrium induced reduction in the equilibrium 
relative wage in the excluded country, with respect to the initial equilibrium, will be 
such to offset the effects of the reduction in intra-bloc trade costs on the sales of 
manufacturing firms located in any member country and in the excluded country.
4.4.3 The effect on the bilateral patterns o f trade
The formation of the currency union affects the patterns of trade of the members and 
the excluded country compared to the initial equilibrium by reducing the level of intrar 
bloc trade costs through the elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different 
currencies, and by a general equilibrium induced reduction of the relative wage in the 
excluded country.
First, we analyse the implications of the formation of the currency union between 
the members of the regional trading bloc on the volume of bilateral trade between 
members.
At this regard, we can state the following proposition:
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Proposition 10 The formation of the currency union unambiguously enhances the 
volume of bilateral trade realised between the member countries compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
The formation of the currency union enhances the volume of bilateral trade between 
the two member countries with respect to the initial equilibrium by increasing the 
volume of exports and imports realised by any member country from, and to the other 
member country.
On the one hand, the reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade implied by the 
formation of the currency union increases the volume of exports and imports of any 
member country from, and to the other member country.
In fact, the reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs implies that the equilib­
rium c.i.f. price paid by consumers located in any of the member countries to import 
any manufactured variety produced in the other member country will decrease.
As a consequence, consumers located in any of the member countries will increase 
their consumption of manufactured varieties produced in the other member country, 
perceiving them as relatively cheaper than in the initial equilibrium.
On the other hand, the general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage 
in the excluded country will reduce the volume of exports and imports realised by 
any member country from and to the other member country, compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
The reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country will imply an equal 
reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the excluded country.
Consumers located in any of the member countries, perceiving varieties produced 
in the excluded country as relatively cheaper than in the initial equilibrium, will then 
increase their consumption of those varieties while reducing their consumption of va­
rieties produced in the other member country.
We emphasise that the reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs and the 
general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country
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implied by the formation of the currency union have opposite implications on the 
volume of bilateral trade realised between the member countries.
However, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the positive effect of the reduc­
tion in the intra-bloc trade costs on the volume of bilateral trade between members is 
greater than the negative effect of the reduction in the relative wage in the excluded 
country.
As a consequence we conclude that the formation of the currency union between 
the members of the regional trading bloc will unambiguously increase the volume of 
bilateral trade realised between the member countries, compared to the initial equilib­
rium.
Given equations (4.25'), (4.26'), (4.37'), (4.44), (4.46) and (4.47), the volume of 
exports and imports of any member country to and from the other member country 
in the equilibrium characterised by the existence of a currency union between the 
members of the regional trading bloc is:
   _ R  T0 -~a)
E X P r  = I M P r  =  r,— ;— 1------------- -— - (4.55)
1 +  ^  1 +  (t2 • wa)( )
It follows that, given equation (4.55), the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade 
realised between the two members in the equilibrium characterised by the existence of 
a currency union between the members of the regional trading bloc is:
B IL R = ------------— --------------- tt— t  (4.56)
1 +  4  +  U  • (T2 ■ ®a) ^
Having pointed out the implications of the formation of the currency union on the 
patterns of trade between the member countries, we focus on how the formation of the 
currency union affects the volume of bilateral trade between any member country and 
the excluded country.
We underline that when the two symmetric member countries form a currency 
union, intra-bloc trade costs are reduced but trade costs applying to the flows of man­
ufactured goods between any member country and excluded country are unaffected.
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In fact, since different currencies are still used in the trade exchanges between any 
of the member countries and the excluded country, transaction costs applying to these 
flows of manufactured goods will be unchanged.
Nonetheless, the formation of the currency union will affect the volume of bilateral 
trade between any of the member countries and the excluded country through the 
reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs and the general equilibrium induced reduction 
in the relative wage in the excluded country.
At this regard, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 11 The formation of the currency union unambiguously reduces the vol­
ume of bilateral trade realised between any of the members and the excluded country 
compared to the initial equilibrium.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
First, the formation of the currency union between the members of the regional 
trading bloc will reduce the volume of export of any member country to the excluded 
country, compared to the initial equilibrium.
In fact, consumers located in the excluded country, experiencing a negative income 
effect due to the reduction in the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country, 
will reduce their consumption of manufactured varieties produced locally and in any 
of the member countries.
Furthermore, consumers located in the excluded country will perceive local varieties 
as relatively cheaper since the reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country 
will lead to an equal reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in 
the excluded country.
Thus, consumers located in the excluded country will reduce their consumption of 
manufactured varieties produced in any of the member countries while increasing their 
consumption of local varieties.
Furthermore, the formation of the currency union between the members of the 
regional trading bloc will reduce the volume of imports of any member country from
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the excluded country, compared to the initial equilibrium.
Due to the reduction in intra-bloc trade costs consumers located in any of the 
member countries, perceiving manufactured varieties produced in the other member 
country as relatively cheaper, will increase their consumption of those varieties while 
reducing their consumption of varieties produced in the excluded country.
On the other hand, the general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage 
in the excluded country, with respect to the initial equilibrium, will increase the volume 
of imports of any member country from the excluded country.
In fact, since the reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country will im­
ply an equal reduction in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the 
excluded country, consumers located in any of the member countries will increase their 
consumption of those varieties, perceiving them as relatively cheaper.
Thus, the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs and the general equilibrium in­
duced reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country implied by the formation 
of the currency union have opposite implications on the volume of import of any mem­
ber country from the excluded country.
However, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the negative effect on the vol­
ume of imports of any member country from the excluded country of the reduction in 
the intrarbloc trade costs is greater than the positive effect on the volume of imports 
of the reduction in the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country.
We conclude that the formation of the currency union between the members of the 
regional trading bloc unambiguously decreases the volume of bilateral trade between 
any of the member countries and the excluded country by reducing both the volume 
of exports and imports of any member to and from the excluded country compared to 
the initial equilibrium.
Given equations (4.25'), (4.26'), (4.37'), (4.38'), (4.44), (4.45), (4.46) and (4.47), 
the volume of exports and imports of any member country to and from the other 
member country in the equilibrium characterised by the existence of a currency union 
between the members of the regional trading bloc, respectively, are:
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e x p a  =
R
(4.57)
IMPa =
R
(4.58)
Given equations (4.57) and (4.58), the volume of bilateral trade between any mem-
4.5 The enlargement o f the currency union
In this section, we consider that the currency union formed by the two symmetric mem­
ber countries enlarges toward the initially excluded country, labelled in the remaining 
of the analysis as the accession country.15
Notably, we model the enlargement of the currency union as the elimination of the 
transaction costs due to the use of different currencies in the trade exchanges between 
the original members and the accession country leading to a reduction in the extra-bloc 
trade costs.
First, we derive the equilibrium characterised by the enlarged currency union, 
pointing out the implications of the enlargement on the extra-bloc trade costs and 
on the equilibrium relative wage (in terms of the numeraire) in the accession country.
We evaluate then how the enlargement of the currency union toward the economi­
cally dissimilar accession country affects the volume of bilateral trade realised between 
any of the original members and the accession country, and between the original mem-
15 In the analysis developed in this chapter, the choice for the currency union to enlarge and for the 
accession country to join is assumed to be exogenous. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for a formal 
analysis of the endogenous choice of a regional trading bloc to enlarge and for third countries to join.
ber country and the excluded country in the equilibrium characterised by the existence 
of the currency union between the members of the regional trading bloc is:
(4.59)
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ber countries.
4.5.1 The equilibrium under the enlargement
Having assumed the wage in the symmetric member countries to be the numeraire, 
and normalised labour forces to one, the aggregate income of labourers located in any
of the original member countries and in the accession country, labelled as E r  and E a ,
respectively, are:
E r  = 1 (4.60)
Ea = wa (4.61)
where wa indicates the wage perceived by labourers in the accession country in the 
equilibrium characterised by the enlarged currency union.
We note that the enlargement of the currency union to include the accession country 
reduces trade costs applying to the flows of manufactured goods between any of the 
original member countries and the accession country.
As shown by equation (4.5), we assumed extra-bloc trade costs to reflect the ex­
istence of non-rent creating barriers to trade between the member countries and the 
accession country, and of transaction costs due to the use of different currencies in the 
exchanges between any member and the accession country.
Following the enlargement of the currency union, transactions costs applying to the 
flows of manufactured goods between any original member and the accession country 
will disappear.
Thus, the enlargement of the currency union implies then a reduction in the extra­
bloc trade costs, from the initial level T2 to <52, with <52 < T2-
We label the f.o.b. price of any manufactured variety produced in any of the original 
member countries and in the accession country as pr and p a , respectively.
Thus, any manufactured variety produced in any of the original member countries 
is sold at price p r , while the c.i.f. price paid for it by consumers located in the other
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original member country and in the accession country are pr-Si and pa'&2 , respectively.
Similarly, any manufactured variety produced in the accession country is sold at 
price pa while the c.i.f. price paid for it by consumers located in any original member 
country is pa ’ 8  2*
The manufacturing composite price indices faced by consumers located in any of 
the member countries and in the accession country, labelled as P r  and P a , respectively, 
are:
P r  =  • P / J  ^  +  Hr  • (p r  • +  u a  • (p a  • < S 2 )^ 1 _ < ^ ] 1 *  (4.62)
Pa = \nA • Pa ~a) +  2 • nR • (pR • <52)(1_(7)] 1-47 (4.63)
with h r  and ua indicate the equilibrium number of manufactured varieties pro­
duced, respectively, in any of the original member countries and in the accession coun­
try.
Following consumers’ utility maximization subject to budget constraints, given 
equations (4.1), (4.60) and (4.62), the demand in any original member country for any 
variety produced locally, in the other original member, and in the accession country, 
labelled as c r ,  and crjj, respectively, are:
CR =  (4 ‘6 4 ) 
R
r R
%  “  - a " )  (4-66)
rA _  (PAjS2)
50 
R
Furthermore, given equations (4.1), (4.61) and (4.63), the demand in the accession 
country for any manufactured variety produced locally, and in any of the original
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member countries, labelled as ca and c j, respectively, are:
^  =  ( 4 -6 7 )  
A
^  = (4-68)
t A
Focusing on the maximization of profits, any manufacturing firm located in any 
of the original member countries faces an aggregate demand given by the sum of the 
local demand, the demand in the other original member country, and the demand in 
the accession country.
Likewise, a typical manufacturing firm located in the accession country faces an 
iaggregate demand given by the sum of the local demand, and the demand in any of 
the original members.
Given equations (4.64), (4.65), (4.66), (4.67), and (4.68), as well as the structure 
of trade costs, the amount of sales of any manufacturing firm located in any original 
member country and in the accession country, labelled as 'sr and sa , respectively, are:
_ _ P r  1^ ■ W A - h - ( P R - h ) ~ °  ,4 69)
SR -  5(1 -a) +  p(l-<r) +  5(1-<t)
r R A
_ wA-n° . 2 -62-(pA-62)-a ,
A p(l-») +  p(l-»)
* A  r R
Since any profit-maximizing manufacturing firm sets its price taking the manufac­
turing composite price index as given and the unit input coefficient (3 is assumed to be 
equal to (a — 1) /cr, the equilibrium f.o.b. price of any manufactured variety produced 
in any of the original member countries and in the accession country, respectively, are:
PR =  1 (4.71)
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PA = WA (4.72)
It follows that the equilibrium c.i.f. price of any manufactured variety produced in 
any of the original member countries faced by consumers located in the other original 
member country and in the accession country are, respectively, <5i and 8 2 -
Furthermore, the equilibrium c.i.f. price paid for any manufactured variety pro­
duced in the accession country by consumers located in any of the original members is 
wa • 52-
Given the equilibrium pricing rules in equation (4.71) and (4.72), the profits of
any manufacturing firm located in any of the original member countries and in the
accession country, labelled as II# and IX4 , respectively, are:
(4.73)
-  a 2  \ (4.74)
where x r  and xa indicate the equilibrium output of any manufactured variety 
produced, respectively, in any of the member countries and in the accession country.
Given equations (4.71), (4.72), (4.73) and (4.74), the zero-profit condition implies 
that the equilibrium output of any manufacturing firm located, respectively, in any of 
the original member countries and in the accession country are:
xr = ol\ 'G  (4-75)
xa =  ot2 • o (4-76)
Thus, given equations (4.75) and (4.76), the number of manufactured varieties 
produced in any of the member countries and in the accession country, respectively,
n  A =  W A -
TT X RII r =  a \
G
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a x e :
nR  =
nA
g o l \
1
(JOL2
(25")
(26")
Given equations (4.25"), (4.26"), (4.62), (4.63), (4.71), and (4.72), the equilibrium 
price indices faced by consumers located in any of the original member countries and 
in the accession country are:
Pr =
1
aoL\ +  —  • (52 • w a ) { 1 - ° }  aa.2
i1—a
Pa =
1 ~(1—<t) . 0 1 xw \ +  2 • ------  d( l - a )2
ll—a
((62'))
((63'))
CTQ!2 O’Q l
Any manufacturing firm located in any of the original member countries and in 
the accession country will produce, respectively, the amount of output specified in 
equations (4.75) and (4.76), if the following conditions are satisfied:
= sr (4.77)
xA = sA (4.78)
Given equations (4.62;), (4.63'), (4.69), (4.70), (4.71), and (4.72), we may rewrite 
conditions (4.77) and (4.78) as:
l  +  < ^ 1 - a )  w A - 4 1 _ < 7 )  / 7 7 / \
ai • + ag-»> «?->  ( U>
<rai aa.2 (joli <rai
2 -WA' ^2 ~ ^
0 2 ' ~  a g - > 2^  +  i t i p - ».■«,)<»-> ( ]
aa<i a a \ crai 0 0 1 2
Thus, any manufacturing firm located in any of the original member countries and 
in the accession country breaks even if the equilibrium wage in the accession country
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is such that the following condition is verified:
(f1)2 ■ + 2 • S1 • S2~a)S j  -  *----------- "  , , =  0 (4.79)
1 +  i5j • (fo • wa)
The wage equation in (4.78) implicitly expresses the wage in the accession country 
in the equilibrium characterised by an enlarged currency union including the initially 
excluded country.
4.5.2 The general equilibrium effect on the relative wage
The enlargement of the currency union toward the accession country will affect the 
relative wage (in terms of the numeraire) in the accession country compared to the 
equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union between 
the members of the regional trading bloc described in Section 4.4.
At this regard, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 12 The enlargement of the currency union increases the equilibrium rel­
ative wage in the accession country compared to the equilibrium in which the accession 
country is excluded from the currency union.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
We noted that the enlargement of the currency union to include the accession coun­
try leads to a reduction in the level of trade costs applying to the flows of manufactured 
varieties between any of the original member countries and the accession country.
Consumers in any of the original member countries will then perceive varieties pro­
duced in the accession country as relatively cheaper since their c.i.f. price decreases 
compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the cur­
rency union.
Thus, the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs will lead consumers located in any 
of the original member countries to increase the consumption of varieties produced in
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the accession country while decreasing the consumption of varieties produced locally 
and in the other original member.
Similarly, consumers located in the accession country, perceiving manufactured 
varieties produced in any of the original member countries as relatively cheaper, will 
increase their consumption of manufactured varieties produced in any of the original 
member countries while decreasing their demand of varieties produced locally compared 
to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
Overall, the reduction in the extrarbloc trade costs implied by the enlargement of 
the currency union will decrease the sales of any manufacturing firm located in any 
of the original member countries, and increase the sales of any firm located in the 
accession country.
However, the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs will not affect the amount 
of production for which any manufacturing firm located, respectively, in any of the 
original member countries and in the accession country, breaks even.
As a consequence, the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country will adjust 
such that the amount of sales of any manufacturing firm located in any of the original 
member countries and in the accession country equals the level of output for which the 
firm breaks even.
Thus, the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country will increase with 
respect to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency 
counterbalancing the effects of the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs on the sales 
of firms located in any of the original member countries and in the accession country.
The increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country will imply 
an equal increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of manufactured varieties produced in 
the accession country, and in the income of consumers located in the accession country.
In turn, the increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the 
accession country and in the income of consumers located in the accession country will 
affect the amount of sales of manufacturing firms located in any of the original member 
countries and in the accession country.
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First, we note that the increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced 
in the accession country will increase the amount of sales of firms located in any of the 
original member countries while reducing the amount of sales of firms located in the 
accession country.
In fact, consumers located in any of the original member countries, perceiving vari­
eties produced in the accession country as relatively more expensive, will increase their 
consumption of manufactured varieties produced locally and in other original mem­
ber countries, and decrease their consumption of varieties produced in the accession 
country.
On the other hand, consumers located in the accession country, perceiving man­
ufactured varieties produced locally as relatively more expensive will decrease their 
consumption of local varieties and they will increase their demand of varieties pro­
duced in any of the original member countries.
Furthermore, the increase in the income of consumers located in the accession 
country will reinforce the increase in their consumption of varieties produced in any 
original member.
Thus, the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession 
country will be such that to counterbalance the effects of the reduction in the extra­
bloc trade costs on the sales of manufacturing firms located in any of the original 
member country and in the accession country.
4.5.3 The effect on the bilateral patterns o f trade
The enlargement of the currency union affects the patterns of trade of the original 
member countries and the accession country by reducing the extra-bloc trade costs 
through the elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different currencies, 
and by leading to a general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the 
accession country.
First, we investigate the implications of the enlargement of the currency union on 
the volume of bilateral trade realised between any of the original members and the
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accession country.
At this regard we can state the following proposition:
Proposition  13 The enlargement of the currency union unambiguously increases the 
volume of bilateral trade between any of the member countries and the accession coun­
try, compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the 
currency union.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
The enlargement of the currency union increases the volume of bilateral trade 
between any of the original member countries and the accession country by increasing 
the volume of exports and imports of any original member country to, and from the 
accession country.
First, the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs and the general equilibrium in­
duced increase in the relative wage in the accession country will increase the volume 
of exports of any of the original member countries to the accession country, compared 
to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
Following the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs, consumers located in the 
accession country, perceiving manufactured varieties produced in any of the member 
country as relatively cheaper, will increase their demand of those varieties.
In addition, consumers located in the accession country, experiencing a positive 
income effect due to the increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession 
country, will increase their consumption of varieties produced in any of the original 
member countries and in the accession country.
Furthermore, the increase in the relative wage in the accession country implies an 
equal increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession 
country.
Thus, consumers located in the accession country, perceiving varieties produced 
locally as relative more expensive, will reduce their consumption of those varieties and 
increase their consumption of varieties produced in any of the original members.
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On the other hand, the reduction in extra-bloc trade costs and the general equi­
librium induced increase in the accession country’s relative wage have opposite im­
plications on the volume of import of any of the original member countries from the 
accession country.
Due to the reduction in extra-bloc trade costs, consumers in any of the original 
member countries, perceiving manufactured varieties produced in the accession coun­
try as relatively cheaper, will increase their consumption of those varieties and decrease 
their consumption of varieties produced locally and in the other original member coun­
try.
However, since the increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country 
implies an equal increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the 
accession country, consumers located in any of the member countries will decrease their 
consumption of these varieties, perceiving them as relatively more expensive.
However, the positive effect on the volume of imports of any original member 
country from the accession country implied by the reduction in extra-bloc trade costs 
is greater than the negative effect implied by the increase in equilibrium relative wage 
in the accession country, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix,.
Given equations (4.25"), (4.26"), (4.62'), (4.63'), (4.69), (4.70), (4.71) and (4.72), 
the volume of exports and imports of any member country to and from the other 
member country in the equilibrium characterized by the enlarged currency union, re­
spectively, are:
E X P a = _ (4.80)
_______ R
I M P a = ----- ------- £— -T— 4---------     (4.81)
| J - ( l  +  4  )) + ( f c - “U)(l-<' )
Given equations (4.80) and (4.81), the volume of bilateral trade between any mem­
ber country and the accession country in the equilibrium characterised by the enlarged 
currency union is:
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Having assessed the implications of the enlargement of the currency union on the 
volume of bilateral trade between any of the original member countries and accession 
country, we examine how the enlargement affects the volume of bilateral trade between 
the two original member countries.
At this regard, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 14 The enlargement of the currency union unambiguously reduces the 
volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries, compared to the equi­
librium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix. ■
The enlargement of the currency union toward the accession country reduces the 
volume of bilateral trade between the two original member countries by increasing 
the volume of exports and imports of any original member country to and from the 
accession country.
First, we note that the reduction in the extrarbloc trade costs reduces the volume 
of exports and imports of any original member country from and to the other mem­
ber, compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the 
currency union between the two symmetric member countries.
Notably, the reduction in extrarbloc trade costs implies that the equilibrium c.i.f. 
price paid by consumers located in any original member country to import any variety 
produced in the accession country will decrease.
Thus, consumers located in any of the original member countries, perceiving vari­
eties produced in the other member country as relatively more expensive, will reduce 
their demand for manufacturing varieties produced in the other original member coun­
try.
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On the other hand, the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country will reduce the volume of imports of any of the original mem­
ber countries from the accession country compared to the equilibrium in which the 
accession country is excluded from the currency union.
We recall that the increase in the equilibrium relative wage leads to an equal 
increase in the equilibrium f.o.b. price of manufacturing varieties produced in the 
accession country.
As a result, consumers located in any of the member countries, perceiving manu­
factured varieties produced in the accession country as relatively more expensive, will 
decrease their consumption of these varieties while increasing their consumption of 
varieties produced in the other original member country.
The reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs and the general equilibrium induced 
increase in the relative wage in the accession country implied by the enlargement of 
the currency union has opposite implications on the volume of bilateral trade between 
the original member countries.
However, as shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the negative effect of the re­
duction of extrarbloc trade costs on the volume of bilateral trade between the member 
countries is greater than the positive effect of the increase in the equilibrium relative 
wage in the accession country.
The enlargement of the currency union to include the accession country will, then, 
unambiguously decrease the volume of bilateral trade realised between the original 
member countries, compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is 
excluded from the currency union between the two symmetric member countries.
Notably, given equations (4.25"), (4.26"), (4.62'), (4.63;), (4.70), (4.71), and (4.72), 
the volume of exports and imports of any member country to and from the other 
member country in the equilibrium characterized by the enlarged the currency union, 
is:
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Finally, given equation (4.83), the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade realised 
between the two members in the equilibrium characterized by the enlarged the currency 
union, is given by:
B I L r -  ! + { t2 . S a )^
4.6 The role o f econom ic dissim ilarities
Our general equilibrium analysis showed that the enlargement of the currency union 
toward a less technological efficient accession country will unambiguously increase the 
volume of bilateral trade between any original member and the accession country.
At this regard, we proved that the enlargement of the currency union will increase 
both the volume of exports of any original member country to the accession country, 
and the volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country.
In this section we investigate how greater technological inefficiency in the accession 
country, modelled as a greater fixed labour input requirement in the manufacturing 
sector, affects the magnitude of the gain in bilateral trade between any original member 
and the accession country that would follow the enlargement of the currency union.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country would affect the magni­
tude of the gains in the volume of bilateral trade between any original member to and 
from the accession country following the enlargement by contracting the number of 
manufactured varieties produced in the accession country, by reducing the equilibrium 
wage in the accession country before the enlargement, and by enhancing the general 
equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession country.
As shown by equations (4.57), (4.58), (4.80), and (4.81), the gain in the volume 
of exports and imports of any original member to and from the accession country are 
complex functions of the number of varieties produced in the accession country, the
(4.84)
equilibrium wage in the accession country before the enlargement, and the increase in 
the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country implied by the enlargement.
Thus, to assess how greater technological inefficiency in the accession country af­
fects the magnitude of the gain in the volume of bilateral trade that would follow the 
enlargement, we simulate under different values of the parameters the gain in bilat­
eral trade due to a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs, and we 
summarize our results in Figure 4-1.
In the following we discuss a baseline case in which the elasticity of substitution 
is (7 =  5, the level of “iceberg” intra-bloc trade costs is t \ — 1.2, and the level of 
“iceberg” extra-bloc trade costs is 7-2 =  1.6, under different assumptions on the extent 
of technological inefficiency in the accession country, compared to the original members.
Notably, we choose an elasticity of substitution of 5 in the baseline to be in the 
middle of the range of estimates provided in Broda and Weinstein (2004) and Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004), but we also experiment with values of 4 and 10 to cover the 
range of the empirical estimates.16 In addition we choose extra-bloc trade costs of 1.6, 
to be in the middle of the estimates in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), but we 
also provide simulations for the lower value of 1.4 and higher value of 1.8 to cover the 
range of their empirical estimates.17 Finally, we choose intra-bloc trade costs of 1.2 
to replicate the estimates of the transport costs component of trade costs in Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004), but we also experiment with values of 1.1 and 1.5 to reflect 
the possibility that intra-bloc costs might be higher than simple transportation costs.18
Thus, in the baseline case 1 we simulate the gain in the volume of bilateral trade
16Broda and Weinstein (2004) estimated that the average elasticity of substitution in the U.S. for 
the period between 1990 and 2001 was around eight for 10-digit goods, around five within 5-digitgoods, 
and about four within 3-digit goods. In addition, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provided a survey 
of the empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the trade literature, and showed that it 
is likely to be in the range of four to ten.
17 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimated the tax equivalent of trade costs, including transport 
costs and border barriers while excluding local distribution margins, to be in the range of 40-80 percent 
for industrialized countries.
18 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimated the tax equivalent of the transportation costs com­
ponent of trade costs to be about 21 percent for industrialized countries.
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Figure 4-1: Gain in bilateral trade due to a marginal reduction in T2
a *1 *2 a2/a! dBil * / d r  2
Baseline Case 1 5 1.2 1.6 Low 0.43879
Baseline Case 2 5 1.2 1.6 High 0.43514
Lower a 4 1.2 1.6 Low 0.53417
Lower a 4 1.2 1.6 High 0.44657
Higher a 10 1.2 1.6 Low 0.14395
Higher a 10 1.2 1.6 High 0.20153
Lower ii 5 1.1 1.6 Low 0.41994
Lower i] 5 1.1 1.6 High 0.39185
Higher i! 5 1.5 1.6 Low 0.47096
Higher Xj 5 1.5 1.6 High 0.43674
Lower x2 5 1.2 1.4 Low 0.68202
Lower x2 5 1.2 1.4 High 0.66486
Higher x2 5 1.2 1.8 Low 0.27699
Higher x2 5 1.2 1.8 High 0.27701
between any original member and the accession country due to a marginal reduction 
in the level of extra-bloc trade costs under the assumption that the accession country 
is almost as technologically efficient as the original members.
On the other hand, in the baseline case 2 we simulate the gain in the volume 
of bilateral trade due to a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs 
under the alternative assumption that the accession country is highly technologically 
inefficient compared to the original member countries.
Our main conclusion is that the more technologically inefficient the accession coun­
try is compared to the original member countries, the lower is the gain in the volume of 
bilateral trade between any of the original member countries and the accession country 
that would follow the enlargement of the currency union.
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4.6.1 Baseline case 1
We assume that the elasticity of substitution is a =  5, the level of the “iceberg” intra­
bloc trade costs is t \ =  1.2, the level of the “iceberg” extra-bloc trade costs is T2 =  1.6, 
and the fixed labour input requirement in the accession country, relative to the one in 
the original members, is a^ /a i =  1.5.
Thus, manufacturing technology in the accession country is assumed to be almost 
as efficient as the manufacturing technology used in the original member countries.
In the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency 
union between the two symmetric member countries, given the assumed values of 
the parameters and the wage equation expressed in (4.54), the wage in the accession 
country is wa =  0.88919.
Given conditions (4.25') and (4.26'), the number of manufactured varieties pro­
duced in any member country and in the accession country are hr = 1 and ua — 
0.66667.
It follows that, given equations (4.57) and (4.58), the equilibrium volume of exports
of any member country toward the accession country and the equilibrium volume of
.— ■— R
imports of any member country from the accession country are E X P A =  0.09892 and 
IM P a = 0.11125.
As a result, given equation (4.59), in the equilibrium in which the accession country
is excluded from the currency union the volume of bilateral trade realised between any
 -of the original member countries and the accession country is B IL A =  0.21017.
T he gain in th e  volum e o f exports
Assuming that a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs arises, we 
analyse its implications on the equilibrium volume of exports of any member country 
to the accession country and the volume of imports of any original member country 
from the accession country.
Given equation (4.104), the direct effect of the marginal reduction in the level of 
extra-bloc trade costs will imply a gain in the volume of exports of any original member
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_  — _  p o p y  p
country to the accession country equal to - — -A = 0.19228.
OT2, Wa
Furthermore, given equation (4.99), the marginal reduction in the level of extra- 
bloc trade costs will lead to an increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession 
country equal to =  0.00345.
Thus, given equation (4.105), the gain in the volume of exports of any original 
member country to the accession country due to the indirect effect of the marginal 
reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs will be equal to =  0.01579.
We conclude that, given equation (4.106), the overall gain in the volume of exports 
of any original member country to the accession country that would follow a marginal
 ^ _ D _ —   Don yn filPYPreduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs will be equal to  ^ A =  - — =4 +^ OT2 3t2, WA
^  = 0.20808.
T he gain in  th e  volum e o f im ports
We focus on the impact of a marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs on the 
volume of imports of any of the original member countries from the accession country.
Given equation (4.107), the direct effect of the marginal reduction in the level of 
extra-bloc trade costs will imply a gain in the volume of imports equal to dJ MPA =
d r 2 , w A
0.25061.
In addition, given equation (4.108), since the equilibrium wage in the accession 
country will increase due to the marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs, the 
reduction in the volume of imports of any original member from the accession country 
due to the indirect effect of the marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs equals
t°  • W t  =  -0.01990.
We note that the gain in imports implied by the direct effect of the marginal 
reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs is greater than the reduction in imports 
implied by the indirect effect of the marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc-trade 
costs.
Finally, given equation (4.109), the overall gain in the volume of imports of any 
original member country to the accession country due to the marginal reduction in the
182
level of extra-bloc trade will be equal to —^ ~ A =  =  0.23071.
The gain in the  volume of bilateral trade
Given equation (4.59), and having derived the gain in the volume of exports of any 
member country to the accession country and the gain in the volume of imports of any 
member country from the accession country, the gain in the volume of bilateral trade 
between any original member country and the accession country due to a marginal
 R .—-—R
reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs, will be equal to +
= 0.43879.
4.6.2 Baseline case 2
As in the baseline case 1 we consider that the elasticity of substitution is a =  5, the 
level of the “iceberg” intra-bloc trade costs is t \ = 1.2, the level of the “iceberg” 
extra-bloc trade costs is T2 =  1.4, while the fixed labour input requirement in the 
accession country, relative to the one in the original members, is <22 A* i =  4.
Thus, the manufacturing technology in the accession country is assumed to be 
highly inefficient with respect to the manufacturing technology used in the original 
members of the currency union.
Given the values of the parameters and the wage equation expressed in (4.54), the 
wage in the accession country in the equilibrium in which the accession country is 
excluded from the currency union is wa =  0.71837.
Since the equilibrium wage in the accession country is lower than under Case 1, we 
can affirm that the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the lower 
the equilibrium wage will be in the accession country before the enlargement of the 
currency union.
Given conditions (4.25') and (4.26'), the number of manufactured varieties pro­
duced in any of the original member countries and in the accession country are given 
by ur =  1 and ua = 0.25.
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Due to the greater technological inefficiency in the accession country, the number 
of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country will be lower than under 
Case 1, while the number of manufactured varieties produced in any member country 
will be unchanged.
It follows that, given equations (4.57) and (4.58), the equilibrium volume of exports
of any original member country to the accession country and the equilibrium volume
—  __
of imports of any member country from the accession country axe E X P A = 0.08712 
and IM P A = 0.12267.
Thus, the equilibrium volume of exports of any member country to the accession 
country is lower while the equilibrium volume of imports of any member country from 
the accession country is greater than under Case 1.
We can affirm that the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the 
lower will be the volume of exports and imports of any member country to and from 
the accession country before the enlargement of the currency union.
Given equation (4.59), in the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded 
from the currency union, the volume of bilateral trade realised between any member 
country and the accession country will be equal to B IL A =  0.209 79.
Since the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade is lower than under Case 1, we can 
affirm that the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the lower will 
be the equilibrium volume of bilateral trade between any member country and the 
accession country before the enlargement of the currency union.
T he gain in  th e  volum e o f exports
We investigate the implications of a marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs on
the equilibrium volume of exports of any member country to the accession country and
the equilibrium volume of imports of any member country from the accession country.
First, given equation (4.104), the direct effect of the marginal reduction in the
level of extrarbloc trade costs will imply a gain in the volume of exports of any original
8 EXPRmember country to the accession country equal to ^  — 0.16625.
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Since the gain in the volume of exports is lower than under Case 1, we can affirm 
that the more technologically inefficient the accession country, the lower the gain in 
the volume of exports of any original member to the accession country following the 
direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union.19
The direct effect of the enlargement will reduce the level of extra-bloc trade costs 
such that consumers located in the accession country, perceiving varieties produced 
in any of the original member countries as relatively cheaper, will increase their con­
sumption of those varieties.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will affect the gain in 
the volume of exports implied by the direct effect of the enlargement by reducing the 
equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country, and 
by reducing the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country 
before the enlargement.
First, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the lower the 
equilibrium number of varieties produced in the accession country will be.
Thus, once the direct effect of the enlargement will reduce the extra-bloc trade 
costs, consumers located in the accession country will increase more their consumption 
of varieties produced in any member country since the range of varieties available in 
the accession country will be narrower.
Furthermore, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the lower 
the equilibrium wage in the accession country will be before the enlargement of the 
currency union such that the f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country 
will be lower.
Once the extra-bloc trade costs will reduce due to the direct effect of the enlarge­
ment, consumers located in the accession country will increase less their consumption of 
varieties produced in any of the original member country since they will perceive them 
as relatively less cheaper being lower their f.o.b. price of the manufactured varieties
19 We refer to the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs implied by the enlargement of the currency 
union as the direct effect of the enlargement.
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before the enlargement.
Thus, greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will increase the 
gain in exports due to the direct effect of enlargement by reducing the range of man­
ufactured varieties produced in the accession country but it will reduce the gain in 
exports by reducing the equilibrium f.o.b price of varieties produced in the accession 
country.
Our simulation analysis indicates that the more technologically inefficient the ac­
cession country is, the smaller the gain in exports implied by the direct effect of en­
largement will be.
In fact, the negative impact on the gains in exports of the lower f.o.b. price of 
varieties produced in the accession country will be greater than the positive impact 
on the gains in exports of the reduction in the number of varieties produced in the 
accession country.
Furthermore, the marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs will lead to a 
general equilibrium induced increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession 
country.
Notably, given equation (4.99), the increase in the equilibrium wage in the accession 
country due to the marginal reduction in extra-bloc trade costs will be equal to =  
0.003585.
Since the increase in the relative wage in the accession country due to the marginal 
reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs is greater than in Case 1, we affirm that 
the more technologically inefficient the accession country is the greater is the general 
equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession country following 
the enlargement.
Given equation (4.105), we have that the gain in the volume of exports of any 
member country toward the accession country due to the indirect effect of the marginal
o------   ~
reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs is =  0.017675.
Since the gain in exports due to the indirect effect of the marginal reduction in the 
extra-bloc trade costs is greater than under Case 1, the more technologically inefficient
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the accession country is, the greater will be the gain in the volume of exports of any 
original member country to the accession country implied by the indirect effect of the 
enlargement.20
The indirect effect of the enlargement will increase the equilibrium relative wage in 
the accession country such that consumers located in the accession country, perceiving 
a greater income, will increase their consumption of varieties produced in the original 
member countries as well as in the accession country.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country affects the gain in the 
volume of exports of any original member country to the accession country due to 
the indirect effect of the enlargement by reducing the equilibrium number of varieties 
produced in the accession country, by reducing the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties 
produced in the accession country, and by enhancing the increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country following the enlargement.
First, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the lower the 
equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country will 
be.
Thus, once the indirect effect of the enlargement will increase the income perceived 
by consumers in the accession country, they will increase more their consumption of 
varieties produced in the original member country since the range of manufactured 
varieties produced in the accession country will be narrower.
Furthermore, the more technological inefficient the accession country is, the lower 
will be the equilibrium wage in the accession country before the enlargement of the 
currency union such that the f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country 
will be lower.
Once the indirect effect of the enlargement will increase the income of consumers 
located in the accession country, they will increase less the consumption of varieties 
produced in the member country since they will increase more the consumption of
20 We refer to the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession country 
implied by the enlargement of the currency union as the indirect effect of the enlargement.
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those varieties being lower the price of varieties produced in the accession country 
before the enlargement.
Finally, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the greater 
the general equilibrium implied increase in the relative wage in the accession country 
will be.
As a consequence, consumers located in the accession country will increase more 
their consumption of varieties produced in any original member country since their 
income will increase more following the indirect effect of the enlargement.
Thus, greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will increase the 
gain in exports due to the indirect effect of enlargement by reducing the range of 
manufactured varieties produced in the accession country and by enhancing the general 
equilibrium implied increase in the relative wage in the accession country.
However, greater technological inefficiency will reduce the gain in exports due to 
the indirect effect of the enlargement by reducing the equilibrium f.o.b price of manu­
facturing varieties produced in the accession country.
Our simulation analysis indicates that the more technologically inefficient the ac­
cession country is, the greater the gain in exports implied by the indirect effect of 
enlargement will be since the positive impact of the reduction in the number of vari­
eties in the accession country and of the greater increase in the wage in the accession 
country will be greater than the negative impact of the lower f.o.b. price of varieties 
produced in the accession country.
Finally, given equation (4.106), the overall gain in the volume of exports of any 
original member country to the accession country following the marginal reduction in 
the level of extra-bloc trade costs will be equal to dE^ A =  +  9 ^ a A ' ~
0.18393.
We note that since the gain exports due to the marginal reduction in the level of 
extra-bloc trade cost is lower than in Case 1, we can affirm that the more technolog­
ically inefficient is the accession country the lower will be the increase in exports of 
any member country to the accession country that would follow the enlargement of
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the currency union.
In fact, our simulations analysis indicates that the negative impact of greater tech­
nological inefficiency in the accession country on the gains in exports following the 
direct effect of enlargement will be greater than the positive impact on the gains of 
exports following the indirect effect of the enlargement.
The gain in the volume of imports
We focus on the impact of the marginal reduction in extra-bloc trade costs on the 
volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country.
First, given equation (4.107), the direct effect of the marginal reduction in the
_ - ^
extra-bloc trade costs will lead to a gain in the volume of imports equal to aJ MPJ 1 =dr2> wA
0.27965.
Since the gain in the volume of imports is greater than under Case 1, we can affirm 
that the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the greater the gain 
in the volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country 
will be following the direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union.
The direct effect of the enlargement will reduce the level of extra-bloc trade costs 
such that consumers located in any member country, perceiving manufactured varieties 
produced in the accession country as relatively cheaper, will increase their consumption 
of those varieties.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will affect the gains in 
the volume of imports due to the direct effect of the enlargement by reducing the 
equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country, and 
by reducing the equilibrium f.o.b. price of those varieties.
As we pointed out, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the 
smaller the equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession 
country will be. Once the direct effect of the enlargement will reduce extra-bloc trade 
costs, consumers located in any original member country will increase less their con­
sumption of varieties produced in the accession country since the narrower is the range
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of varieties produced in the accession country. Furthermore, the more technologically 
inefficient the accession country is, the lower will be the equilibrium wage in the ac­
cession country before the enlargement of the currency union such that the lower will 
be the f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country.
Once the extrarbloc trade costs are reduced due to the direct effect of the en­
largement, consumers located in any original member country will increase more their 
consumption of varieties produced in the accession country.
In fact, varieties produced in the accession country will seem relatively more cheaper 
once extra-bloc trade costs reduce since the lower will be their f.o.b. price before the 
enlargement.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will, then, reduce the 
gain in imports due to the direct effect of enlargement by reducing the number of 
manufactured varieties produced in the accession country but it will increase the gain 
in imports by reducing equilibrium f.o.b. price of manufacturing varieties produced in 
the accession country.
Our simulation analysis shows that the more technologically inefficient the accession 
country is, the greater the gain in imports due to the direct effect of enlargement will 
be.
In fact, the positive impact on the gain in imports of the lower equilibrium f.o.b. 
price of varieties produced in the accession country will be greater than the negative 
effect on the gain in imports of the reduction in the number of varieties produced in 
the accession country.
Focusing on the indirect effect of the marginal reduction in extrarbloc trade costs 
we previously pointed out that it will lead to an increase in the equilibrium relative 
wage in the accession country.
Given equation (4.99) and being the increase in the equilibrium relative wage in
the accession country equal to =  0.03585, the reduction in the volume of imports
of any original member country from the accession country following the indirect effect
 a ^
of the marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs is q^ aa ' =  —0.028455.
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We note that the reduction in the volume of imports of any original member country 
from the accession country due to the indirect effect of the marginal reduction in the 
extra-bloc trade costs is greater than under Case 1.
We can, then, affirm that the more technologically inefficient the accession country 
is, the greater the reduction in the volume of imports of any member country from 
the accession country will be following the indirect effect of the enlargement of the 
currency union.
The indirect effect of the enlargement will increase the equilibrium relative wage 
in the accession country such that to equally increase the equilibrium f.o.b. price of 
varieties produced in the accession country.
As a consequence, consumers located in any member country, perceiving varieties 
produced in the accession country as more expensive, will reduce their consumption of 
those varieties. Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country will affect 
the reduction in imports due to the indirect effect of the enlargement by reducing the 
equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country, by 
reducing the equilibrium f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country 
before the enlargement, and by enhancing the increase in the relative wage in the 
accession country following the enlargement.
First, the more technologically inefficient is the accession country, the lower will be 
the equilibrium number of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country.
Thus, once the indirect effect of the enlargement increases the equilibrium f.o.b. 
price of varieties produced in the accession country, consumers located in any mem­
ber country will reduce less their consumption of varieties produced in the accession 
countries since the narrower will be the range of manufactured varieties produced in 
the accession country.
In addition, the more technologically inefficient is the accession country, the lower 
will be the equilibrium wage in the accession country before the enlargement such that 
the lower will be the f.o.b. price of varieties produced in the accession country before 
the enlargement.
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Thus, once due to the indirect effect of the enlargement the equilibrium f.o.b. 
price of varieties produced in the accession country increases, consumers located in 
any member country will reduce more their consumption of varieties produced in the 
accession country.
In fact, consumers located in any member country will perceive varieties produced 
in the accession country as relatively more expensive following the indirect effect of the 
enlargement since their equilibrium f.o.b. price will be lower before the enlargement.
Finally, the more technologically inefficient the accession country is, the greater 
will be the magnitude of the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country. As a result, consumers located in any member country will 
decrease more their consumption of manufactured varieties produced in the accession 
country since the relatively more expensive those varieties will be following the indirect 
effect of the enlargement.
Greater technological inefficiency in the accession country increases the reduction 
of imports due to the indirect effect of enlargement by reducing the f.o.b price of 
varieties produced in the accession country before the enlargement and by increasing 
the magnitude of the general equilibrium implied increase in the relative wage in the 
accession country.
On the other hand, greater technological inefficiency will decrease the reduction in 
the volume of imports due to the indirect effect of the enlargement by reducing the 
range of manufactured varieties produced in the accession country.
Our simulation analysis indicates that the more technologically inefficient the ac­
cession country is, the greater is the reduction in the imports of any original member 
country from the accession country due to the indirect effect of the enlargement.
In fact, the greater reduction in imports due to the lower equilibrium f.o.b. price 
of varieties produced in the accession country and the greater increase in the relative 
wage in the accession country will more than compensate for the lower reduction in 
imports due to the smaller number of varieties produced in the accession country.
Given equation (4.109), the overall gain in the volume of imports of any member
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country from the accession country following the marginal reduction in the level of 
extra-bloc trade costs will be equal to 9i¥ pa =  +  —£1 Pa ■ = 0.25121.
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Since the gain in imports due to the marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc 
trade cost is greater than under Case 1, we can affirm that the more technologically 
inefficient is the accession country, the greater the increase in the volume of imports 
of any member country from the accession country will be following the enlargement 
of the currency union.
In fact, our simulation analysis points out that the increase in the gain in imports 
due to the direct effect of enlargement will be greater than the increase in the reduction 
in imports due to the indirect effect of the enlargement induced by greater technological 
inefficiency in the accession country.
The gain in the volume of bilateral trade
Given equation (4.81), the gain in the volume of bilateral trade between any member
country and the accession country, due to the marginal reduction in the level of extra-
 — ^  —
bloc trade costs, will be equal to =  6E£.Pa +  =  0.43514.
Since the gain in bilateral trade due to the marginal reduction in the level of extra- 
bloc trade cost is lower than under Case 1, we conclude that the more technologically 
inefficient the accession country is, the lower will be the increase in the volume of 
bilateral trade between any original member country and the accession country that 
would follow the enlargement.21
In fact, our simulation analysis shows that the reduction in the gain in the volume 
of exports of any member country to the accession country due to greater technological 
inefficiency in the accession country will be greater than the increase in the gain in the
21 The prediction of our model that the more technological inefficient is the accession country the 
lower the gain in the volume of bilateral trade following the enlargement concerns intraindustry trade 
explained by consumers’ love of variety and increasing returns to scale. If we extended our model to 
add comparative advantages, the positive effects of greater economic dissimilarities on trade explained 
by comparative advantages would have to be taken into account in assessing the impact of greater 
technological inefficiency in the accession country on the gains in the volume of bilateral trade that 
would follow the enlargement.
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volume of imports of any original member from the accession country.
4.7  Conclusions
Recent empirical findings have suggested that sharing a common currency significantly 
enhances bilateral trade realised between pair of countries.
Our work provided a general equilibrium analysis of the trade effects of the for­
mation of a currency union between the members of a regional trading bloc, of the 
subsequent enlargement of the currency union to include an economically dissimilar 
country, and the role played by economic dissimilarities on the magnitude of the trade 
effects of a common currency.
We built a three-countries general equilibrium intra-industry trade model in which 
economic dissimilarities across countries are featured, and sharing a common currency 
affects patterns of trade by reducing transaction costs due to the use of different cur­
rencies, and by affecting the equilibrium relative wage across countries.
First, we investigated the implications of the formation of a currency union between 
the members of a regional trading bloc on the volume of bilateral trade realised between 
the member countries and between any of the members and the excluded country.
Specifically, we considered the excluded country to be economically dissimilar from 
the members of the currency union by having a less efficient manufacturing production 
technology compared to the member countries.
Thus, we showed that the formation of a currency union between the members of 
a regional bloc affects the patterns of trade by reducing intrarbloc trade costs through 
the elimination of transaction costs due to the use of different currencies, and by 
leading to a general equilibrium induced reduction of the equilibrium relative wage in 
the excluded country.
Taking into account these effects, we proved that the formation of a currency union 
between the members of a regional trading bloc enhances the volume of bilateral trade 
between the member countries while it reduces the volume of bilateral trade between
194
any of the members and the excluded country.
Concerning the volume of bilateral trade between members, we showed that the 
formation of the currency union enhances it by increasing the volume of exports and 
imports that any member realises to and from the other member.
Notably, we proved that the volume of exports and imports of any member to and 
from the other member is increased by the reduction in intra-bloc trade costs while 
it is reduced by the general equilibrium induced reduction in the equilibrium relative 
wage in the excluded country.
At this regard, we demonstrated that the positive implications of the reduction in 
intra-bloc trade costs on the volume of bilateral trade between the member countries 
is greater than the negative implication of the reduction in the relative wage in the 
excluded country.
Concerning the volume of bilateral trade between any member and the excluded 
country, we showed that the formation of the currency union reduces it by reducing 
the volume of exports and imports that any member realises to and from the excluded 
country.
Thus, we showed that the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs reduces the volume 
of imports that any of member countries realises from the excluded country.
Notably we showed that the negative impact of the reduction in intra-bloc trade 
costs on the volume of imports of any member from the excluded country is greater 
than the positive impact of the reduction of the relative wage in the excluded country.22
2 2 The equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country is such as to guarantee that firms break 
even. The formation of the currency union implies a reduction in the intra-bloc costs that tends to 
increase (reduce) the sales of firms located in the currency union (excluded country). However, the 
fact that the level of output for which firms break even is unaffected leads to a general equilibrium 
induced reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country that tends to reduce (increase) the sales 
of firms located in the excluded country (currency union). As we can expect, since the reduction in 
the relative wage is a general equilibrium adjustment resulting from the initial reduction in intra-bloc 
trade costs, its impact on the overall firms’ sales will counterbalance the impact of the reduction in 
intra-bloc trade costs. However, a rigorous analysis is needed to assess how the different components 
of firms’ sales are affected by the operating of those two effects. At this regard, we provide analytical 
proof that the impact of the reduction in the relative wage on a member’s imports from the excluded 
country is dominated by the impact of lower intra-bloc trade costs.
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In addition, we proved that the general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative 
wage in the excluded country reduces the volume of exports of any member country 
to the excluded country while it enhances the volume of imports of any member from 
the excluded country.
Second, we analysed how the enlargement of the currency union to include the 
economically dissimilar country affects the volume of bilateral trade realised between 
any original member and the accession country, and between the original members.
We showed that the enlargement of the currency union affects the patterns of trade 
by reducing extrarbloc trade costs through the elimination of transaction costs due 
toward the use of different currencies, and by implying a general equilibrium induced 
increase in the relative wage in the accession country.
Considering these effects, we showed that the enlargement of a currency union to 
an economically dissimilar country enhances the volume of bilateral trade between any 
original member and the accession country, while it reduces the volume of bilateral 
trade between the original member countries.
Concerning the volume of bilateral trade between any original member and the 
accession country, we proved that the enlargement enhances it by increasing the volume 
of exports and imports of any original member from and to the accession country.
In this regard, we showed that the reduction in the extrarbloc trade costs increases 
the volume of exports and imports of any original member to and from the accession 
country. Furthermore, the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in 
the accession country enhances the volume of exports of any original member to the 
accession country while it reduces the volume of imports of any original member from 
the accession country.
We demonstrated, then, that the positive implications of the reduction in extra­
bloc trade costs on the volume of imports of any original member from the accession 
country is greater than the negative implications of the increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country.
Concerning the volume of bilateral trade between the original members, we proved
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that the enlargement of the currency union reduces it by reducing the volume of exports 
and imports of any original member from and to the other member.
We showed that the volume of exports and imports between the original member 
countries is reduced by the reduction in the extrarbloc trade costs while it is enhanced 
by the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in the accession coun­
try.
We proved, then, that the negative implication of the increase in the accession 
country’s relative wage on the volume of bilateral trade between the original members 
is greater than the positive implication of the reduction in extra-bloc trade costs.
Finally, we analysed how economic dissimilarities between the original members of 
the currency union and the accession country affect the magnitude of the gain in the 
volume of bilateral trade that would follow the enlargement.
Simulating our general equilibrium model, we showed that the more technologically 
inefficient the accession country is compared to the original members of the currency 
union, the lower is the gain in the volume of bilateral trade between any original 
member and the accession country following the enlargement of the currency union.
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4.8 M athem atical Appendix
4.8.1 Derivation of the wage equation in the initial equilibrium
In the initial equilibrium, manufacturing firms located in any of the member countries 
and in the excluded country break even if conditions (4.27') and (4.28') are satisfied.
Notably, it is possible to show that the wage in the excluded country that would 
satisfy the condition for which firms in the member countries break even would also 
satisfy the condition for which firms in the excluded country break even.
Focusing on the condition for which firms in the member countries break even, 
condition (4.27') may be rewritten as:
1 +  ’- M  + l i  ( ^ ) (1- " ) g  • w(Al~a) +
After some simplifications, solving the previous equation with respect to the equi­
librium wage in the excluded country, we derive the wage equation that implicitly 
defines the equilibrium wage in the excluded country as a function of the parameters 
of the model:
1  _  +  2 £ « ’r r ? _' ) =  0 (4.85)
Notably, we can prove that the equilibrium wage in the excluded country results 
to be lower than unity for any value of the parameters of the model.
Since the equilibrium wage in the excluded country is such that the wage equation 
in (4.84) is satisfied, if we substitute into equation (4.84) the unitary value for the 
equilibrium wage and the wage equation is not satisfied, then the equilibrium wage in 
the excluded country will never assume the unitary value.
Defining as G the left-hand side of the wage equation in (4.84), if we substitute 
the unitary value for the equilibrium wage in the excluded country and G is positive 
for any value of the parameters, we might conclude that the equilibrium wage in the
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excluded country is lower than unity given that is positive for any value of the 
parameters (See Proof of Proposition 10).
Substituting the unitary value for the equilibrium wage in the excluded country 
into the wage equation, we may rewrite G as:
22 ®2.r (1-<7) 0=1 T(1-<7)
G = ----- -p-----— -------- 22----- 1----------  (84')
Since the denominator of (4.84') is positive for any value of the parameters, given 
that c*2 > 0, a\ > 0, T2 > 1, and t \ > 1, we focus on the numerator of (4.84') in order 
to assess the sign of G.
Given that 02 > 01 , cr > 1, and T2 > t i ,  the numerator of (4.84;) has a positive 
sign for any value of the parameters.
We conclude that the equilibrium wage in the excluded country is lower than unity 
for any value of the parameters of the model.
4.8.2 Proof o f Proposition 9
In order to analyze the general equilibrium relative wage effect of the formation of 
the currency union between the two member countries, we investigate how a marginal 
reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs would affect the equilibrium relative wage in 
the excluded country.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the wage equation we have:
r\ dGdwA _  W[ 
^  &
(4.86)
After some simplifications, we obtain:
dG - % • ( * - [ %  ' WA 2°) +  2w 
[ i  +  r j 1- ^  a  (TS. „ * )< ! -> ] ;
(4.87)
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(2* -  1) ( g ) 2 • w f  + 2 g ^ - l)r<1-" )] • ( l  +  r*1-" ))  
----------------------- K '  v '  (4.88)9wa [l +  r [1 ") + f a  • wA ) {1 ff)]
In order to assess the sign of we focus on the signs of and expressed 
by equations (4.86) and (4.87), respectively.
Having assumed that at\ > 0, cx.2 > 0, t \  > 1, 7-2 > 1 and a > 1, we observe that 
for any value of the parameters will have a negative sign while will have a 
positive sign.
Thus, given equation (4.84), since < 0 and > 0, we have that for any value 
of the parameters of the model:
dwA”7^ > 0
UT l
We conclude that the formation of the currency union between the two symmetric 
member countries, leading the reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs, will 
reduce the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country, compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
4.8.3 Proof o f Proposition 10
The volume of bilateral trade between the two member countries will be affected by 
the formation of the currency union through the reduction in the level of intra-bloc 
trade costs, and the general equilibrium implied reduction in the equilibrium relative 
wage in the excluded country.
In order to investigate the trade impact of the direct effect of the formation of the 
currency union, that is the reduction in intra-bloc trade costs, we compute the partial 
derivative of the initial equilibrium volume of bilateral trade between the two member 
countries, expressed in equation (4.31), with respect to the intrarbloc trade costs, r\,
200
assuming the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country is unchanged.
Thus, after some manipulations, we have:
dBIL% 2 (1 -  g )  • [ l  +  g  f a  • u u ) (1- g>] 
dTl' WA [l +  ^  +  g ^ W 1^ ] 2
Having assumed a \  > 0,0 2  > 0, t \  > 0, T2 > 0 and a  > 1, the partial derivative in 
(4.88) has a negative sign for any value of the parameters such that a marginal reduction 
in the intra-bloc trade costs will increase the volume of bilateral trade between the 
member countries.
We can affirm that the direct effect of the formation of the currency union will 
increase the volume of bilateral trade between the member countries, compared to the 
initial equilibrium.
To investigate the trade impact of the indirect effect of the formation of the cur­
rency union i.e. the general equilibrium implied reduction in the relative wage in the 
excluded country, we compute the partial derivative of the initial equilibrium volume 
of bilateral trade between the member countries, expressed in equation (4.31), with 
respect to the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country times the derivative 
of the equilibrium wage in the excluded country with respect to the level of intrarbloc 
trade costs.
After some simplifications, we obtain:
dBILft Owa _  2 t^  ^  • (<j -  1) ^  • wAa QwA
dwA d r i  r. . J i - a )  , a, / \ ( i—<t)1 2 d r i
(4.90)
Having proved that 7^ ,  expressed in (4.84), is always positive and assumed that 
ot\ > 0, «2 > 0, T\ > 0, 7"2>0 and cr > 1, the expression in (4.89) will have a positive 
sign for any value of the parameters.
It follows that the general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage in 
the excluded country implied by a marginal reduction in intra-bloc trade costs, will 
reduce the volume of bilateral trade between the two member countries.
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We note that the indirect effect of the formation of the currency union will reduce 
the volume of bilateral trade between the two member countries, compared to the 
initial equilibrium.
Finally in order to investigate the overall effect of the formation of the currency 
union on the volume of bilateral trade between the member countries, we compute the 
total derivative of (4.31) with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade costs, taking into 
account that the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country is a function of 
level of intra-bloc trade costs.
After some manipulations, we have:
dBIL% 2 C1 -  g ) Ti g I1 +  % (t2Wa){1 "*] +  2f£ (<t -  1 )r ,1 "M 1 g) • w /Sgft
(4.91)
We observe that the volume of bilateral trade between the member countries will
increase due to a marginal reduction of intra-bloc trade costs if the total derivative in
(4.90) is negative.
Since we assumed a i > 0 and «2 > 0 and T2 > 1, the denominator of the expression 
in (4.90) is always positive such that the total derivative results negative only if its 
numerator is negative. After some manipulations, we obtain that the numerator of the 
expression in (4.90) is negative if:
n  d w A  ^  1 . OL2 ( t r - l )  ( < 7 - l )  ( A n o x X—  < 1 H ’ (4.92)
w a d r i  a i  1 A
Given equations (4.85), (4.86) and (4.87), it is possible to show that the condition 
in (91) will be satisfied if the following inequality holds:
Having assumed a > 1, the above inequality will be satisfied for any value of the 
parameters implying that the condition expressed in (4.91) will be satisfied for any 
value of the parameters.
Since the total derivative in (4.90) will be positive for any value of the parameters, 
a marginal reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs will increase the volume of bilateral 
trade realized between member countries, taking into account the general equilibrium 
induced reduction in the relative wage in the excluded country.
We conclude that the formation of the currency union unambiguously increases 
the volume of bilateral trade between the member countries compared to the initial 
equilibrium since the positive impact of the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs will 
be greater than the negative effect of the general equilibrium induced reduction in the 
relative wage in the excluded country.
4.8.4 Proof o f Proposition 11
The formation of the currency union affects the volume of bilateral trade between any 
of the member countries and the excluded country by reducing the intra-bloc trade 
costs, and leading to a general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage in 
the excluded country.
In order to investigate the trade implications of the direct effect of the formation of 
the currency union, that is the reduction in intra-bloc trade costs on volume of exports 
of any member country to the excluded country, we compute the partial derivative of 
the initial equilibrium, expressed in equation (4.32), with respect to the intrarbloc trade 
costs, assuming unchanged the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country.
Thus, we have:
0 (4.93)
OT i , W A
Since the partial derivative in (4.92) is zero, a marginal reduction in the intrarbloc 
trade costs will not affect the volume of bilateral trade between any of the members
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and the excluded country, assuming unchanged the equilibrium relative wage in the 
excluded country.
We can affirm that the direct effect of the formation of the currency union will 
not affect the volume of bilateral trade between any of the member countries and the 
excluded country.
To analyze the trade implications of the indirect effect of the formation of the 
currency union, that is the general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage in 
the excluded country, on the volume of export of any member to the accession country 
we compute the partial derivative of equation (4.32) with respect to the equilibrium 
relative wage in the excluded country times the derivative of the equilibrium relative 
wage in the excluded country with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade costs.
Notably, we obtain:
dEXP% dWA = T^~ a) • M - *1 +  2 t21~<?> +  (°r ~ 1) %>WA~a)) dwA
dwA dti |^ w £ " (7) +  2'41~<t)] 2 mi
In order to assess the sign of (4.93), we focus on its numerator since, having assumed 
that <7 > 1, ori > 0 and Q2 > 0, its denominator is always positive.
Having proved that expressed in (4.84), is always positive and assumed that 
a > 1 and T2 > 1, the numerator of (4.93) will be positive for any value of the 
parameters.
It follows that the reduction in the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country 
implied by a marginal reduction in intra-bloc trade costs will lead to a reduction in 
the volume of exports of any member country to the excluded country.
Thus, the indirect effect of the formation of the currency union will reduce the 
volume of exports of any member country to the excluded, compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
Since the direct effect of the formation of the currency union does not affect the 
volume of bilateral trade between any of the member countries and the excluded coun­
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try, we conclude that the formation of the currency union unambiguously decreases 
the volume of exports of any member country and the excluded country compared to 
the initial equilibrium.
In order to investigate the implications of the direct effect of the formation of 
the currency union on the volume of imports of any member country from the ex­
cluded country, we compute the partial derivative of (4.33) with respect to the level of 
intra-bloc trade costs, assuming that the equilibrium wage in the excluded country is 
unchanged.
After some manipulations, we have:
d I M P %  =  ■ ( t 2w a )1~‘7
8 t i ' W a  [sHi+ l^_"))+(W i-‘')]2
Having assumed that a > 1, a i > 0, 012 > 0, T2 > 0 and t \  > 0, the partial 
derivative in (4.94) is positive for any value of the parameters.
It follows that a marginal reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs will lead 
to a reduction in the volume of imports of any member country from the excluded 
country, assuming the equilibrium relative wage to be unchanged.
The direct effect of the formation of the currency union reduces then the volume 
of imports of any member country from the excluded country, compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
On the other hand, to investigate the implications of the indirect effect of the 
formation of the currency union on the volume of imports of any member country 
from the excluded country, we compute the partial derivative of (4.33) with respect 
to the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country times the derivative of the 
equilibrium wage in the excluded country with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade 
costs.
After some manipulations, we obtain:
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PIMPf dwA °wa° ( i + t{? a))  dwA
9 w a  ' 911  [ a  . ( l  +  r ' 1 - " ) )  +  ( r 2 ^ ) ( ' - " ) ] 2  '  ^
Having proved that is always positive and assumed given a > 1, ot\ > 0, 
c*2 > 0, T2 > 0 and t \  > 0, we conclude that the derivative in (4.95) has a negative 
sign for any value of the parameters .
It follows that the reduction in the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country 
due to a marginal reduction in the level of intrarbloc trade costs increases the volume 
of imports of any member country from the excluded country.
The indirect effect of the formation of the currency union increases then the volume 
of imports of any member country from the excluded country, compared to the initial 
equilibrium.
Finally, in order to investigate the overall effect of the formation of the currency 
union on the volume of imports of any member country from the excluded country, 
we compute the total derivative of (4.33) with respect to the level of intra-bloc trade 
costs, taking into account that the equilibrium relative wage in the excluded country 
is a function of level of intra-bloc trade costs. After some manipulations, we have:
PIM P* _  g? (g -  1) t 2 " W  ■ [ t, °wa -  ( l  +  r j 1 g))  • g ff]
9 t i  [ i f  ( i + ^ 1_<r)) + (T2lt,A)(1- ,,)] 2
The volume of imports of any member country from the excluded country will 
decrease due a marginal reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs if the total derivative 
expressed in (4.96) is positive.
Having assumed a > 1, a\ > 0 and c*2 > 0, T2 > 1, and t \ > 1, the denominator 
of (4.96) is always positive such that the total derivative will be positive only if its 
numerator is positive. After some manipulations we obtain that the numerator of 
(4.96) will be positive only if the following condition is satisfied:
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Given expressed in (4.85), the condition expressed in (4.97) may be rewritten
as:
f £  ■ ( l  +  r '1-"*) -  r ^ >  ■ {WA) ■ &
^ • ( l  +  r ? - ' ))  < 0
where g— and are expressed in (4.86) and (4.87), respectively.
Having proved that is always positive, given our assumptions on the parameters 
of the model, the denominator of (4.97') is always positive.
Furthermore, since we showed that ^  is negative for any value of the parameters, 
it follows that the numerator of (4.97x) will be always positive, implying that the 
condition expressed in (4.97) will always be verified.
It follows that the numerator of (4.96) is negative for any value of the parameters 
such that the volume of imports of any member country from the excluded country 
will reduce due to a marginal reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs.
Thus, the formation of the currency union unambiguously decreases the volume 
of imports of any member country from excluded country compared to the initial 
equilibrium since the negative effect of the reduction in the intra-bloc trade costs is 
greater than the positive effect of the general equilibrium induced reduction in the 
relative wage in the excluded country.
We conclude that the volume of bilateral trade between any member country and 
the excluded country unambiguously reduces following the formation of the currency 
union since both the volume of exports and imports of any member to and from the 
excluded country will reduce.
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4.8.5 Proof o f Proposition 12
Given expression (4.84), the wage equation in the equilibrium characterized by the 
existence of a currency union between the two symmetric member countries is:
(4.99)
In order to investigate the general equilibrium induced relative wage effect of the 
enlargement of the currency union toward the accession country, we investigate how a 
marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs would affect the equilibrium relative 
wage in the accession country.
Defining as G\ the left-hand side of (4.98), the implicit function theorem implies 
that:
9wa
dT2
dGi 
dr 2 
dGi 
&WA
(4.100)
3Gl + 2j% (CT -  1)T2<7«iA J) • [l +  -  (g -  !) • (§ ^ )3 •T
-<t~( 2- 3<t)
W
dr 2
(4.101)
dGi
dw\
(2<r -  1) ( g ) *  • f ij2” +  ■ w (r ~ 1] • r?-'*] • ( l  +  4 1_<7)) +
+CT(s)' w + 2 («) w (-2 a) 2(1—er) (4.102)
Given expression (4.99), in order to assess the sign of we focus on the analysis 
of the signs of and expressed in equations (4.100) and (4.101), respectively. 
First, we note that, having assumed that a i  > 0,0 1 2  > 0, t \  > 1, T 2 > 1 and a > 1,
is positive for any value of the parameters.
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In order to assess the sign of we note that since the denominator of (4.100) is 
positive for any value of the parameters, having assumed that ai > 0, olz > 0, 5i > 1 
and T2 > 1, we may focus on its numerator.
After some manipulations, it is possible to show that the numerator of (4.100) will 
be positive when the equilibrium wage in the accession country satisfies the following 
condition:
)
wa > -------------  — f— (4.103)
[ 2 . ( l  +  4 1-" )) ] ^
Since the equilibrium wage in the accession country is such that the wage equation 
in (4.98) is ‘satisfied, if we substitute into the wage equation the value specified in 
the right-hand side of (4.102) for the equilibrium wage and the wage equation is not 
satisfied, then the equilibrium wage in the accession country will never assume the 
specified value.
Furthermore, if we substitute in (4.98) the right hand side of (4.102) for the equilib­
rium wage in the accession country and G\ is negative we conclude that the equilibrium 
wage will be greater than the specified value since we previously proved that is 
positive for any value of the parameters.
Substituting the right-hand side of (4.102) for the equilibrium wage into the wage 
equation in (4.98), after some simplifications we may rewrite G\ as:
02 2
Gi =
2 -
• ( M M )
( s i
(4.104)
In order to assess the sign of (4.103), we can focus on its numerator since its
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denominator is positive for any value of the parameters given that a\ > 0, a 2 > 0, 
<Si > 1 and T2 > 1.
Notably, we have:
25 > 22(1-<t)
21 > (21 
OL2 \Q!2
<7 — 2 
(*-1)
2 >
2 +  2 S\
2(<t—1)
Since the numerator of (4.103) has a negative sign for any value of the parameters, 
G\ is always negative such that the equilibrium wage in the accession country will 
always satisfy the condition in (4.102).
It follows that will have a positive sign for any value of the parameters of the 
model.
Having proved that > 0 and > 0 and given equation (4.98), for any value 
of the parameters we have:
9wa
dT2
< 0
We conclude that the enlargement of the currency union to the accession country, 
implying a reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs, will lead to an increase in 
the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country, compared to the equilibrium in 
which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
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4.8.6 Proof o f Proposition 13
The enlargement of the currency union to the accession country affects the volume 
of bilateral trade between any of the original members and the accession country by 
reducing the extrarbloc trade costs, and by leading to a the general equilibrium induced 
increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country.
In order to investigate the implications of the direct effect of the enlargement of 
the currency union, that is the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs, on the volume 
of exports of any original member country to the accession country, we compute the 
partial derivative of equation (57), with respect to the level of extrarbloc trade costs, 
assuming the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country to be unchanged.
After some manipulations, we have:
d E X p \  (1 w(l ~ a)
dT^ A [g-fi2- ' , + 2ri1- ' )]2
Having assumed <j  > 1, a\ > 0, o.^  > 0, and 7-2 > 1, the derivative expressed in 
(4.104) is negative for any value of the parameters.
It follows that a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs will in­
crease the volume of exports of any original member country to the accession country, 
assuming that the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country is unchanged.
We conclude that the direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union in­
creases the volume of exports of any original member country to the accession country 
compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the cur­
rency union.
In order to investigate the implications of the indirect effect of the enlargement 
of the currency i.e. the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country, on the volume of exports of any original member to the 
accession country we compute the partial derivative of equation (4.57), with respect 
to the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country times the derivative of the 
equilibrium relative wage in the accession with respect to the level of extra-bloc trade
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costs.
After some simplifications, we obtain:
d E X P *  dwA 2 r f - <,) + ga - 4 1-'7)r ^  d$ A 
d$A ' dr2 [S .f i» - )  + 2r<1- ' f  ' dT>
Having proved that expressed in (4.99), is always negative and assumed that 
a > 1, ot\ > 0, «2 > 0, and T2 > 1 , the derivative in (4.105) is negative for any value 
of the parameters.
It follows that the increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country 
due to a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs will increase in the 
volume of exports of any member country to the accession country.
We conclude that the indirect effect of the enlargement of the currency union 
increases the volume of exports of any member country to the accession country, com­
pared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency 
union.
In order to assess the overall effect of the enlargement of the currency union on 
the volume of export of any member country to the accession country, we compute 
the total derivative of (4.57) with respect to the level of extra-bloc trade costs, taking 
into account that the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country is a function 
of level of extra-bloc trade costs.
After some manipulations, the overall derivative is:
d E X P RA (1 -  o ) r ?  • g  • w T ° ] +  &  ' 2 r f  ~g) +  • 4 * ^
dr  2 + 2
(4.107)
Having assumed that <7 > 1, a\ > 0 and 012 > 0, and 7*2 > 1, the denominator of 
(4.106) is always positive while, having proved that < 0, the numerator of (4.106) 
is negative for any value of the parameters of the model.
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Since the total derivative expressed in (4.106) is always a negative, the volume of 
exports of any original member country to the accession country will increase due to 
marginal reduction of the level of extra-bloc trade costs.
We conclude that the enlargement of the currency union unambiguously increases 
the volume of exports of any original member country to the accession country com­
pared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency 
union.
The volume of exports of any member country to the accession country will increase 
due to the reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs and the general equilibrium 
induced increase in the relative wage in the accession country following the enlarge­
ment.
In order to assess the direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union on 
the volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country, we 
compute the partial derivative of equation (4.58) with respect to the level of intra-bloc 
trade costs, assuming unchanged the equilibrium wage in the accession country.
Thus, we have:
diMp^  oirMi-g)-Tr-g-(i+4w))
d r2 A  [ g - ( l  +  4 1-" )) +  (t2  •
Since we assumed a > 1, a\ > 0, ct2 > 0, T2 > 1, and <5i > 1, the partial derivative 
in (4.107) is always negative.
It follows that a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs increases 
the volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country, 
assuming unchanged the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country.
We can affirm that the direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union in­
creases the volume of imports of any original member from the accession country com­
pared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency 
union.
In order to evaluate the implications of the indirect effect of the enlargement of the
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currency union on the volume of imports of any member from the accession country, 
we compute the partial derivative of (4.58) with respect to the equilibrium relative 
wage in the accession country times the derivative of the equilibrium relative wage in 
the accession country with respect to the level of extra-bloc trade costs.
After some simplifications, we obtain:
Since we proved that expressed in (4.99), is always negative and we assumed 
that <7 > 1, a i > 0, a 2 > 0, T2 > 1, and 5i > 1, the expression in (4.108) will have a 
positive sign for any value of the parameters.
It follows that the increase in the equilibrium wage in the accession country due 
to a marginal reduction in the level of extrarbloc trade costs decreases the volume of 
imports of any member country from the accession country.
Thus, the indirect effect of the enlargement of the currency union increases the 
volume of imports of any member country from the accession country, compared to 
the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
In order to examine the overall effect of the enlargement of the currency union on 
the volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country, we 
compute the total derivative of (4.58) with respect to the extra-bloc trade costs, taking 
into account that the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country is a function 
of the extra-bloc trade costs.
After some manipulations, the total derivative is given by:
OWA
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We observe that the volume of imports of any original member country from the 
accession will increase due to a marginal reduction in extra-bloc trade costs if the 
overall derivative expressed in (4.109) has a negative sign.
Having assumed a > 1, ai > 0 and 02 > 0, T2 > 1, and <5i > 1, the denominator 
of (4.109) is always positive implying that the total derivative is negative only if its 
numerator is negative. After some manipulations, we note that the numerator of 
(4.109) is negative only if the following condition is satisfied:
9wa wa
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(4.111)
Given expressed in (99), the condition in (4.110) may be rewritten as:
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where and are expressed in (4.100) and (4.101), respectively.
Having proved that is always positive, given our assumptions on the parameters 
of the model, the denominator of the left hand side of (4.110') is always positive.
Furthermore, given and J^-, the numerator of the left hand side of (4.110') 
may be rewritten as:
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Since we assumed that cr > 1, the numerator of the left hand side of (4.110') results
positive for any value of the parameters of the model, implying that the condition 
expressed in (4.110) will be verified for any value of the parameters.
It follows that the numerator of (4.109) is negative for any value of the parameters.
The volume of imports of any original member country from the accession country 
will reduce due to a marginal reduction in the level of intra-bloc trade costs, taking 
into account the general equilibrium induced increase in the equilibrium relative wage 
in the accession country.
Thus, the enlargement of the currency union unambiguously increases the volume 
of imports of any original member country from the accession country compared to 
the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
In fact, the positive effect implied by the reduction in extra-bloc trade costs will 
be greater than the negative effect of the general equilibrium implied increase in the 
equilibrium wage in the accession country.
We conclude that the volume of bilateral trade between any of the original member 
countries and the accession country unambiguously increases due to the enlargement 
of the currency union since both the volume of exports and imports of any original 
member to and from the accession country will increase.
4.8.7 Proof o f Proposition 14
The enlargement of the currency union to the accession country affects the volume of 
bilateral trade between the two original member countries by reducing the extra-bloc 
trade costs, and by the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage in 
the accession country.
In order to investigate the trade implications of direct effect of the enlargement of 
the currency union, that is the reduction in the level of extrarbloc trade costs on the 
volume between the two original member countries, we compute the partial derivative 
of equation (4.56), with respect to the level of extra-bloc trade costs, assuming the 
equilibrium relative wage in the accession country to be unchanged.
Thus, after some manipulations, we have:
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Having assumed a > 1, ot\ > 0, «2 > 0, T2 > 1, and <$i > 0, the derivative
It follows that a marginal reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs will decrease the
We can affirm that the direct effect of the enlargement of the currency union de­
currency union i.e. the general equilibrium implied reduction in the relative wage 
in the accession country, we compute the partial derivative of (4.56) with respect
equilibrium relative wage in the accession country with respect to the level of extra-bloc 
trade costs.
After some simplifications, we have:
cr > 1, o:i > 0, CL2 > 05 7-2 > 1, and <$i > 1, the expression in (4.112) will have a 
negative sign for any value of the parameters.
It follows that the general equilibrium implied increase in the relative wage in the 
accession country due to a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs 
increases the volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries.
Thus, the indirect effect of the enlargement of the currency union increases the 
volume of bilateral trade between the two original members of the currency union, 
compared to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the cur-
expressed in (4.111) has a positive sign for any value of the parameters.
volume of bilateral trade realized between the original member countries.
creases the volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries, compared 
to the equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union. 
In order to investigate the impact of the indirect effect of the enlargement of the
to the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country times the derivative of the
dB IL (4.113)
Having proved that expressed in (4.99), is always negative and assumed that
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rency union.
Finally, in order to investigate the overall effect of the enlargement of the currency 
union on the volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries, we 
compute the total derivative of (4.58) with respect to the level of extrarbloc trade 
costs, taking into account that the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country 
is a function of the extrarbloc trade costs.
After some manipulations, we obtain:
a m i  • g  • ( g  - 1 )  • [ r r c g ^ + T \-° u ,{r ] • f f c '
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The volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries decreases due to 
the enlargement of the currency union if the overall derivative expressed in (4.113) is 
positive.
Since we assumed a\ > 0 and c*2 > 0, T2 > 1, and Si > 1, the denominator of
(4.113) is always positive such that the overall derivative is positive if its numerator is 
positive.
After some manipulations, we have that the numerator of (4.113) will be positive
if:
dwA wa
dT2 T2
Having shown in the proof of Proposition 14 that the above condition is verified for 
any value of the parameters, we note that the numerator of (4.113) is always positive 
such that the total derivative expressed in (4.113) is positive for any value of the 
parameters.
Thus, a marginal reduction in the level of extra-bloc trade costs reduces the volume 
of bilateral trade between member countries, taking into account the general equilib­
rium induced increase in the equilibrium relative wage in the accession country.
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We conclude that the enlargement of the currency union unambiguously decreases 
the volume of bilateral trade between the original member countries compared to the 
equilibrium in which the accession country is excluded from the currency union.
In fact, the negative effect of the reduction in the extra-bloc trade costs is greater 
than the positive effect of the general equilibrium induced increase in the relative 
equilibrium wage in the accession country.
219
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis contributed in several ways to the theoretical literature that studies re­
gionalism and its dynamic time-path effect, that is whether regionalism provides an 
impetus to, or detract from the multilateral non-discriminatory freeing of trade.
First, this thesis contributed to the literature by addressing the question of whether 
there are incentives for a regional trading bloc to enlarge through further extensions 
of its membership, or to reject new membership requests.
Thus, the analysis we provided in Chapter 2 filled a gap in the existing literature 
which had so far focused on the incentives for third countries to join regional trading 
bloc assuming that any country asking for membership in a regional trading bloc would 
be admitted in it.
Notably, we developed a theoretical model in which the incentives for a regional 
trading bloc to enlarge, and for third countries to join are formalized, and the en­
largement of the bloc endogenously arises from the interaction between supply of, and 
demand for membership.
Our theoretical model is the first in the literature to formalise the supply of mem­
bership of a regional trading bloc, and to provide a formal analysis of the incentives 
underpinning members’ decision on whether to accept or reject third countries’ mem­
bership requests.
In addition, our model is the first to formalise the enlargement of a regional trading
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bloc as endogenously determined by the interaction of the supply of, and demand for 
membership.
Assuming a political economy setting k la Grossman-Helpman (1994), we showed 
that pro and anti-enlargement forces operate in a regional trading bloc, and the regional 
policy-maker’s choice to enlarge or not to is a political equilibrium that balances these 
contrasting forces.
Our analysis indicated that industrial lobbing may operate as a pro- or an anti­
enlargement force in the policy-making process depending on the initial size of the 
regional trading bloc.
On the other hand, we emphasised that the higher level of aggregate social welfare 
that could be achieved if the regional policy-maker chose to enlarge the regional trading 
bloc represents a pro-enlargement force in the policy-making process.
Notably, we showed that due to interaction between pro- and anti-enlargement 
forces, a maximum size of the regional trading bloc exists beyond which the regional 
policy-maker will prevent any further enlargement to avoid a loss in the political sup­
port it receives, labelled as the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc.
Furthermore, we formalised the enlargement of a regional trading bloc as the en­
dogenous outcome of the interaction between the supply of membership of the bloc, 
and the demand of membership from third countries.
Our analysis showed that when the size of a regional trading bloc is smaller than 
its supply-side implied maximum size, the bloc will enlarge in the event of a request 
for membership from third countries.
However, once the regional bloc has reached its supply-side implied maximum size, 
the regional policy-maker will not be willing to further enlarge the bloc such that any 
eventual request for membership from third countries will not be satisfied.
On these grounds, we emphasised that the equilibrium size of a regional trading 
bloc cannot exceed the supply-side implied maximum size of the bloc since the supply- 
side of membership will be binding on further enlargements once this maximum size 
has been reached.
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In addition, we showed that the equilibrium size of a regional trading bloc might 
be smaller than its supply-side implied maximum size if third countries’ requests for 
membership are not “numerous” enough such that the demand-side of membership is 
binding on further enlargements of the bloc.
The analysis we developed in Chapter 2 also studied how a process of deeper 
integration among the members of a regional trading bloc might affect the equilibrium 
size of the bloc.
In this regard, drawing on our theoretical framework we showed that deeper inte­
gration within a regional trading bloc contracts the maximum size to which the regional 
policy-maker is willing to enlarge the bloc, while it boosts the demand of membership 
from third countries. Notably, we showed that the impact of deeper integration on the 
equilibrium size of a regional trading bloc depends on whether the supply-side or the 
demand-side of membership axe binding in the determination of the equilibrium size 
of the bloc.
We concluded that deeper integration among the members of a regional trading 
bloc might lead to wider integration when the demand-side for membership is binding 
in the determination of the equilibrium size of the bloc.
On the other hand, a process of deeper integration within a regional trading bloc 
will not affect the equilibrium size of the bloc when the supply-side of membership is 
binding in the determination of the equilibrium size of the bloc.
Second, this thesis contributed to the literature by formalising the incentives for a 
country to enter a regional trade agreement when a multilateral free trade agreement 
is available, and the implications of this choice on the country’s incentives to pursue 
multilateral trade liberalization.
Thus, in Chapter 3 we developed a theoretical model which depicted a regional 
trade agreement and a multilateral free trade agreement as alternative options of trade 
policy, and formalised a country’s choice between the two alternative trade agreements.
Assuming a political economic framework & la Grossman-Helpman (1994), our 
analysis pointed out that pro- and anti-regionalism forces operate, and the choice
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of the incumbent policy-maker is a political equilibrium that balances these opposing 
forces.
In this regard, we showed that industrial lobbying constitutes a pro-regionalism 
force in the policy-making process, while the higher level of net aggregate social welfare 
that could be achieved under the multilateral free trade agreement operates as an anti­
regionalism force.
Thus, we derived a condition which reflected the interaction between pro and anti- 
regionalism forces in the policy-making process, and under which the policy-maker 
prefers to enter a regional trade agreement rather than a multilateral free trade agree­
ment.
We concluded that the decision of entering a regional trade agreement rather than 
a multilateral free trade agreement is a choice of political economy driven by the 
policy-maker’s objective to maximize the political support it receives.
Furthermore, the analysis we developed in Chapter 3 pointed out the implications 
of a country’s initial choice of entering a regional trade agreement on its incentives to 
subsequently move toward multilateral trade liberalization.
In this regard we proved that in our theoretical framework where policy-maker 
balances the industrial interests and social welfare in choosing its trade policy, the 
choice of regionalism unambiguously undermines multilateral trade liberalisation.
Notably, our analysis indicated that when a country chooses to enter a regional 
trade agreement, further multilateral trade liberalization will no longer be pursued 
since the policy-maker will have no incentives to move from the status quo.
Third, this thesis contributed to the literature by providing a general equilibrium 
analysis of the trade implications of deeper integration within a regional trading bloc, 
and by assessing the impact of economic dissimilarities on the magnitude of the iden­
tified trade effects.
Thus, in Chapter 4 we developed a theoretical general equilibrium model which 
formalised the trade effects of the formation of a currency union among the members 
of a regional trading bloc, and of its subsequent enlargement toward an economically
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dissimilar accession country.
We built an intra-industry trade model in which economic dissimilarities across 
countries exist, and sharing a common currency affects the patterns of trade by elimi­
nating the transaction costs due to the use of different currencies, and by affecting the 
relative wage across countries.
The analysis we conducted in Chapter 4 pointed out that the formation of a cur­
rency union among the members of a regional trading bloc increases the volume of 
bilateral trade between members, and reduces the volume of bilateral trade between 
members and non-members.
In this regard, we emphasized that the formation of a currency union affects the 
patterns of trade of members and non-members by reducing intra-bloc transaction 
costs, and leading to a general equilibrium induced reduction in the relative wage in 
non-member countries.
Our analysis also proved that the enlargement of a currency union toward an eco­
nomically dissimilar country increases the volume of bilateral trade between the original 
members and the accession country, and reduces the volume of bilateral trade between 
the original members.
We emphasized that the enlargement of a currency union affects the patterns of 
trade of the original members and the accession country by reducing the extrarbloc 
transaction costs, and to a general equilibrium induced increase in the relative wage 
in the accession country.
Furthermore, the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 pointed out the implications of 
greater economic dissimilarities between the original members of a currency union and 
an accession country on the magnitude of the trade effects implied by the enlargement 
of the currency union.
Thus, simulating our theoretical model, we showed that the more economically 
dissimilar the accession country compared to the original members, the smaller the 
gains in the volume of bilateral trade between any member and the accession country 
fostered by the enlargement.
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